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Executive summary 
This thesis explores the role of and opportunities for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the context of 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) by investigating the case of Uganda and the CSO Uganda Debt 
Network (UDN). The thesis aims at filling an apparent gap in development research as existing studies 
have primarily focused on the role of CSOs in PRSP formulation and only to a limited extent looked at 
PRSP implementation. Taking departure in the assumption that PRSPs may promote an opening of political 
space and CSO influence in politics, the thesis aims at illuminate what role CSOs can play in promoting 
and securing accountability in PRSP implementation. The object of the study is the case Uganda Debt 
Network and their interventions in to selected districts in Uganda. 
 
The thesis is constructed around a research question in two parts: The first part of the research problem 
ask how the PRSP of Uganda, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) was implemented and what 
were the obstacles and opportunities for accountability and legitimacy in the case districts, and the second 
part of the research problem addresses how UDN interventions in PEAP implementation in the case 
districts have affected accountability and legitimacy of local government and UDN, and seeks to 
determine what factors where crucial for the outcomes. 
Theoretically, the thesis builds on two frameworks for analyzing the interaction between state and society 
and how legitimacy and accountability is generated: the governance and the patrimonial framework. The 
governance framework provides the ideal type theory, whereas the patrimonial framework is applied as a 
corrective mode of understanding civil society and state interaction. 
 
The answer to the first part of the question is divided into several parts. Firstly, it is demonstrated how the 
regime context, the legal provisions and the policy framework of PEAP (in providing formal mechanisms 
for participatory governance) affects the implementation of PEAP and the role of CSOs. In this 
perspective Uganda’s CSOs find themselves operating in difficult circumstances: on the one hand have 
formal access to the policy process at national and local level and avenues for participation as ascribed in 
legal texts; on the other hand the no-party regime character, the political control exercised through local 
councils and Registration Act, and the dependence of donors limit the opportunities for CSOs to 
participate in the policy process. 
 
Secondly, through the analysis of the implementation process of the PEAP in the two case districts, 
focusing on the capacities, incentives and intra-organizational relations observed among local actors, the 
thesis demonstrated that Bushenyi with relative high capacity and good intra-organizational relations was 
more successful than Tororo where political and ethnic strides along with low capacity resulted in a less 
successful implementation. In both districts it is observed how the different local government actors in 
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pursuing their interests take recurrence in dual patrimonial and governance norms and behaviour and that 
their behavior potentially lead to accountability failures.  
 
The analysis of the second part of the research question investigated how the intervention of UDN takes place in 
three arenas: planning, monitoring, and district dialogue meetings. Each of these arenas forms a distinctive 
political space with particular opportunities for UDN. 
The analysis shows that UDN has managed to reach some impact in their ambition to improve local 
government accountability and has thus made use of political space: operating monitoring groups have 
been established in both districts in up to 1/3 of the sub counties. The UDN groups have managed to 
create new spaces for interaction have been created in monitoring and in the so-called dialogue meetings 
at the sub county and district level in which decisions and observations of irregularities are raised. In this 
way, new channels for accountability have been developed. There also seem to be evidence that in some 
areas the monitoring activities have had an effect in improving accountability especially in regard to street 
level bureaucrats and at local levels in general. 
 
Several challenges and obstacles for UDN interventions to succeed are also revealed, however. 
UDN ambitions to influence the planning/budget process and sub county and district level have not been 
successful, and therefore no significant link between local budget and monitoring processes has been 
established among adherents. UDN is invited and participates in the annual budget meeting at the district, 
but does not provide any input to the process, neither do they track the overall budget allocations. 
In monitoring it remains a severe problem that UDN does not have access or capacity to analyze one of 
the most important areas of accountability; the tendering processes at district and sub county level. Both 
in monitoring and dialogue meetings UDN faces a struggle for legitimacy in that their status, their reporting, 
and their mandates risk being questioned by local government actors. 
 
Apart from governance factors such as capacity, resources and organizational relations, the study finds 
that other factors also influence the outcomes of UDN interventions. 
The political context in both districts proved to be a determining factor for the outcomes of UDN 
interventions. Organizational structure and capacity of local branches of UDN also proved very important, and the 
ability to engage in networks and create alliances was a further important factor. 
The study also demonstrated the very weak links between the application of political and administrative 
accountability standards, i.e. vote buying has become a common practice. 
 
Overall, there seem to be a fundamental disconnection between the descriptions and understandings of 
accountability in the district among the different actors. This disconnection reflects an apparent dual 
existence of governance and patrimonial norms and behaviour at one at the same time. The behaviour and 
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the strategies of both some of the local government actors and UDN actors cannot be explained using 
simply one paradigm, for which reason both frameworks serve to explain and understand the cases. 
The thesis thus argue on the basis of the case study that PRSP processes may provide new opportunities 
for CSOs to influence politics at the district level, but that the impact of CSOs interventions to a large 
extent depend on the capacity and benevolence of local governments, as well as the ability to build a 
strong organization that is not overwhelmed by patrimonial relations. 
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Chapter 1 Motivation, background and area of investigation 
 
1.1 Motivation 
This thesis is motivated by my interest in Civil Society Organizations (CSO) in developing countries and 
their potential role to contribute to the development of these countries. As an employee in the Danish 
CSO DanChurchAid I have encountered and discovered the practical and political complexities in the 
work of CSOs. Their role being highly contested, it is my ambition to achieve a more profound, critical, 
detailed and empirically based notion of how CSOs operate and what problems and achievements they 
meet in the context of new modalities of aid and in the context of the political challenges they face in 
developing countries. It is my specific interest in the context of PRSPs to disclose the obstacles and 
opportunities for CSOs to hold local government accountable empower the local population in requesting 
services as a right and not as a gift, and thus ultimately improving the opportunities for the poor and the 
marginalized. How do these prospects hold in the empirical contexts, and what are the factors 
determining whether CSOs collapse or are succesfull in their interventions? 
 
1.2. Background 
The introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) in the late 1990s is often perceived as 
introducing a new era in international development discourse (e.g. Porter and Craig 2003). PRSPs have 
become the main vehicle for national development and eradication of poverty in donor circles, and 
increasing number of countries are formulating PRSPs as part of new aid modalities. The concept of 
PRSP and the strategies that inform it apparently mark a real change in the understanding of development 
among key actors in the aid environment. 
 
The paradigms of rolling-back-the-state, structural adjustment, privatizing public service providers, and 
directly involving non-state actors in all sorts of services and projects, that dominated the 1980s and 
1990s, apparently reached an impasse, and was to some extent replaced by “putting back the state on the 
stage”, i.e. accepting the central role of state administration in development initiatives under the demands 
of good governance, applying new government-centered, centralized aid modalities such as sector wide 
approach and budget support, and reconfiguring the role of non-state actors (including CSOs) from 
service providers and direct implementers of social delivery to political actors and advocates on behalf of 
the poor and marginalized1.  
However, not only did governments in developing countries recapture their central role in implementing 
development policies and interventions, the objective of development strategies has also been adjusted 
from a general focus on economic growth toward the project of reducing poverty. According to the PRSP 
framework this objective can only be reached through the involvement of the poor and the marginalized 
                                                 
1 This change in priorities was most evident in the 1997 World Bank Development Report. 
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groups in the population during the planning and implementation of PRSP (e.g. World Bank Poverty 
Reduction Handbook, 2003). As this segment of the population rarely has the capacity or opportunities to 
participate in politics, the CSOs in most countries have acted as mediators between government, donors 
and the local population, apparently on behalf of the constituencies. 
  
The demand for national ownership of development policies within each country, prescribed by PRSP 
strategy, not only enabled increasing government control of policies, but also put emphasis on all 
stakeholders in a governance partnership model (including civil society, donors, government, and the 
private sector) (e.g. World Bank 2003).  
Thus, potentially, the introduction of PRSPs enables an enlargement of political space in developing countries 
and a consolidation of the role of CSOs as political actors and advocates on behalf of the poor and the 
marginalized. In this way they may contribute to improved governance to the benefit of the poor and 
marginalized, e.g. through advocacy, participation in sector working groups, and budget monitoring.  
 
On the other hand, while emphasizing country ownership and broad participation in the formulation of 
PRSPs, the PRSP framework also clearly endorse performance and objective indicators for poverty 
reduction, and substantially recreates and strengthen close donor-government ties. Therefore, one must 
ask how can CSOs employ the new context of governance provided by the PRSP to increase their 
influence on policies and decision making? 
 
CSOs in many developing countries have been involved in all stages of the PRSP process: formulation 
(mostly in the mode of consultation with government and donors), monitoring, and implementation (as 
service delivery agencies). In most research, however, a popular approach in terms of analyzing CSO roles 
and functions has been to investigate the policy processes unfolding on the central level around the 
formulation of the PRSP in developing countries (cf. Possing 2003, Nyamugasira 2002, Piron & Norton 
2004).  
To some extent this research has revealed that in a large number of countries CSO involvement and 
influence have increased as compared to pre-PRSP times (e.g. IMF 2004), although criticism has been 
raised that the participation of CSOs in PRSP processes often has only been symbolic (e.g. Gould & 
Ojanen 2003, Possing 2003). Considering the fact that pro-poor policies derived from the PRSP have now 
been operating for some years (the first PRSPs were introduced in 1997), it seems obvious to attempt to 
gain more knowledge on the politics of implementation of the PRSPs2.  Also as opposed to most studies 
                                                 
2 Grindle’s famous anthology (1980) on policy implementation in developing countries demonstrates the importance of the 
implementation process: “...In the Third World a large portion of individual and collective demand making, the representation of interests, and the 
emergence and resolution of conflict occurs at the output stage” (Grindle 1980:15).  
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investigating the central level of PRSP processes it seems obvious to undertake a localized approach. This 
approach moves beyond the policy level to understand the practices of politics3. 
 
1.3 Area of investigation 
This thesis takes its departure in the assumption that the introduction of PRSP in developing countries 
and the political and institutional practices surrounding PRSP has provided the formal basis for a new and 
growing political space4 in which CSOs are ascribed and may potentially take up a central role.  
Secondly, it is argued that the importance of the output stage5 in policy process in developing countries 
necessitates that the investigation focuses on the implementation processes at the local level. Based on 
these assumptions, the thesis aims at critically investigating the role of a selected CSO (Uganda Debt 
Network - UDN) in Uganda6 in the context of implementation of the PRSP/PEAP7 in two selected 
Ugandan districts. Thereby, the thesis will analyze the opportunities and crucial factors for CSOs to 
exploit the political space at the local level. 
 
The central dynamic in the new political space is the politics of poverty. By politics of poverty I refer to the 
political processes evolving from the introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers as key 
instruments in aid policy in developing countries8.   
Apart from the formal parts, the PRSP itself, and the institutions involved in producing it, two central 
categories within the politics of poverty are new resources and arenas for interaction that derives from the 
PRSP.  
Resources represent an important dynamic in politics of poverty as the approval of a PRSP releases 
substantial funds from the donor community as well as allocations from the national revenues toward the 
goal of eradicating poverty.  
The new arenas for interaction at local, regional and national level are two-folded: 1) the formal forums for 
policy making as prescribed in the PRSPs, and 2) the forums for policy interaction as prescribed in the 
national legal framework., 3) The new arenas initiated by CSOs (e.g. dialogue meetings, budget monitoring 
etc.).  
                                                 
3 There has been a few attempts to include a local analysis when analyzing the politics of PRSP implementation, e.g. Gould & 
Ojanenen: “Merging in The Circle – The Politics of Tanzania’s Poverty Reduction Strategy” (2003), but it only deals briefly with the 
implications for accountability and CSOs interventions at the local level. Other examples include Ellis & Bahigwa (2003) and 
Francis & James (2003), but none of these explicitly investigate the role of CSOs.  
4 Political space is here defined as: “moments in which interventions or event throw up new opportunities, reconfiguring 
relationships between actors within these spaces or bringing up new actors, and opening of possibilities for a shift in direction” 
(Brock et al. 2001 – IDS). 
5 The output stage is defined broadly as the implementation stage in the policy process as outlined in Grindle’s definition 
mentioned above. 
6 For in-depth discussion of case selection and detailed information on UDN see chapter 2. 
7 In Uganda the PRSP goes by the name of Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). 
8 I agree with Grindle (1980) on the importance to look at implementation processes in developing countries during which policy 
(here the PRSP) becomes politics in the struggle for influence and resources. Refer chapter 4.3 for a further discussion of this.  
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By providing resources and opening up of new arenas of interaction the PRSP framework potentially 
constitutes a political space in which CSOs may operate to influence the political process and seek to hold 
government accountable.  
 
Figure 1.1: Actors and relations in the implementation of PEAP (macro-level) 
 
 
In policy processes in developing countries CSOs are assumed (by donors) to operate with a specific 
rationale (e.g. World Bank 2003): 
- To act as a watchdog vis-à-vis the government seeking to secure accountability9 in policy formulation 
and implementation (e.g. monitoring10 the allocation and spending of resources) 
- To act as a catalyst in engaging with local governments and empowering the population to influence 
allocative decisions (advocacy via arenas of interaction, e.g. elections, meetings, budget conferences) 
- To remain a legitimate and accountable actor themselves through transparent and clear activism 
 
There is general agreement that one of the most important challenges in policy implementation in 
decentralized contexts in developing countries is the risk of elite capture of policies and the risk of 
accountability failures (e.g. failure in service delivery, corrupt tendering processes, lack of political 
accountability, corrupt practices among extension officers (health, education sector), etc.).  
                                                 
9 A rudimentary definition of accountability: “Accountability describes a relationship where A is accountable to B if A is oblige to 
explain and justify his actions to B, or if A may suffer sanctions if his conduct, or explanation for it, is found wanting by B” 
(Goetz & Jenkins, 2005:2). In chapter 4 an elaborate discussion and operationalization of the concept is provided. 
10 The role of CSOs in monitoring is specifically emphasized in World Bank PRSP Source Book 2001: “Non-governmental actors 
– research institutions, civil society organizations, special-interest and advocacy groups....- have an important role to play in the 
design of the monitoring and evaluation system, in actually carrying out monitoring, and in using the results” (World Bank, 
2001:37). 
Local District Governments in 
Uganda  
Donors: World Bank, IMF, Bilateral donors
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Uganda 
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The Government of Uganda
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Here, CSOs are promoted as catalysts of accountability through monitoring of different parts of 
government. Likewise, CSOs have been promoted as an extra-government actor that influences budget 
decisions on behalf of the poor and marginalized who are otherwise excluded from political arenas. The 
premise of these potential CSO roles are that increased CSO intervention leads to increased accountability in 
governance and potentially increased legitimacy of the government. 
However, although studies of CSOs are manifold, there does seem to be much systematic knowledge on 
what factors are crucial for CSO to succeed in these roles, and neither the complexity of promoting 
accountability in an African context has been sufficiently addressed. We shall investigate both of these 
ascribed roles in this study using the case of Uganda Debt Network (UDN)11.  
 
The second assumption (i.e. that the output stage is one of the most important arenas in the policy 
process in developing countries) prescribes that we must investigate the role of the CSOs in the context of 
implementation. Therefore, an analysis of CSO interventions in implementation also demands an analysis 
of the governance context of implementation. What resources and arenas of interaction are available at the 
district level and how are they employed by the local government and CSOs in planning, monitoring, and 
implementation of PRSP policies in local governments? 
Applying our premise outlined above we should expect that increased CSO intervention (here UDN) equals 
increased accountability in implementation specifically and in governance generally. 
 
The two assumptions raise new questions. How do the expectations to PRSP and involvement of CSOs 
correspond to realities observed on the ground in Ugandan districts? Do the PRSP processes actually 
enable the creation of a growing political space in terms of policy influence and empowerment of UDN? 
What strategies does UDN make use of to fulfill their interests and gain access to resources? And how do 
local government authorities react? These questions demand a critical analysis of the role of civil society 
organizations12 in the implementation process of the PRSP.  
 
Building on the investigation of the UDN interventions in PRSP implementation in two districts, it is the 
ambition of this thesis to throw new light on the connection between good governance and opportunities 
for UDN intervention, and analyze what factors produce a conducive respectively inhibiting environment 
for UDN interventions. It is thus the aim of this thesis through this case study to contribute to our overall 
knowledge on opportunities and weaknesses for CSOs to contribute to increased accountability and 
legitimacy of government in developing countries. 
 
                                                 
11 A detailed presentation of the organization follows in chapter 2. 
12 Recent studies (e.g. Lewis 2002:589, Comaroff & Comaroff 1999) also point to the lack of empirical studies on the actual role 
of civil society activity in Africa in general. It is expected that this thesis may provide another piece in the puzzle for establishing 
more “grounded” theory and knowledge beyond the vast literature of theoretical debates on the concept of civil society. 
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1.4 Research Question 
The above discussion of area of investigation leads to the following research question divided in two 
parts: 
1) How was PEAP implemented and what were the obstacles and opportunities for accountability 
and legitimacy in the case districts?  
2) How has UDN interventions in PEAP implementation affected accountability and legitimacy of 
local government and UDN in the case districts, and what were the crucial factors for the 
outcomes?  
 
Figure 1.2: Preliminary overview of actors and relations in the research project13 
 
 
The first part of the research question addresses the implementation process in the two districts. As argued 
above, the approach of this thesis is that in order to analyze and understand CSO interventions in 
governance it is necessary to analyze the context of the intervention, in this case the implementation 
process. The analysis of the implementation process reveals the general institutional structures, the actors 
and their interests, and the characteristics of the resources and arenas of interaction in the two districts. 
The analysis focuses on prospects for accountable governance and in particular on opportunities for 
intervention for UDN. Therefore, a thorough analysis is carried out on the accountability and legitimacy 
of local government as observed from the implementation process. Ultimately, we may develop an 
                                                 
13 The arrows in the figure indicate relations: citizens vote for politicians, and politicians are accountable to citizens, admin staff 
are responsible for service delivery to citizens, UDN interact with both political and administrative wings in local government, 
donors support and make demands on local government and UDN respectively, and UDN depend on citizens to carry out 
monitoring, but can only access this resource by delivering results.  
Politics of 
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District Government
Admin staff and 
technicians 
Politicians
Uganda Debt Network 
Donors 
District Citizens 
Accountability and 
legitimacy 
Accountability and 
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assumption about the opportunities and obstacles for UDN to achieve in their intervention in each of the 
two districts. 
 
The second part of the problem addresses interventions of UDN in the PEAP implementation process in the 
two districts, and investigates to what extent UDN interventions have affected accountability and 
legitimacy of local government and UDN. The analysis focuses on three important arenas of interaction: 
planning, monitoring and dialogue meetings & radio broadcasts. The analysis discusses the assumption developed 
from question 1, and gives an assessment of the adequacy of the assumption14. 
 
1.5 Clarification and limitations 
The thesis focuses on the meso level of governance in the districts. The vantage point is UDN, but with 
the focus on interaction between UDN and the local government institutions the latter are equally 
important actors. The thesis focuses on the formal interaction between the two actors in the 
implementation process of PEAP. As regard implementation, the focus is on process and prospects for 
accountability for which reason there is no ambition to analyze the policy impact for beneficiaries in the 
district. 
With the focus of interaction between the CSO and local government the question of representation of 
CSOs is not addressed with as well as the perspective on the national level which has been thoroughly 
dealt with in other works15. 
The concepts of accountability and legitimacy are discussed and operationalized in chapter 4.5 below.
                                                 
14 The analytical approach of the study is further developed in chapter 2.  
15 See for instance Brock et al 2002: Poverty Knowledge and policy processes: a case study of Ugandan national poverty policy, 
IDS Research report #53, 2002 and Hickey 2003: The Politics of Staying Poor in Uganda, Research Report, University of 
Manchester 
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Chapter 2 – Methodology and Analytical Approach 
In this chapter I present the analytical approach of the thesis and discuss the selection of case study 
approach applied. 
 
2.1 Analytical Approach  
Through my investigation of the two districts of Bushenyi and Tororo16 in Uganda, I intend to understand 
how Uganda Debt Network have made use of and operated within the new political space provided by the 
PRSP framework. 
I will answer the research question and the working questions through analysis of empirical data:  
interviews and observation of key actors at district level (Bushenyi and Tororo) in Uganda – that implies 
UDN, local government representatives, and UDN members at the local level. I will also make use of 
literature studies in the same line found in Ugandan universities and data compiled at the central level. The 
analysis of the empirical data will be guided by the theoretical framework that is developed in chapter 4. 
However, a brief introduction will serve to illuminate the approach chosen. 
 
The prescribed dynamics resources and arenas are operationalized in the following way: 
a) The contest about access to and influence on allocation of resources derived from the PRSP, and  
b) The impact of new institutional arrangements, i.e. arenas, deriving form the PRSP implementation, 
involving representatives from different actor levels17. 
 
The main focus in the study is on the role of UDN in the above described dynamics in terms of:   
1) Their opportunities and abilities to improve local government accountability through monitoring the spending 
of funds  
2) Their legitimacy vis-à-vis local government admin staff and politicians and their influence and monitoring 
of local decision-making and resource allocation, 
3) Their strategies in interacting with LG and seeking influence18. 
These three thematic categories form the analytical key points of this thesis. The analysis is thus 
empirically based, but the analysis is guided by the theoretical framework. The intervention of UDN aims 
at improving accountability in implementation and integrating poverty sensitive planning in the planning 
                                                 
16 The districts are described in detail in chapter 6 and in the strategy of analysis. 
17 Here, I specifically refer to task force groups (consisting of government, donors and CSOs) which are involved in the 
formulation process of national PRSPs: e.g. sector working groups, policy advisory groups. On the local level I refer to the Local 
Government Development Programme, the process of formulating the District Development Plans, Budget Conferences, and 
Poverty Action Fund Monitoring Groups. Apart from these formal forums one must include the arenas initiated by UDN: district 
dialogue meetings and radio broadcasts.    
18 The key concepts of accountability and legitimacy are discussed and their analytical potential is presented later in chapter 4. 
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processes. Thereby, the intervention exactly confronts the paradox between the governance framework 
and the patrimonial structures in African societies. 
 
The three categories above are derived from a governance framework which ascribes a transformational role 
to CSO19. These theories claim that CSOs as a third actor (apart from state and market) potentially play an 
important role in promoting democratic values and improving government accountability through their 
interaction with the state and citizens (e.g. Hyden 1992). Arenas are here undecided forums in which state 
and non-state actors engage. The crucial factors for implementation are capacity, adequate resources, and 
organizational relations.  
 
However, it is the assumption of this thesis that the governance framework is insufficient for analysing 
and understanding the politics of implementation and the role of CSOs in Africa in general and in Uganda 
in particular. Therefore, important thematic categories for analyzing the interaction between state and civil 
society derived from the patrimonial tradition have been included as a parallel explanative framework. In this 
framework the influence of CSOs on government institutions is highly doubtful, since these organizations 
most often cannot avoid to become indulged in patrimonial modes of governance that shape the arenas of 
interaction: clientelism, public office as a means to private gains of public funds, and personalization of 
power. These structures also affect the behaviour of each actor in that each actor strives to exploit the 
opportunities to access resources through the patrimonial relations. 
 
Eventually, the result of UDN intervention in PEAP implementation is affected and determined by the 
balancing of these two conflicting paradigms (please refer figure 2.1 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 This framework rests on the paradigm of “good governance” introduced by the World Bank in the 1989 Development Report 
(World Bank 1989). 
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Figure 2.1: Analytical framework 
 
 
The governance framework contains a number of basic assumptions about the relationship of CSO and 
state and about the criteria for effective implementation. The following assumptions explain the link from 
the theoretical perspective to our expectations of the outcome in the two cases: 
- Politics of poverty and the resources, rules and guidelines that follows from it affect CSOs and 
their strategies, preferences, and goals 
- Politics of poverty and the resources, rules and guidelines that follows from it challenges 
accountability and legitimacy of CSOs and local government and may open avenues for increased 
or decreased accountability and legitimacy 
- CSOs may enhance local government accountability  
- The governance framework of Uganda influences the implementation process 
- UDN is more likely to succeed in their interventions in the district with successful 
implementation of PEAP and overall high performance than in the district with implementation 
problems and overall low performance 
 
These assumptions are based on what a classical, liberal understanding of the role of civil society20 as 
developed in the governance framework. Any patrimonial tendencies observed in the districts may impede 
the coherence of these assumptions about the roles, behaviour of actors and the outcome of UDN 
intervention in PEAP implementation process. The causality of the analytical approach is outlined below: 
 
                                                 
20 For a discussion of the concept of civil society please refer chapter 4.1. 
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The PEAP is formulated at central level and governance modalities for resource allocation and arenas for 
interaction are decided. In the implementation process resources and new modes of governance (arenas) 
are transferred to the districts in Uganda. This is the independent variable of the investigation as described 
above. 
 
The explanatory variables are derived from our theoretical assumptions in governance21. In this paradigm the 
crucial factors for implementation are the capacity of staff and politicians, the availability of resources, and 
the organizational relations (including internal). 
The capacity of staff and politicians could increase the opportunities for successful, accountable 
implementation of PEAP and for UDN intervention to succeed since we assume that local government 
institutions will be well-functioning, access to information is secured, and willingness to cooperate with 
CSO is high.  
If resources at the disposal of local government are adequate we must assume that implementation of PEAP 
is likely to succeed since programmes are sufficiently financed, and incentives among government staff to 
distort implementation through appropriation of government funds will be less likely. 
Organizational relations may impede policy implementation and opportunities for UDN intervention if 
internal conflicts and disagreements hamper the work of local government, whereas good relations 
increase opportunities for PEAP implementation and for UDN intervention to succeed since UDN can 
interact with one, stable actor not risking to become part of internal power struggles. 
Ultimately, by applying this framework of assumptions derived from the governance approach, our 
analyses shall be able to determine the factors for UDN interventions (the dependent variable).  
 
Figure 2.2: Analytical perspective – Research question 
 
 
Throughout the analyses, as mentioned above, the patrimonial framework is applied as an alternative, 
critical mode of understanding the behaviour of and the interaction between the actors in the district. It is 
thus applied as critical correction of the governance framework. 
                                                 
21 This procedure of deriving explanatory variables from theory is a basic measure in constructing social enquiry (e.g. King et al. 
1994: 77ff).  
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The research question is analyzed as two separate units, the second building on the answer of the first. 
Firstly, the implementation process and the context of implementation is described and analyzed22. This 
analysis provides an overall understanding of the roles of different actors, the access to resources and the 
arenas of interaction in implementation of PEAP. On the basis of the analysis, an assumption about the 
opportunities and obstacles for UDN to achieve in their intervention in each of the two districts is 
developed. 
Secondly, the interventions of UDN and local government as reflected in the implementation process are 
analyzed. The analysis focuses on three important arenas of interaction: planning, monitoring and dialogue 
meetings & radio broadcasts. The analysis discusses the assumption developed from question 1, and gives an 
assessment of the adequacy of the assumption  
Finally, the findings of this analysis are summarized and gathered, and subsequently perspectives from the 
study are discussed. 
 
2.2 Case Selection Considerations 
In this section I will briefly discuss considerations for the selection of cases in this thesis in terms of the 
country, the organization, and the case study approach.  
 
2.2.1 Why Uganda? 
Uganda to large extent enjoys a prominent position in East Africa among key donors. Throughout the 
90’s the country has experienced a constant economic growth and a certain degree of political stability 
compared to the turbulent post-colonial decades (e.g. Reinikka & Collier 2001:453f). Already in 1997, 
preceding pro-poor initiatives from IFIs, Uganda introduced its own Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
(PEAP) through Poverty Action Fund, earmarking funds for poverty reduction initiatives.  
Uganda was also accepted for the HIPC initiative23 and a PRSP was developed from the existing PEAP. 
Adding to this, Uganda has implemented a range of governance reforms: an extended decentralization, 
large public sector reforms, and establishing “checks-and-balances” institutions24. The particular political 
Movement-system or democracy of Uganda, however, creates a somewhat tense political environment for 
CSO maneuvers and mobility. With no official, legal political opposition CSOs risk to become politicized 
and under threat of government accusations that they are partisan and against the state. 
 
                                                 
22 Due to the data available and the focus of this study on the role of UDN, the analysis of the implementation process remains 
on an overall level and doesn’t deal in detail with specific policies in the PEAP, but look at policy areas where UDN interventions 
have appeared. 
23 In 1999 IMF and WB decided to give exemptions on loans and favorable conditions for new loans to developing countries if 
the countries developed a coherent plan on how to combat poverty, i.e. a Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan. 
24 E.g. Inspectorate General of Government (IGG), the Auditor General (AG) and Directorate of Ethics and Integrity (DEI). 
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Uganda also appears to be exceptional in terms of the apparent participatory character of the poverty 
policy process. The establishment of the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP) that 
aims at improving the understanding of poverty and the development of poverty indicators is an example 
of this unique development (UPPAP 2000). CSO actors have, formally, been increasingly involved in the 
PRSP process and in comparison with other countries have enjoyed a more influential role, although the 
political climate of Uganda remains a challenge for such organizations as Uganda move to multi-party 
politics.  
In terms of implementation results, Uganda has succeeded in reducing the number of people living in 
absolute poverty from 56% to 35% from 1996 to 2002, but this number has been rising in recent years. 
The number also does not reveal the massive regional differences within the country (UNDP 2000). 
 
The Ugandan case thus represents a most interesting and relevant case representing specific political 
dynamics (decentralization reforms), apparent successful poverty reduction policies, and one-party 
political system. A critical investigation of a concrete implementation process in a specific region makes it 
possible to assess the role of CSOs in the implementation of PRSP in a local context as well as the 
relationship between local government and CSOs25 in this policy process. 
 
2.2.2 Uganda Debt Network 
To specify the state-civil society relation perspective, Uganda Debt Network (UDN) and has been elected. 
UDN is a DANIDA partner within the Human Rights and Democratization Programme in Uganda. 
Uganda Debt Network is an umbrella organization consisting of more than 100 CSO-members that is 
working to advocate for pro-poor policies in Uganda.  
The organization was established in 1996 and has been involved in major policy processes, including 
PRSP-planning, the revision of the PRSP in 2000, debt relief campaign, and PEAP monitoring and budget 
processes. However, two activities at the local level are of interest in this thesis: the Budget Advocacy 
Initiative (BAI) and the Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation System (CBMES). Both initiatives 
aim at empowering communities at district level to influence the budget processes, and creating 
mechanisms and groups to monitor the use of the Poverty Action Fund26. 
 
Through BAI, participating organizations receive capacity-building skills and information on budgetary 
processes to develop advocacy areas and lobbying strategies.  For example, BAI has organized radio talk 
                                                 
25 As UDN activities are not sector based it has been decided to look at different policies that affects communities within the PRS 
framework instead of focusing on one specific sector or policy. 
26 The Poverty Action Fund is a ring-fenced fund that was set up as part of the PEAP in 1997. The PAF derives partly from funds 
generated by the HIPC initiative and donor funds, partly from allocations from GoU annual budgets, and is part of the national 
budget. Funds are earmarked directly to poverty reduction, i.e. in this case primary education, health, water and sanitation, 
agriculture, and rural roads PAF funds are mainly transferred as conditional grants to local governments. In 2003/04 PAF took 
up 35% of GoU budget. (GoU PEAP 2004:201). 
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shows and introductory budget workshops; written and disseminated budget briefs; and monitored the 
government’s use of Poverty Action Fund resources for elementary education, primary health care, water 
and sanitation, road maintenance, and agricultural extension 
 
Apart from the Budget Advocacy Initiative Uganda Debt Network has also facilitated the formation of 
Poverty Action Fund Monitoring Committees in 17 different districts through the so-called Community 
Based Monitoring and Evaluation System (CBMES). These committees are monitoring the allocation and 
spending of the Poverty Actions Fund on the district, sub-county, and village level. The committees are 
composed of volunteers that are elected by the communities27.  
 
The two initiatives BAI and CBMES will provide the practical activity focus for understanding the 
dynamics of UDN vis-à-vis the local government and the constituencies. The two types of initiatives will 
also inform the position from which to observe the implementation of PRSP, i.e. influencing the budget 
process and monitoring the spending of PAF funds (enforcing accountability). 
 
2.2.3. The case study approach 
This thesis is a framed as a case study, and therefore it is necessary to briefly discuss the details of the case 
study approach employed here. 
As discussed in the introduction, there appears to be a lacuna in regard to studies investigating the role of 
CSOs in the implementation of PRSPs at local levels promoting accountability. Therefore, an explorative 
case study is a relevant research strategy because one of the ambitions of this thesis is to contribute to our 
empirical knowledge on the perspectives for CSOs to become involved in PRSP and related political 
processes in developing countries. However, the explorative approach does not depart from a theoretical 
tabula rasa. The investigation of the cases is guided by a theoretical framework applied in the multiple case 
studies28. The case study approach is very relevant to the research objective in this study as “the 
quintessesntial characteristic of case studies is that they strive towards a holistic understanding of cultural systems of action”. 
(Yin 1994). 
 
As the focus of the study remains at the meso level, a multiple case study will be applied using two districts as 
case material. The cases are selected as two extreme cases – one that is seemingly performing well in terms 
of PEAP implementation and reaching stated targets, and one that is “poor performing”. Through the use 
of a replication logic (using the same framework to analyze two situations) the analysis will gain from the 
                                                 
27 A detailed description of the organizational characteristics of UDN and the CBMES initiative is found in chapter 5. 
28 Theory plays a crucial role in case studies as theories assist in developing assumptions about our research questions and guide 
our data collection process (Yin 1994:5-6).  
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reference framework of the two cases29. The multiple case study aims at generalizing results on the basis of 
theory, not on the basis of the number of cases sampled (cf. Yin 1994, Flyvbjerg 1991). The two extreme 
cases are investigated on the basis of an assumption developed from the theoretical framework. This 
framework also guide the development of question guide applied in the field work. 
 
Basis of analysis 
One the one hand, the theoretical framework will provide a number of propositions regarding what could 
be expected from the implementation process. The analysis will be guided by these assumptions and will 
address them in the light of the collected data in the two cases. 
On the other hand, the study will not exclusively make use of a deductive approach, but rather on the 
basis of a localized approach that remain focused on the particularities and special issues relating to the 
selected cases and the Ugandan context as such.   
Thus, the analysis reflects the dynamics of an inductive-deductive “double” approach that is realistically 
the only viable in qualitative social research studies. However, as the theoretical frameworke has 
constructed the questions applied in the field work and the institutions selected, one may argue that a the 
approach is more deductive than inductive.  
 
Criteria for selection of case districts 
The following criteria were applied in selecting the case districts:  
1) The performance of PEAP implementation of the district on a national scale (high respectively low),  2) 
the presence of UDN CBMES and BAI initiatives in the district30, and  
3) The existence of other studies of local government and CSO relations had been completed in the same 
districts31.  
Out of the sample districts that were elected a final election was made by taking into consideration 
geographical location, the mode of production, and economic growth. Furthermore, the district election 
also was dependent on UDN approval, but they did not interfere in the election process. 
 
Units of analysis 
Following the meso-level approach of the study the main units of analysis are the strategies and actions of 
UDN and the local governments of Bushenyi and Tororo. The main focus is UDN. However, within each 
actor level different actors can be found and there may be conflicts or disagreements between one or 
more actors both within each actor level and between them. 
                                                 
29 The replication logic does not imply a positivist approach to the cases, but simply that the use more of the same framework of 
analysis provides a focused understanding of the two districts.  
30 CBMES implementation take place in 17 districts in total (Interview, UDN Officer) – although this number has been reduced 
in recent years. 
31 This criterion was chosen to enable additional data material for the analysis apart from the material collected by the author. 
 
 
Chapter 2 – Methodology and Analytical Approach 
 
 23
The strategies and actions of the two actors are analyzed by investigating: a) concrete interactions, i.e. 
meetings, conferences, and other activities with LG and UDN, b) formal documents and guidelines at 
organizational level, both with LG, UDN and central government and donor institutions, c) quantitative 
material such as budget overview, statistics, economic key figures from districts, d) interviews with 
representatives from the 3 stakeholder levels, e) secondary literature on the subject in general and on the 
districts specifically. 
It is obvious that analyzing the actions and strategies of the two principle actors demands an amount of 
interpretation given that the data material in this thesis is based on interviews, observation, secondary 
sources such as literature and reports. The strategies and actions of the actors cannot be directly measured 
as such, so the data goes through a process of interpretation according to the theoretical framework. 
 
Criteria for interpreting/analyzing the findings: 
The criteria are based on firstly, the variables described above, secondly, on the propositions/concepts 
inferred from the theoretical framework. As stated, if/when data and findings “move beyond” the 
theoretical propositions this will also be reflected in the analysis. 
 
2.2.4 Empirical basis - Data 
The empirical basis of the analysis consists of documentation provided in Denmark as well as Uganda, 
interviews with key stakeholders in the districts and at the central level32. Primary data includes interviews 
with government and UDN stakeholders, donors, and other CSOs, observation, participant observation. 
Secondary data include government meeting minutes from LG meetings, evaluations, performance audits, 
government assessments, UDN documents, etc. 
                                                 
32 Please refer chapter 3 for a thorough discussion of methods in the field research. 
 
 
Chapter 3 - Field Research 
 24
 
Chapter 3 - Field Research 
 
This chapter provides an account of the methods selected in the data collection process. The case 
selection process has already been briefly described above, so this section contains a more detailed 
discussion of the methods used for data collection during the field work in Uganda.  
 
3.1 Background 
The background for selecting Uganda as a case country has been outlined above. Uganda Debt Network 
was selected as a case CSO on the basis of literature study of the PRSP process in Uganda and discussions 
with informants at research institutions in Denmark and Uganda as well as with DANIDA representatives 
in Uganda. From the very beginning, it was decided that a field trip to collect data for the analysis was to 
be undertaken. 
 
In Uganda, the selection of sub counties was made upon arrival in the district. The criteria for selecting 
sub counties were the following: 
1) that UDN had on-going monitoring and budget advocacy activities in the sub county, 2) that UDN had 
been present for at least one year, and 3) geographical location – one sub county rather close to the 
district capital and one sub county distant from the district capital. 
These criteria were applied to make sure that an assessment of the local branches of UDN could be 
undertaken, and secondly, that any bias in terms of rural vs. urban-affected settings was diminished. 
 
As will appear in chapter 4 several theories are applied in this thesis. The theories provide a number of 
different insights which are used to raise questions and construct the thematic categories for the analysis.  
 
The investigations in this thesis seek to disclose the behaviour and interaction of CSO and local 
government actors in the governance of PEAP at the district level in Uganda. The premise for 
understanding this question is that the actual behaviour as such is not directly observable and possible to 
discern, but instead only recognizable in statements of actors involved, observations, and written 
materials. Through the process of interpretation based on theoretical insights, these statements can be 
discerned and analyzed.  
 
Observation is theory dependent. In line with this, the point of departure of this thesis is epistemological 
perspectivism to the extent that behaviour and interaction cannot be directly discerned, but it is also 
hypothetic-deductive in applying a hypothesis to inform the analysis. The ideal type theory of governance 
is applied in analysis of the field material, but the patrimonial framework is used as a corrective. Instead of 
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manipulating data interpretation, the different onthologies of these theories enables access to the different 
type of behaviour and logic among the actors. Eventually, the data collected may raise new questions 
regarding the validity and coverage of the theories. 
 
3.2 Choice of Methods for Data Collection 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the role of UDN in implementation of Uganda’s PEAP in two 
cases at the district level. Discerning this objective we realize that the aim is to understand and possible 
explain the behavior of and interaction between (and within) organizations and ultimately the outcome of 
UDN interventions in PEAP implementation process. Studying intra-organizational and inter-
organizational relations it is necessary to access data on the behaviour of individuals.  Therefore, 
qualitative data appears to be the most important source of data to be gathered.  
 
The field work was carried out in a 6 weeks period in February-March 2005. During these six weeks there 
were stays in the two districts as well as interviews in Kampala33. 
Interviews are one of the key methods in case studies (Yin 1994).  As Steinar Kvale argues, “interviews are 
particularly suited for studying people’s understanding of the meanings in their lived world, describing their experiences and 
self-understanding and clarifying and elaborating their own perspective on their lived world” (Kvale 1996:105). By 
definition, semi structured interviews enable some flexibility in following leads from the respondent, but 
at the same time allows for comparisons with other interviews34.  
 
Therefore, it was decided to apply this method, and semi structured interviews were thus undertaken with 
all stakeholders in the data collection process. Semi structured interviews provided information on 
stakeholders’ perception on policy implementation and on relations with other stakeholders at the district 
and national level. As such semi structured interviews cannot be used to quantify replies and draw 
conclusions, but give an in-depth understanding of how stakeholders perceive the interaction between 
UDN and local government. 
 
Apart from semi structured interviews focus group interviews were also carried out with UDN’s Poverty 
Monitoring Committees at the district and sub county level. Focus group interviews is defined as a 
“…research method that produces data via the group interaction regarding a subject divided by the researcher” (Halkier 
2002:11). This method has the advantage of promoting the interaction between members of the group 
and thus inspiring the discussion, revealing internal disagreements, and providing a forum for dialogue in 
contrast to individual interviews.  
                                                 
33 Please refer annex A for a complete overview of the field work. 
34 E.g. Casley & Kumar: ”...the information from various respondents is comparable enough to determine the simple frequency of 
responses, although the main emphasis will continue to be placed on the in-depth understanding provided by the respondents 
(1988:14).  
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Another advantage is the fact that the method provides quick access to large pools of data. Statements can 
be validated in that the involved persons often negotiate contradicting statements or at least give 
arguments for their opinions. However, focus group interviews may also risk being captured by a 
dominating participant who sets the course of the replies, and indirectly makes the other participants 
comply. Another potential problem with this type on interview is the risk that some of the participants 
remain silent because they are not confident to speak out in the presence of the other participants.  
 
Furthermore, with the aim of understanding behaviour and interaction of organizations observation has 
been applied as a crucial method. Observational evidence is often useful in providing additional 
information about the topic to be studied (Yin 1994:87), and not least as an important corrective to 
interviews.  
As Kvale also argue, “the observations of field studies will usually give more valid knowledge than merely asking subjects 
about their behavior” (Kvale 1996:104). In this study meetings in local government and dialogue meetings 
between local government staff and UDN were observed. Adding to this, observation of physical 
structures in government and UDN buildings, the display of information in public places, and the general 
context of the working groups provided important additional insights relation to the research question. 
 
Participant observation was also employed during the field work. By participating and interacting with 
UDN members in two radio programmes at the district level important features regarding the dynamic 
and the approach of discussing sensitive, political issues were revealed, and at the same time my role as a 
guest may also potentially have biased the course of events   
 
Apart from interviews and observation the use of government, donor and CSO reports, research articles, 
evaluations, statistics, and newspapers all provided indispensable information to the field work. Among 
these reports and articles were qualitative-based studies and quantitative surveys as well as genuine 
statistics.  
In the data collection I thus primarily, according to the character of the research question, made use of 
qualitative methods, but using secondary reports with data collected with quantitative methods. By using 
different types of interviews as well as observation and analysis of written material methodological 
triangulation has been ensured.  
 
When dealing with interviews one always has to consider how to avoid bias in the answers form 
respondents. This apply in particular in the theme of this thesis in which strategic answers to present the 
institution that you represent in the best possible light could affect the replies to the questions. In order to 
avoid this data triangulation is an important measure that can lead to much more valid inferences and data. 
Data triangulation has been considered and constructed as different types of data has been applied and 
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analyzed: e.g. interviews, observation, government reports, and CSO reports. In applying triangulation 
measures the quality and relevance of field data is secured: “[the field data is, red] likely to be much more 
convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of information, following a corroborative mode” (Yin 
1994:92). 
The applied methodology along with the triangulation applied in terms of both methods and data helps to 
ensure the validity and reliability of the findings in this thesis.  
 
3.3 Interviews and observation 
A total of 60 interviews were conducted throughout the field period35. The majority of the interviews were 
conducted with UDN staff and UDN members at the district level and with local government staff. These 
interviews were key interviews that provided the bulk of data used in the analyses. At the district level 
CSOs and private sector representatives were also interviewed were possible. 
 
The majority of these interviews were conducted as individual semi structured interviews. In interviews 
with PMC groups at the sub county level and in interviews with Paya and Mukuju sub county staff focus 
group interviews were applied. 
Interviews were also conducted with important stakeholders at the central level. Among these were 
donors, central government stakeholders, and national CSOs. The information generated from the 
interviews with central government staff and government institutions  served to put a wider perspective 
on the district level analysis by giving accounts of the implementation process of PEAP as well as the 
central-local relations between government institutions. The information generated from donor and CSO 
interviews served to throw light on the role of donors vis-à-vis Ugandan CSOs and also provided 
assessments of PEAP implementation and the role of CSO herein. 
 
The selection of informants was twofold. At the central level, UDN provided me with a number of 
contacts in ministries, donors, and CSOs. This gave me unparalleled opportunities to directly access key 
figures in these institutions. The risk of bias in the selection, conducted by UDN, was not confirmed 
during interviews were informants were not reluctant to criticize or question arguments and directions of 
UDN. The interviews were useful both as expert interviews providing insights in the PEAP 
implementation process, but also as more subjective assessments on the role of CSOs in general and 
UDN in particular in this process. 
 
At the district level the selection of informants in local government was carried out independently. I took 
contact to the relevant persons through the aid of the PMC leaders and tried to arrange interviews. Due to 
temporary absence of staff, however, it was not possible to meet with exactly the same persons in each 
                                                 
35 Refer annex B for a full list of informants and interviews conducted. 
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district, but overall informants from both political and administrative wing were interviewed. At the sub 
county level appointments were made before-hand with sub county staff and councilors. Interviews were 
conducted individually as well as in groups depending on the setting and the time constraints. 
 
UDN staff was interviewed individually at the central level. The PMCs were interviewed individually as 
well as in group interviews. Group interviews were useful to reveal different examples of the work from 
different places, the achievements and the obstacles. Group interviews, however, sometimes demonstrated 
the hierarchies and power relations between members within the group (both with UDN and local 
government). Therefore, in some cases only a few informants were actually active. However, this problem 
was countered by posing questions directly to the “silent” participants36. 
 
The interview guides were developed according to the analytical framework and in accordance with the 
position of the informant37. For instance, at local government, sector responsible councilors and officers 
were enquired about implementation on their particular sector along with the more general questions in 
regard to their administrative/political role. 
In interviews with UDN adherents in PMCs at district and sub county level themes of interviews were 
structured around the ambition to understand the concrete monitoring work carried out as well as the 
relations with government staff and politicians at both levels. In both interview forms I combined the 
fundamental questions with direct use of comments from relevant reports, thereby providing further 
empirically based critical enquiries to informants38. 
 
One potential bias in the data collected through interviews could be the problem of the role of the 
researcher. Although I introduced myself as a researcher and emphasized that this was my only role, the 
fact that I was indirectly related to UDN and came from Denmark made several informants believe that I 
was a representative of the donors. Indeed, in some cases I was kindly asked to return to Denmark and 
UDN and hand over the comments and requirements of the PMC interviewed. Although this definitely 
may have influenced the replies of the informants and made them consider their “strategy”, it is doubtful 
whether it had any real impact39. 
 
                                                 
36 In PMCs the women were often rather reluctant to speak out. At the sub county level the internal hierarchy between staff 
embers was evidently exposed. 
37 Examples of the interview guides applied are found in annex C.  
38 This strategy was particularly relevant in regard to those among local government staff who were somewhat reluctant to discuss 
more openly.  
39 An example of this is that although the request for an increase in resources to the PMCs was articulated among many of the 
informants, they were not in any way reluctant to criticize and question UDN. 
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The majority of interviews were recorded on tape40. Key interviews were transcribed whereas background 
interviews were listened to and noted on a more overall basis41.  The data was organized and analyzed 
according to the themes outlined in the analytical framework. 
The observation of meetings at local government and participant observation of two UDN radio 
programmes gave me the opportunity to experience the actors in interaction and thus provided and 
important alternative perspective on the data collected. Unfortunately, there was no opportunity to 
participate in a dialogue meeting between UDN and local government during the field work, but video 
recordings of recent meetings in both districts were available and were used as secondary data material.  
 
3.4 Reports and written material 
Government reports and publications, CSO reports, evaluations, donor reports, Ugandan acts and policy 
documents constituted a third important type of data in the analysis: secondary, written material. These 
documents were applied as reference and background material and as control mechanisms of the 
inferences made from interviews and observations in the district. With the time and resource constraints 
of being one person conducting the field work, this material formed invaluable data, both in terms of 
PEAP implementation, the case districts, and role of UDN.  
 
The methodology applied in the field work has been presented and discussed. The research objective has 
guided the selection of methods, and the analytical framework has directed the development of interview 
guides and questions. Observation and secondary documentation has been applied as important methods 
of data collection. Triangulation of information and methods has thus been ensured. 
 
We may now move on to the refinement of the analytical framework. 
                                                 
40 A technical problem was the difficulty of using tape recorder in outdoor circumstances where some of the 
interviews took place. However, meticulous notes were recorded at these occasions either by myself or by an 
assistant. This ensured that data was properly recorded. 
41 Tape recordings of all interviews as well as transcriptions of key interviews can be acquired on request. 
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Chapter 4 - Theoretical framework 
In this chapter I develop a theoretical framework through which the research question can be analyzed.  
The selection of relevant theory is guided by the ambition on how to analyze the role of a CSO in a 
developing country, the struggle for resources and the use of arenas. As outlined above, I do not aim at 
analyzing policy outcomes, but understanding the politics in the process of implementation of PEAP (cf. 
Grindle 1980). 
 
In order for us to analyze and possibly explain the implementation process and the role of UDN in the 
two case districts we shall need to apply theories that increase our understanding of state and civil society. 
Our particular focus will according to the research problem be on how these actors establish and maintain 
their legitimacy, and how accountability is constituted. 
We need to define how state and not-state actors interact in arenas and decide about resources and how 
accountability and legitimacy is constituted in this interaction. Following this we develop a theoretical position 
on how the arenas are constituted and we need to define which parameters are crucial for the outcomes of 
CSO intervention in governance. As the subject of the thesis is in particular looking at the implementation 
process of the PEAP in Uganda, elements from implementation theory are applied to establish relevant 
categories for analyzing the implementation process. 
Eventually, a thorough discussion of accountability and legitimacy and analytical categories for analyzing 
them are established at the end of the chapter where the different elements of theory are joined. 
  
As outlined above, this thesis claims that in order to explain and understand the outcome of CSO 
interventions in the PEAP implementation process in Ugandan districts it is necessary to apply insights 
and concepts from two different paradigms: the patrimonial and the governance paradigm. In the 
following we shall outline the background, content and the use of these two frameworks in the analysis. 
 
4.1 The state and civil society 
Analyzing the role of Uganda Debt Network in Ugandan poverty politics raises a number of fundamental 
questions about how to define and apply the concept of civil society. It also necessitates an understanding 
of how civil society organizations relate to the state and vice versa, and specifically what constitutes crucial 
indicators for successful CSO interventions. Eventually, civil society organizations cannot be analyzed 
without understanding the role of donors who often provide the financial input into these organizations. 
In this section the concept and analytical application of the concept if civil society is firstly discussed. 
Following this, as the state is our second actor and as the arenas of interaction are shaped in context of 
the state, we shall investigate the avenues for analyzing the state in Africa.  
 
 
 
Chapter 4 - Theoretical framework 
 31
4.1.1. Civil society in developing countries 
Civil society has been an important part of development discourse since the late 1980s and the early 
1990s. Initially part of a grassroots’ often left wing critique, the concept of civil society has been embraced 
by the entire development community and become inherent in mainstream development discourse. 
However, the concept is entrenched in different political positions. 
 
Firstly, it is extremely important to distinguish the analytical use of civil society from the 
normative/prescriptive use of the concept. This is one of the most enduring and problematic 
characteristics of the use and abuse of the concept of civil society. The concept has been applied with 
widely different implications by political thinkers ranging from Hegel, over Marx, Gramsci, de Tocqueville 
and even Vaclav Havel (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1999:5, Howell & Pearce 2001). For de Tocqueville, 
civil society is a defensive counterbalance to the increased capabilities of the modern state that interacts 
constructively with the state, not to subvert it, but to improve and refine its actions and improve its 
efficiency (Whaites in Edwards 2000:127, citing de Tocqueville 1835: Democracy in America). In this view 
civil society groups coalesce not over primordial attachments (ethnicity, religion, etc.), but over specific 
issues, such as the anti-slavery movements. For Gramsci, civil society constitutes the contested terrain 
outside the state and economic forces in society over which the state and other actors seek to secure 
legitimacy for their political, social, and economic projects (e.g. Hickey 2003:28). Civil society thus does 
not carry specific agendas or values, but is an arena itself, an institution which is ascribed different values 
and roles on the basis of different agendas. 
 
 “Civil society” as such is thus not related to a specific theory or a line of causal relations. However, in 
development thinking two broad lines of applying the concept can be outlined: the “mainstream” is 
related among others to the World Bank in line with the good governance agenda, and the alternative 
related to CSOs and more explicitly political organizations (Howell & Pearce 2001:33).  
 
Civil society in the mainstream variant is inspired by Robert Putnam’s study of civic associations in Italy 
and his concept of social capital42 (Putnam 1993). Putnam asserted that CS is composed of horizontal 
groups which cross-cut vertical common causes, ties of kinship and patronage (Putnam 1993:54). CS is 
part of a triad model in which state and market are the other institutions. The basic claim of Putnam and 
the (expanding) “social capital” literature is that civil society organizations (or as Putnam phrases it: civic 
organizations) foster democratic development by creating social capital which promotes democracy and 
economic development.  Social capital strengthens trust and cooperation and thus sustains the 
                                                 
42 Social capital is defined as “…features of social organization, such as trust, norms (of reciprocity), and networks than can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam 1993:167).  
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opportunities for development43. In this line of thinking, which has been advanced by the World Bank, 
civil society may be a watch guard vis-à-vis the state in that it possesses the capacity to put pressure on the 
state and promote freedom and democracy.  
 
This mainstream understanding of civil society is closely related to the good governance agenda that was 
introduced in the early 1990s, with the first indication of the shift in the 1989 World Bank report “Sub-
Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth” (World Bank 1989). The successes in Eastern Europe 
and a strong disillusion with non-performing African states made donors shifted their emphasis from 
states to CSOs as a more legitimate and less corrupt development partner.  
Civil society is part of the triangle state-market-civil society in that it has the role simultaneously to 
improve the governance of the state by promoting values of accountability, transparency, and efficiency in 
service delivery (e.g. Hyden 1992:15f, Abrahamsen 2000:50f, Howell and Pearce 2001:30). At this stage 
most CSOs were directly involved in service delivery and in many African states these organizations took 
over large part of the responsibility of different sectors (e.g. Pearce 2000). 
 
In the last part of the 1990s donors changed the focus and reinstalled the state as the central partner in 
achieving development44 and introduced new modalities of aid, the budget support, Sector Wide 
Approach, and the PRSPs to enable better coordination of policies and more efficiency. CSOs in this 
paradigm are ascribed a role as co-partners in formulating policies and representing the poor. However, 
the overall thinking is the same: CSOs are organizations are separate from the state and are expected to 
check the power of the state through participation in policy formulation and monitoring of policy 
implementation. In this way CSOs are thought act as a legitimate actor that holds the government 
accountable and enable opportunities for citizen participation. 
 
The alternative variant of CS on the other hand ascribe an anti-capitalist and emancipatory, revolutionary 
role to CS (i.e. Chambers 1983, Friedmann 1991). CS is part of a power struggle promoting and 
empowering the public to influence and enhance democracy against what is seen as “enemies of the 
people” (be they government, ruling elites, donors, military, industries, etc.). In this model political 
struggle is key to development – technical adjustments in policies will not lead to change (Howell and 
Pearce 2001:32). This alternative variant thus builds on a Gramscian focus on civil society as providing 
institutional channels for challenging the ruling ideologies and the hegemony of dominating elites (Howell 
and Pearce 2001:34).  
                                                 
43 There is a significant degree of resemblance between Putnam and Tocqueville understanding of civil society as a counterbalance 
to the capabilities of the modern state. The Toquevillean CS provides a realm in which society interacts constructively with the 
state, not to subvert it, but to refine its actions and improve its efficiency (Whaites:127 in Pearce 2000). 
44 This was to some the extent a reaction to the lack of results of the Structural Adjustments Programmes that focused on 
reducing state involvement in service delivery through privatization and liberalization of public sector activities (e.g. Martinussen 
and Engberg-Pedersen 1999:79ff) 
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In contrast to the mainstream variant, the alternative approach also asserts the importance of inequality 
and social differentiation in society, and thus the importance of civil society as a conflictous arena, as well 
as the importance of the autonomy of civil society organizations to formulate their own political visions. 
 
The two models described very precisely characterize some of the difficulties of an analytical application 
of the concept of civil society. This implies e.g.: The problem about matching existing institutions with 
ideals (normative versus realist), CS as a universalized and not contextualized concept, and the lack of any 
specific theory or causal thinking connected to CS. 
 
It therefore seems obvious that an analytical viable concept of civil society in African contexts musts seek 
to address these problems outlined above. Assessing the analytical relevance of civil society in Africa, 
David Lewis (2002:574ff) describes four different positions: 1) Prescriptive universalism: The basic, 
normative position is that CS is indeed very relevant and important to Africa in the political project of 
promoting democracy, 2) Western Exceptionalism: The concept emerged at a specific point in European 
history and is not relevant in other cultural settings, 3) Adaptive Prescription: The concept may be 
potentially relevant in African contexts, but will take specific local forms and meanings, and should not be 
applied too rigidly , and 4) the concept of civil society is already relevant as civil society organizations have 
already indirectly or directly  had impact of African history in configurations of actors and in political 
struggles. 
 
Due to the basic proposition of this thesis the approach of adaptive prescription is applied in the analysis. 
Thus, it follows that the concept must be applied in the perspective of the context and that e.g. non-
political groups, traditional, kinship, partisan associations and other institutional configurations not 
originally connected to the Western understanding of civil society organizations is crucial for 
understanding civil society in Africa (Lewis 2002:579, Karlström 1999 and Comaroff & Comaroff 1999). 
In this way we shall avoid the problem of ascribing Eurocentric organizational modes to our case study. 
This leads to a preliminary definition of civil society: “The population of groups formed for collective purposes 
primarily outside the State and market place” (van Rooy 1998:30). 
This broad definition is useful to the extent that it does not beforehand exclude organizations in the case 
study which may be influential or important, but would not be part of civil society in the a more classic, 
liberal definition. 
 
However, this clarification still does not solve the problem about any specific theory or causality linked to 
the concept of civil society. Therefore, in the following section we shall introduce two overarching 
frameworks of understanding the interaction between state and civil society. These frameworks will 
provide us with analytical tools to analyze the research question. 
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4.1.2. Two frameworks for understanding the state 
Developmental state scholars in the 1950s and 1960s assumed that the state can be conceived ahistorically, 
that there exist a universal notion of political community and body-politic that defines the nation-state and 
that in African countries there is an operational principle of political accountability (Chabal 1994:69f), 
Martinussen 1998 :).  
 
A number of perspectives have since then criticized the “traditional” paradigms of the developmental 
state, in which the state is always analyzed as the single dominant actor (e.g. Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 
Evans 1989, Sandbrook 1986). The critique is only one among several of the a traditional political science 
approach to the concept of the state in which the state is seen as the dominant actor and a homogenous 
and coherent entity, separated from and opposed to society. 
 
Part of the literature on the character of the state in Africa has for many years emphasized how the 
colonial period affected the development of the African state. Ekeh (1975) argued that colonialism left 
African states with two kinds of publics – a civic public and a primordial public with individuals upholding 
the virtues of the civic public whilst simultaneously remaining loyal to their primordial public. This clash 
of norms and interests generate tendencies such as nepotism, tribalism, and corruption. The division 
between public and private is blurred.  
Mamdani (1996) adds to this argument through his argument that colonialism institutionalized a 
“bifurcated” state where the urban areas were governed by civil laws and power whereas rural areas were 
guided by customary law. However, there is no agreement about the impact of this state structure on the 
governance of African countries today.  
 
The implications of the perspectives offered above are:  
1) That one of the fundamental dichotomies between state-centred and society-centred theories in 
development studies is transcended – and that other theories or mix of approaches must be applied, and 
2) that the formal, top-down concept of the state does not reflect the realities of the African state.  
 
In the following we shall look at two approaches of analyzing the state in developing countries. 
 
A Governance Approach 
The good governance approach, which has been outlined above, is based on the fundamental premise that 
political and bureaucratic reforms in developing countries can improve governance in terms of democracy, 
accountability, performance, and legitimacy. The central position of the state in the new modalities of aid 
has put improvement of government institutions on the top of the agenda of donors. However, the 
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approach seeks to dismantle the “blind eye” of the modernization school by emphasizing the importance 
of reconciling modern state institutions and existing indigenous institutions (e.g. World Bank 1989:89, 
Abrahamsen 2000:58ff).  
 
Some of the central factors for improved governance in this paradigm are institutional capacity, ability to 
collect financial resources (taxes), rules-based governance, effective mechanisms for control and oversight 
of public institutions, and efficient and impartial judiciary (e.g. Hyden 1992:18f, Martinussen 1994:308f, 
World Bank 2003). The so-called governance triangle, with politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens 
emphasizes the importance of accountability relations between all three type of actors as derived from 
traditional, liberal political theory (political accountability through elections, politicians oversight of 
bureaucracy, and accountability in service delivery from bureaucracy to citizens)45. Legitimacy is derived in 
a parallel way: if the fundamental principles of governance are operative the political and bureaucratic 
system will thrive on the satisfaction of citizens (voters will oust illegitimate politicians, politicians and 
accountability institutions will check bureaucracy, and accountability institutions will check the 
accountability of political and administrative institutions). 
 
Civil society organizations in the governance mode are presumed to be autonomous organizations that 
may assist in the process of improving governance (e.g. Diamond 1994). Civil society organizations are 
here important actors in constructing improved governance bottom-up through citizen empowerment in 
projects. CSO interventions are seen as technical rather than political operations. 
The governance thinking has been the over-arching framework of understanding for the majority of 
donor interventions in developing countries, especially as part of the PRSP development, as explained 
above. However, there are different analytical approaches related to the framework, and in this thesis the 
so-called interactive approach (the study of state and society relations) is applied (refer e.g. (Degnbol 1996), 
Chazan (1988 & Chazan 1994 in Harbeson et al.), Bratton (1994) and Migdal (1994)). This cluster of 
theories aims at transcending the state-society dichotomy by focusing on the interaction and plurality of 
state and societal structures46.   
In this approach the state is simultaneously apprehended as an arena of interaction and conflict between 
competing forces and an actor on its own (Degnbol 1996:329). The state contains a number of different 
arenas in which society and state interact (e.g. the PRSP process, where donors and CSOs are players on 
the stage of the state), but at the same time the state is an actor on its own in the PRSP negotiations.    
 
                                                 
45 The other triangle in this paradigm is the state, market, and civil society triangle in which civil society is the third power. 
46 In this way there is a high degree of similarity with the approach of governance – the change in the meaning of government, 
“…referring to a new process of governing, or a changed condition of ordered rule, or the new method by which society is 
governed” (Rhodes: Understanding Governance 1997:45). There is a need to go beyond the formal state structures to understand 
the political dynamics of modern society. 
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Engagement and disengagement are categories for describing the dynamics relationship between society and 
state, in that they represent different strategies undertaken by state or society actors (Bratton 1994:235). 
Bratton distinguishes between state-sponsored engagement, i.e. efforts by state actors to authoritatively regulate 
social behaviour, and state-sponsored disengagement, i.e. retrenchment by state actors who are confronted with 
limits to the reach of public authority.  
Society-sponsored disengagement towards the state refers to actions from citizens to withdraw from the realm of 
state authority or to evade compliance with official directives. Society-sponsored engagement entails collective 
actions to influence the allocation of public resources (Bratton 1994:234-235). These are ideal types and 
they may appear in the interactions between state and society in different ways, depending on the political 
context, the strategies used by actors, and the resources available. The categories may thus help us in 
identifying interaction forms and eventually their outcomes.  
 
The four ideal types can be identified in the cases by looking at the strategies and tactics in the relationship 
between society and state actors.  The state and society actors may apply a wide number of strategies and 
tactics in their interaction: they state can take up an laissez faire approach, seek to reduce conflict between 
interests, repress all or some organized interests, distribute patronage in effort to cultivate interests, seek 
to mobilize support, may use direct slogans and support. On the other side, society organizations may take 
up different tools to achieve their goals: stay away completely from government arenas, seek to influence 
key persons in local government by strategic coalitions, arrange public events to put pressure on 
government, etc. 
 
The degree to which the initiatives of society and state will be successful is determined by their autonomy 
and their capacity which are applied as the fundamental categories of power. Bratton defines autonomy as 
“...the latitude of social actors to take political initiatives unconstrained by the claims of others” (Bratton 1994:235). 
Autonomy thus refers to the process in which actors set goals for organizations. Capacity is defined as the 
ability to implement political decision, and thus deals with the means of goal realization.  
 
In Bratton's view, autonomy takes precedence over capacity because even if a group does not have the 
capacity to reach its goals, it can at least withhold its support to a given initiative or demonstrates its 
opposition (Bratton 1994:236). Therefore, autonomy becomes a crucial indicator for state-society 
interaction especially since most non-state organizations in Africa have limited capacity. 
Again, in the analysis of behaviour and interactions between UDN and local government we shall apply 
the four ideal types on the basis of autonomy and capacity. 
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The concept of political space provide another relevant category of analysis from the governance 
approach that may add perspectives on what constitutes the arenas in which the interaction between state 
and civil society takes place.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction an important assumption for the research question outlined is that the 
introduction of PRSP/PEAP in Uganda has provided a new political space. Following this it is necessary 
that the concept and relevance of the concept of political space is further explored. 
 
Political spaces can be defined as “moments in which interventions or event throw up new opportunities, reconfiguring 
relationships between actors within these spaces or bringing up new actors, and opening of possibilities for a shift in direction” 
(Grindle and Thomas 1991)47. In traditional political science, these spaces are normally seen as the 
purview of government, i.e. the executive branch, parliaments, assemblies, etc., and generally, policy 
analysis has focused on the central level of governance. 
 
As argued earlier this thesis sets out to explore the implications of PRSPs at the local level, and we 
therefore aim at understanding policy spaces at this level. McGee (2004:18ff) in her analysis of the framing 
of political spaces categorize a number of specific political spaces: 
- Closed spaces: Spaces where no public participation is encouraged and actors operate on their 
own; e.g. government institutions, parliament, and ministries 
- Invited spaces: Spaces in which non-state actors are invited to participate (e.g. PRSP-processes) 
- Autonomous spaces: Spaces outside the official policy processes established independently of the 
state, and working in parallel, or sometimes in direct reaction to, official invited spaces. (McGee 
2004:19). 
 
When investigating a policy space we must seek to disclose the different dimensions that constitute a 
political space: its access, mechanics, and dynamics (McGee 2004:20). There are different standards for the 
access to spaces, who participates and who is excluded. There are observable mechanics in space – who 
does what, what happens, in what context. And there are dynamics that affect the behaviour which occurs 
within the space. According to our two modes of governance spaces any formal political impact can be 
captured and deconstructed in the patrimonial mode, whereas in the governance mode spaces represent a 
genuine political arena. 
These different categories of political spaces may provide a point of departure for understanding and 
classifying the political dynamics of the case districts. 
 
                                                 
47 Moments are not necessarily to be seen as short transient periods, but could also be a sustained period of time, or and 
established social norm. Another precision to be added is that the site where things happen as well as what takes place is part of 
the policy space. 
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In applying the governance approach in the analysis of the implementation process in the case districts, we 
shall in particular look at three selected, important interlinked factors for successful (i.e. accountable) 
implementation: capacity, resources, and organizational relations.  
 
The capacity of individual and institutions in the state is one of the crucial factors of governance. The 
availability of the human resources in public organizations is directly linked to the performance of these 
institutions. If capacity is strong the risk of accountability failure may likewise be smaller since inclination 
to patronage behaviour could be expected to be less likely since rule-based norms could be expected to 
dominate the organization.  
 
Financial resources compose another crucial factor. If a public organization has access to adequate and 
sustainable (e.g. taxes) pools of resources, we must assume that the likelihood is greater that it will 
perform. If resources are available the prospects for accountability are good - e.g. the due release of 
salaries decrease the risk of patronage behaviour.  
 
Organizational relations (including internal) can affect the performance of a given public organization. If 
conflict of interests prevails it may impede the performance of the organization, whereas if relations are 
strong it may improve the performance of the organization. 
 
Given the logic of this framework we may outline the following assumption for UDN interventions in the 
two case districts: 
UDN is more likely to succeed with intervention in high performing district with fewer accountability problems than in low 
performing districts with widespread accountability failures. 
 
We shall seek to follow and test this assumption in the analysis. 
 
The governance approach as developed in the forms outlined above may help us in typologizing and 
explaining the behaviour and interaction of UDN and local government. The governance approach 
upholds the primacy of accountability and legitimacy as a result of functioning institutions, access to 
information, and public sector transparency. The strength of the approach is that, while pointing at 
determining factors for outcomes, it ascribes an important role to individual actors and their opportunities 
to act in governance arenas. At the same time, it captures the heterogeneity of different actors involved in 
the process. 
The limitations of the approach are the limited ability of the approach in analyzing the state in Africa has 
aroused. The governance triangle and the division of state and society as separate realms are explicitly 
mentioned as problematic when looking at the construction of African states. The governance approach 
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appears to be somewhat blind to the prevailing conditions in African societies, it is claimed. The 
empowerment of specific actors does not consider the numerous structural conditions that affect all 
actors in society. In the light of this criticism we shall apply an additional approach. 
 
A Patrimonial Approach 
Bayart (1986) and other French scholars introduced the concepts of high politics, referring to the central, 
top level, and low politics, referring to local politics, and argued for the importance of the interrelatedness of 
the two and the importance of analyzing the state. To enable a empirically based understanding of politics 
in African states one needs to move beyond the central structure and mechanisms of the state and 
bureaucracy, which reflect only a part of political practices, and instead focus on the decentred practices 
and institutions of governing (Hansen & Stepputat 2001, Steinmetz 1999, Degnbol 1996). 
 
On line of thinking applying this approach could be labelled the patrimonial school (e.g. Bayart 1986, 
Chabal 1994, and Chabal & Daloz 1999). They argue that the patrimonial state emerges from the 
incorporation of patrimonial logic into bureaucratic institutions, and is characterized by three features: the 
personalisation of power, whereby all positions of political power are held by virtue of the ruler’s patronage, 
and based on ties personal, nepotistic, ethnic or regional loyalty. The second characteristic is that public 
office is treated as a means to personal and communal gain, and thirdly, power is extended throughout the area 
via networks of clientelism at every level.  
 
Thus, although formal political and administrative institutions and political systems are in place they are 
being domesticated according to these three dominating dynamics of African societies.  
This line of thinking has specific impact on the constitution of arenas of interaction, and the expected 
behaviour of each actor in the arenas as well the analysis of legitimacy and accountability with each actor. 
For instance, legitimacy within this paradigm is secured through the distribution of resources to the 
relevant constituencies (the primordial) and to a smaller degree through the delivery of political results 
(e.g. service delivery) to voters.  
This also entails that the principles of accountability which guides the liberal democracy are not applicable 
since vertical and horizontal accountability is not provided through elections, bureaucratic discretion and 
parliament exercise of control of government, but primarily through personal relations, clientelism, and 
distribution of resources among key actors to maintain power48. 
 
                                                 
48 It is generally agreed that the importance of the private sphere (e.g. kinship, patronage, and ethnicity) in political 
processes also apply to Uganda (e.g. Francis and James 2003, Brock 2004:142), but it remains outside the scope of 
this research to analyze these informal structures in depth. Instead, we shall see how they appear in testimonies of 
informants.  
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The patrimonial school almost dismisses the relevance of the concept of civil society in either the 
mainstream or the alternative variant as they argue that African societies are organized in different groups 
rather than as individual citizens and that these groups connect with the state along specific networks. The 
civil society – state binary can therefore not be applied in African circumstances since the state is not 
sufficiently institutionalised from society (Karlström 1999:117 in Comaroff 1999). 
 
Resources and power are distributed in the groups, and therefore the civil society mode of organization is 
not relevant as the distinction between public and private, collective and individual is opaque (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999). CSOs in this context are also accommodated according to the three dynamics outlined 
above, and therefore their role as change agent and seeker of accountability may be severely hampered. 
CSOs here become part of a larger game of accessing resources. Interaction with the state can take up 
many different forms according to the strategies and opportunities with each actor.  
 
On the other hand, it is asserted, for instance by Chabal and Daloz (1999:30), that there are “embryonic 
societal movements opposing central power” which may not form civil society in a de Tocquevillean 
sense, but which is never the less an actor of its own in the political struggle. This also brings them to 
claim that, “...understanding politics in Africa is a matter of identifying the complexities of shadow boxing that takes place 
between state and society” (Chabal & Daloz 1999:21-22).  
 
In the course of the analysis we shall apply the patrimonial framework as a measure of explaining the 
behaviour of actors and the outcome of interventions. We will focus on the three central dynamics of 
personal rule, public office as access to private resources, and clientelism and investigate to what extent 
they guide the behaviour of actors and outcomes of interactions.  
 
However, although the patrimonial framework has been widely applied in recent years of research on 
politics in Africa49, there still seem to be some deficiencies in the approach. There is an inherent tendency 
of determinism in the strong powers assigned to structural explanations in the form of cultural specific 
“logics” guiding the behaviour of all actors. This leaves very little space for explaining exceptions from the 
rules of patrimonialism, and thus for the role of specific actors or of other important factors in 
governance. The determinism also causes most conclusions to be given before-hand. 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 The relevance of the patrimonial approach has been demonstrated in a number of analyses in recent years: van de Walle 1997, 
Sardan 2003, Chabal & Daloz 1999, etc). Among the advantages of this approach are the cultural sensitive explanation and the 
explanatory power. 
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Table 4.1: The perspectives of the two frameworks50 
 
Applying two theoretical approaches with apparently different epistemological basis risk becoming a 
problem; one could expect that we shall be able to explain everything since the frameworks range very 
broadly. However, this problem is countered by constantly considering the empirical basis of the analysis, 
i.e. by checking what can be inferred from the data, and by discussing the relevance of the two approaches 
in understanding the role of UDN in the context of PEAP implementation. 
 
The two alternative theoretical approaches complement each other and enable a more profound 
understanding of the dynamics in the relationship between local governments and UDN (refer table 4.1 
above). 
 
Role of donors 
Investigating the relationship between civil society organizations and the state in developing countries the 
donors (Northern governments or NGOs) play an important role in shaping this relationship (e.g. Hulme 
& Edwards 1997). Donors are main actors in the formulation of Uganda’s PRSP – the PEAP. It has been 
asserted that donors with a few central government actors make up en exclusive governance nexus in this 
part of the policy process (Ssewarakiyanga 2004:78, Brock et al. 2003) – donors are not just funders, but 
important actors interacting with the government. Donors also providing resources to development 
activities and projects and thus find themselves in a crucial position vis-à-vis the CSOs in that their 
control of resources may directly influence the strategies and policies of the CSO. The strategies and 
policies of donors themselves may directly influence the CSOs and their mode of operation being, as they 
are often are, fully dependent on donor support. Therefore, one must consider the influence of donors 
                                                 
50 In regard to accountability and legitimacy in the two frameworks draw reference is made to section 4.3. and 4.4. in which the 
two concepts are operationalized. 
 Governance Approach Patrimonial Approach 
The concept of the State State as supreme governing actor 
and arena of interaction 
Arena of resource struggle: 
personalization of power, public 
office as mean to personal gain, 
networks of clienteles 
The role of Civil society Improvement of governance 
through demands on governments 
& empowerment of citizens 
CS is not divided from state – 
part of the resource struggle 
What determines 
legitimacy? 
Exercise of power according to 
formal rules on the basis of 
elections – relation as contract 
Exercise of power through 
distribution of resources 
according to informal rules – 
relations as reciprocity 
What determines 
accountability? 
Access to information, 
answerability, enforcement  
Support from key figures in 
networks – patron client 
relationships 
What determines CS-State 
interaction? 
Capacity, resources, organizational 
relations, autonomy 
The involvement in networks 
and access to key persons 
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and their agendas when analyzing the role of UDN in local governance. However, in this study the donors 
are mainly apprehended as resource providers and policy makers at the overall level. The analysis does not 
focus on the specific role of donors in the two districts.  
 
Through the discussion of how to analyze state and society relations we have extracted a number of 
central parameters to be applied in the analysis of the role of UDN in the politics of poverty in Bushenyi 
and Tororo.  
We simultaneously apply the patrimonial and interactive approach and the analytical perspectives they 
offer in regard to state-society interaction, mechanisms for accountability and legitimacy and the role of 
CSOs. The different kinds of spaces are applied as they appear in the field work along with the efforts to 
use the institutional channels in the local governance setting.   
However, in order to understand the role of specific actors we need to investigate the environment of the 
implementation of politics of poverty in the two districts. For this purpose we shall extract a number of 
insights from implementation theory.   
 
4.2 Implementation theory 
As the subject of this thesis related to policy implementation it is useful to investigate if there is any 
implementation theory which may enrich the analysis of the research problem. In line with the arguments 
outlined above on the localized approach, it is the proposition of this research project that although the 
central government and donors are important actors in the policy process of PRSP, it is extremely relevant 
to seek to understand the local dynamics of policy implementation of PRSP to assess the impact of 
introducing such policies.  
 
With inspiration from Jan Erik Lane (1987) it is asserted that it is important to distinguish implementation 
outcome from implementation process. As the interest in this thesis is on the process, there is no ambition to 
measure the impact of the policies implemented, but to gain understanding of the processes surrounding 
it. Rather than looking at policy goals and measuring the outcome, which demands a different kind of 
analysis than undertaken here, the study investigates the process of implementation at the local level in 
Uganda.  Therefore, the study will eclectically make use of a limited range of concepts and insights from 
implementation theory.  
 
The purpose of applying implementation theory is to establish the characteristics of the actors, the arenas 
and the resources in the two case districts, and thus provide a richer and more precise picture of the 
context in which UDN operates as well as an assessment of the opportunities for accountability and 
legitimacy improvement/consolidation. 
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When investigating implementation processes in Third World countries one must consider the specific 
characteristics that shape policy making51. Grindle emphasizes the importance of donors, the weakness of 
interest aggregating structures, and the dominance of elites in policy formulation causes implementation to 
be the key phase for most actors to influence decision making (Grindle 1980:18).  
She further argues that “...the study of public policy in general, but especially in the Third World, must include a study of 
the political system itself and the distribution of effective power within it if the implementability of public programs is to be 
assessed” (Grindle 1980: 34). The implementation process in developing countries thus is a central arena in 
which individuals and groups are able to pursue conflicting interests and compete for access to scarce 
resources. 
 
Winter (1994) developed a so-called integrated implementation model for analyzing implementation of 
policies in Denmark. Although his model is not directly developed for use in developing countries, the 
components and the levels of analysis in his model are too a large extent compatible with implementation 
experiences and challenges encountered in these countries.  
 
Integrating the key characteristics of the Grindle’s implementation framework and Winter’s integrated 
implementation model (Winter 1994:59, Grindle 1980:21ff) the analysis will focus on organizational 
behaviour, street level bureaucracy behaviour, and target group behaviour to assess the implementation process. 
Eventually, the study also takes into consideration the significance of the environment in the implementation 
process: e.g. the regime type, interests and strategies of actors, and the legal framework (Grindle 1980:11).  
 
Even though the objective of analyzing the implementation process is to understand the process, and not 
to assess the outcome of the policy of PEAP, the analysis may still make use of some of assumptions that 
guide the understanding of implementation theory.  
 
These assumptions include: the importance of incentives, capacities and interests of organizations and 
individuals involved in the process, and the importance of conflict and coordination problems that may occur 
during the implementation process (Winter 1994:71, Grindle 1980), the importance of inter-organizational 
relations, street level bureaucrats as key actors in implementation, and the importance of target group behaviour in 
reaction to policies.  
 
                                                 
51 The traditions and the different schools in implementation research are not discussed here since the focus is on implementation 
in developing countries. Traditionally, implementation research was developed in 1950s and 1960s in Western democracies. Most 
often the schools within implementation research have been dived into different generations with different objectives (e.g. 
Sabatier 1986). However, the explicit application of implementation theory in development studies has been somewhat limited, 
but it may be argued that it is indirectly applied in the studies of decentralization (e.g. Smoke 2003, Wunsch 2001). 
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Intra-organizational relations may be conflict-ridden thus resulting in difficulties for implementation. Street 
level bureaucrats play an important role as political decision makers (Lipsky 1980) in carrying out 
discretion on how to use resources, if there is lack of resources, they may reduce demand for services by 
reducing access to information, or they prioritize routines tasks in favour of complicated tasks, and they 
may bias the citizens they are serving as they choose to serve resource strong citizens in favour of weaker 
individuals (Winter 1994:80). 
 
The target group also influences policy implementation: they may influence the delivery of services, 
participate in service delivery, and affect the outcome by abiding the demands of policy. Hirschman points 
at two strategies – voice and exit – which the target group can apply. Voice entails interacting with 
government officials in decision making processes and regarding service delivery, whereas exit signifies the 
complete redraw from and non-compliance with service delivery and street level bureaucracy (Hirschman 
1970). Voice and exit are in compliance with the concepts of engagement and disengagement elaborated 
above. 
 
The insights from implementation theory are linked with the governance framework which has been 
applied overall. There are obvious parallels in the logic of thinking: the governance as well as the 
implementation perspective implies a fundamental causal relation between accountability and capacity, 
street level bureaucrats, and organizations. Accountability will prevail when capacity is high, organizations 
are strong, and behaviour of implementing staff is rule-guided and incentives are clear. Accountability will 
fail when capacity is low, organizations are weak, and behaviour of implementing staff is guided by 
informal, not-transparent, potentially corrupted norms and incentives.  These assumptions form essential 
directions for the analysis of the research question in the two districts. 
 
Through the analysis of the implementation process a coherent picture of actors involved in politics of 
poverty at the district level is outlined, including an indication of the central implementation problems and 
achievements that have occurred in each district. Thereby, the first part of the research question is 
accounted for. 
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4.3. Accountability 
As reflected in the research question above the concept of accountability is crucial in this thesis. 
Understanding accountability failures and relations may enable us to analyze the accountability of local 
government and of UDN and the efforts of UDN to improve accountability.  
In the following I intend to clarify and operationalize the concept of accountability. Throughout this 
section the two kinds of understanding of accountability and legitimacy according the patrimonial 
respectively the interactive approach are incorporated. It is asserted that accountability as a principle 
derived from governance theory is linked to the interactive approach, and that it can be applied in 
different cultural settings, but that this application demands further refinement and adjustments which is 
presented below. 
 
Accountability as a concept is closely related to democracy theory and to the basic dynamics of a 
functioning democracy52. Democratic accountability describes the necessity for society to control the 
exercise of power of the state. In democracies, politicians are accountable to voters through the mandate 
they receive when they are elected, a mandate which the constituencies may remove at the next election. 
In this relation they are accountable to the constituencies who may punish or reward them for their 
actions in parliament. This relationship is often defined as political accountability. 
 
This example indicates that accountability is a relational concept as it describes the function of actors in a 
relationship of power53. Accountability can be defined in the following way: “A is accountable to B when A is 
obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of 
an eventual misconduct” (Schedler et al. 1999:17). 
This definition encompasses two of the fundamental aspects of accountability: answerability and enforcement. 
Answerability indicates the obligation to provide information about one’s actions, and justification for 
their correctness, whereas enforcement lack of justification or information (i.e. lack of accountability) has 
consequences in the way that punishment another kind of actual action is taken. If there is no 
enforcement or answerability one may speak of an accountability failure. 
 
One can distinguish between several different types of accountability. In the classical distinction between 
vertical and horizontal accountability vertical accountability is a relationship between unequal groups, e.g. 
constituencies and politicians, in which non-state agents holds the state accountable. Mechanisms could be 
elections, but also lobby work, investigative journalism etc. Horizontal accountability, on the contrary, is 
                                                 
52 However, accountability relations do not necessarily have to involve state and non-state actors and the regulation of the power 
of the state. Accountability relations in modern society occur in all kinds of settings: internally in organizations, between states, 
accountability of NGOs, etc (Newell and Bellour 2002). In this study, though, the main focus is on relations between a non-state 
actor (UDN) and the state (local government). 
53 Accountability denotes a relationship of power in that it ascribes the capacity of someone engage in reason-giving to justify 
his/her behaviour, and/or the capacity to impose a penalty for poor performance.  
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an intra-state relationship in which public institutions, e.g. Ombudsman, inspectorates, auditors-general, 
commission, are formally authorized to demand explanations and/or impose sanctions on other state 
actors (Goetz and Jenkins 2005:13, Schedler et al. 1999: 14-17, Newell & Bellour 2002: 1-2)54.  
 
Another important distinction is between ex-post and ex-ante accountability. Ex-post accountability 
describes the sequence that power holders need to give account of and explain their decisions and actions, 
and this can only take place after actions and decisions have been completed or made public. However, 
ex-ante accountability do exist, for instance when a decision-making process is subjected to questioning 
before it is approved, e.g. when national budgets are questioned in parliament. Ex post and ex ante 
accountability may provide further mechanisms for accountability and analytical categories for our 
investigation55. 
 
Who are the actors involved in accountability relationships? Overall, one may distinguish between 
accountability seekers and targets of accountability. The seeker of accountability is an organization, 
institution or individual entitled to insist on explanations or to impose punishments on the target of 
accountability who is obliged to give account for actions and decisions made. This relationship may be 
compared to a “reverse” principal-agent relationship in which the seeker is the principal and the target is 
the agent. 
 
Key institutions in accountability relations include the electorate, parliament, the bureaucracy, monitoring 
institutions, public finance monitoring, and the judiciary. (Goetz & Jenkins:46). Each actor possesses 
certain responsibilities and areas of jurisdiction in the accountability arena. For our analysis, we shall focus 
on the local government institutions of accountability, the Inspectorate General of Government, and the 
monitoring mechanisms in local government. Here, UDN is a new actor seeking accountability. 
 
Several scholars (Goetz and Jenkins 2005, Schedler et al. 1999, Newell & Bellour 2002) have pointed at 
the apparent inadequacy of the above outlined concept of accountability to grasp with the development in 
democracies today, in the West or in developing countries. Several accountability deficiencies have 
occurred, i.e. elections may provide the opportunity to vote, but voting it itself cannot create 
accountability. Outsourcing, deregulation and the new mechanisms of service delivery introduced globally 
in the last decade has also challenged traditional accountability relationships as answerability has become 
                                                 
54 Adding to this one may distinguish between process accountability, which refers to situation that the correct procedures in a 
decision making process have been followed, and output accountability, i.e. that the policies and initiatives deliver the output that 
is planned. 
55 Other types of accountability include managerial accountability is distinguished from political accountability. 
Managerial accountability describes the intra-organizational accountability of bureaucrats.  2nd order accountability 
involves the question about how to hold accountability seekers accountable. Both of these type of accountability  
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much more complex (e.g. Day & Klein 1987). Another challenge to traditional accountability is the 
decentralization reforms which are implemented throughout developing countries. These reforms, 
although their aim may be to increase accountability, often also open avenues for local political elites to 
exploit the new opportunities to access resources for their own good only infringe the local elections in 
vote buying mechanisms ( Newell and Bellour 2002:13). 
 
A third fundamental challenge to the usefulness of applying accountability in political analysis developing 
countries is the question about the relevance of accountability if the dominant mode of governance in 
these countries is based on patrimonialism as some writers assert. However, as demonstrated by Chabal, 
adherents of the patrimonial school do not deny the importance of accountability: “Political accountability is 
a relation of reciprocity and inequality between the rulers and the ruled: kings and subjects…..It is a relation of collaboration, 
coercion and violence. Above all, it is a relation which constantly changes as external and internal context itself changes” 
(Chabal: 1994:54ff). In comparison to the concept of accountability applied in the governance school 
Chabal proposes an analysis that take into account the inequality and power relations of the rulers and the 
ruled56.  Therefore, it is argued that it is possible to reconcile the concept accountability in the governance 
and the patrimonial mode by taking into account the perspective offered by Chabal. 
 
As a result of the challenges outlined above, new perspectives have been added to refine accountability as 
an analytical concept. There is a need to soften the sharp distinction between vertical and horizontal 
accountability and consider new, hybrid forms of accountability. Goetz and Jenkins (2005:13) argues that 
the traditional top down focus of public accountability has tended to leave out important informal 
structures in society – i.e. relations between rich and poor, gender, ethnic groups, etc. which may be 
extremely unaccountable, but are not investigated since they are not within the accountability orthodoxy57.  
Among these new hybrid forms is the tendency that new non-state actors enter the accountability arena, i.e. 
civil society organizations as quasi-accountability agencies, CSOs creating new formal accountability 
mechanisms, and CSO becoming targets of accountability themselves (Goetz and Jenkins 2005:79). 
 
Thirdly, it is important to emphasize the often great difference between de jure and de facto accountability. 
What is formally constituted as rights and obligations of actors in the accountability arena may be very 
different from what is actually the dynamic of the relations. In developing countries politicians may be just 
as (or even more) occupied with accountability towards aid donors than answering to their constituencies. 
The distinction of de jure and de facto accountability is also essential to consider when analyzing 
discussion on the need for accountability. The concern could be to bring de facto accountability in line 
                                                 
56 Lonsdale (1986) in Chabal et al. (1986) also argues for the relevance of accountability from a patrimonial perspective, especially 
as a principle of organizing and legitimizing power relationships (1986:136). 
57 For an example of new accountability forms in India refer Goetz (2001). 
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with the legal framework, or it may be to impose a stricter moral regime of accountability into the legal 
framework (Goetz and Jenkins 2005:144).  
 
Finally, as discussed above, from the perspective offered by patrimonialism we must concede that any 
accountability analysis in developing countries must take into the consideration the extent to which 
patrimonial governance dominates the societal interaction. This means that accountability modes linked 
with a liberal governance model could be expected to co-exist with governance modes derived from a 
clientelistic, patrimonial interaction, i.e. where accountability basically equals a patron-client relationship. 
In this case accountability failures occur according to the governance paradigm, but may succeed 
according to the principles of patrimonial governance.  
 
Operationalization of accountability 
The reflections above leads to the following operationalization of accountability which will guide the 
analysis in the project: “Accountability establishes a dialogic relationship between accountable and accounting actors” 
(Schedler et al 1999: 15). This relationship contains three elements (Bovens 2003:12): 
- the obligation to provide information 
- the debating phase 
- the judgement phase 
 
However, many different social relations may qualify within this category. Therefore, we may define a 
social relation as a practice of accountability when 1) there is public accountability of the account giving – 
and not purely internal, discrete informing, 2) explanation and justification of the conduct – and not 
propaganda, or the provision of information or instructions to the general public, 3) the explanation 
should be directed at a specific forum – and not be given at random, and 4) the actor must feel obliged to 
come forward – instead of being at liberty to provide any account what so ever (Bovens 2003:18). 
 
The three phases will be applied in the analysis of understanding accountability relations in this study. The 
obligation to provide accountability is formally defined in the legal provisions governing local 
governments. Therefore, these will be presented and discussed, and the analysis will discuss the provision 
of and access to information as it appears in the two districts. The two other phases, the debating phase, 
and the judgement phase, will be analyzed through the data collected in the two districts.  
 
Finally, analyzing accountability also involve analyzing accountability failures. Traditionally, accountability 
failure has been explained with elite capture and corruption (Schedler et al. 1999) which may affect any of 
the accountability institutions described above. An example could be the problem about elections that in 
some developing countries prove to be incapable as genuine accountability mechanisms because of 
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threats, fraud, vote-buying etc. Goetz and Jenkins (2005:35ff), however, adds the importance of bias 
causing accountability failures. Bias is defined as the systematic “...practices that are not illegal or motivated by the 
desire for private benefit, but nevertheless involve allocative and regulatory decisions that benefit already advantaged groups” 
(Ibid:35). As examples one can mention institutional bias, legal bias, and administrative bias. The different 
types of accountability failure will be analyzed along with the types of accountability outlined above as 
they appear in the data material. We shall seek to understand how different paradigms of governance 
represent different logics of accountability.  
 
 
4.4. Legitimacy 
What defines the roles of and relations between UDN and local government? Of course, there are formal 
legal and administrative documents that prescribe the roles and responsibilities of actors, but beyond the 
formal rules and regulations there are other important factors that influence the behaviour of each actor. 
This leads us to the concept of legitimacy58.  Once again we shall contextualize the concepts introduced to 
the African setting of our case study, and to the two overarching paradigms, the patrimonial and the 
governance paradigm. 
 
At its most abstract level, legitimacy is “the moralization of authority”, the moral grounds for obedience to 
power (Beetham 1991). Traditionally, political scientists have focused only on state legitimacy, building on 
the rational-legal school of Max Weber. In later studies of legitimacy (e.g. Beetham 1991) one finds a 
fundamental rejection of the Weberian concept of legitimacy as “belief in legitimacy” (Weber 1968 
Economy and Society, cited in Beetham 1991: 6). Beetham refutes this definition in that it is reductionist 
(it reduces legitimacy from a complex set of factors to a single dimension). It also misconceives the 
relationship between legitimacy and the beliefs that provide the justificatory basis for the rules of power 
(Beetham 1991:23).    
 
In this study we shall seek beyond mere state legitimacy and therefore need a more wide definition. 
Legitimacy can be defined as “a generalized perception or assumption to indicate that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of values, norms, beliefs, and definitions” (Scott 
2003:85). Thus, to speak of legitimate power is to indicate (1) a set of persons or positions linked by 
power relations, (2) a set of norms or rules governing the distribution and exercise of power and the 
response to it59. 
 
                                                 
58 Beetham describes the relevance of studying legitimacy in the following way: “A social-scientific analysis of legitimacy is 
concerned with the effect it has on the character of a given relationship and on the behaviour of those involved in it” (Beetham 
1991:25). This corresponds directly to the research question. 
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Beethams (1991) conceptual map of legitimacy provides a number of useful and more concrete 
perspectives which can be applied in the analysis. He suggests three dimensions of legitimacy:  legality, 
legitimacy, and legitimation. For rule of power to be legitimate it must: 
i) conform to established rules 
ii) the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate; 
and 
iii) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation (Beetham 
1991:15-16)  
 
The first level is that of rules, that is one may question does the exercise of power build on a framework 
of rules? These rules may be informal, unwritten, conventions or they may be formal codes or laws. The 
opposite of legitimacy according to rules is, simply, illegitimacy; power is illegitimate where it is either 
acquired in contravention of rules or exercised in a manner that exceeds or contravenes them. In the 
African context, “modern” and patrimonial modes of governance provide different types of rules and 
conventions to guide legitimate governance. With our focus on formal structures we shall primarily 
investigate the formal rules of governance, but with the awareness that they may co-exist with informal, 
patrimonial rules.   
 
On its own, legal validity is insufficient to secure legitimacy; the rules must be justifiable vis-à-vis the 
governed. Therefore, the second level of legitimacy - justification of rules - must be investigated. “Power 
has to be derived from a valid source of authority, the rules must provide that those who come to hold power have the qualities 
appropriate to its exercise, and the structure of power must be seen to serve a recognizably general interest” (Beetham 
1991:17). A legitimacy deficit will occur when rules can no longer be justified, either because of lack of 
shared beliefs, because of changes in beliefs, or because of changing circumstances have existing 
justifications for rules irrelevant. Typically, to understand the specific contents of beliefs one must look 
for the valid source of authority, how people come to possess the qualities appropriate to the exercise of 
power, and the ends that power should serve (Beetham 1991:21). Again, both the in the patrimonial and 
the governance framework the different sources of authority may be challenged for which the reason the 
legitimacy is questioned.  
 
The third level of legitimacy involves the actual expression of consent; actions, that demonstrate consent 
on behalf of the subordinate to the particular power relation in which they are involved. Examples of this 
include casting the vote in elections, concluding agreements or swearing allegiance. In case of non-
cooperation, protests, and demonstrations etc. one may identify power exercise to be illegitimate. In the 
African context patrimonial modes of governance involves other expressions of consent and non-
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cooperation: e.g. long-term allegiance to on a patron, exchange deals, the principle of reciprocity, 
defection from a patron, etc. (e.g. Chabal and Daloz 1999).    
 
Beetham emphasizes that legitimacy is not an all-or-nothing affair, because legitimacy deficiencies may be 
found at different circumstances and to different degrees in societies. One must look at legitimacy on a 
continuum. Adding to this I also argue, with Beetham (1991:39) that relations of legitimacy is not 
exclusively a matter for the state, and in particular may be relevant in analyzing relations of organizations 
that declare themselves to be “non-governmental”, but nevertheless engage in the sphere of the state in 
their activities. 
 
The authorization of power thus can be stated to involve two different articulations of power in the two 
modes of governance: in the governance mode power is exercised as a contract between electorates and 
politicians based on rules, whereas in the patrimonial mode of governance power is exercised as a relation 
of reciprocity based on exchange of material and other direct benefits.  
The three levels of legitimacy form analytical categories with which to analyze the relations between local 
government and UDN in the districts.  
 
4.5. Summary 
The theoretical discussion outlined has provided the central categories through which we shall analyze the 
research question to understand the role of UDN. 
The research question is analyzed through the patrimonial and the governance framework. These two 
perspectives provide the overarching lenses in which all other theories are understood.  
 
Investigating the first part of the research question the analysis will be guided by the insights from 
implementation theory and the modes of interaction between state and civil society as explained above. 
The analysis of the PEAP implementation process in Bushenyi and Tororo focuses on revealing the 
institutional framework, the actors, the capacity, and the resources of the districts and seeking to outline 
the challenges and perspectives of local government accountability and legitimacy in the two districts. 
Thereby, we may predict the opportunities for UDN intervention to succeed. 
 
Building on the results of the first analysis, the investigation of second part of the thesis focuses on the 
interaction between UDN and LG through the parameters of the two overarching theoretical frameworks 
and the indicators for accountability and legitimacy. In this analysis the assumptions regarding 
opportunities for UDN success in their intervention are interpreted against the development observed in 
the field work, and the opportunities for UDN to affect local government accountability through the two 
interventions are assessed.
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Chapter 5 - The governance of PEAP in Uganda: Arenas and Resources 
This chapter provides the background and context of Uganda’s PEAP and investigates the main 
components of the PEAP. The regime context and the room for manoeuvre for CSOs are discussed, and 
the main actors and structures in Ugandan governance are introduced with the focus on the flow of 
resources and the arenas of interaction. The presentation of the governance structures also analyzes 
institutions and procedures for accountability as outlined in the research question. The chapter thus 
establishes the background for analyzing the role of UDN and the implementation of PEAP in Bushenyi 
and Tororo. Figure 5.1 outlines the analytical focus of chapter 5. 
 
Figure 5.1: The focus of analysis in Chapter 5 
 
 
5.1. The political context and CSOs in Uganda 
Since 1986 Uganda has been ruled by the National Resistance Movement (NRM), a political movement 
that arose from a guerilla army fighting president Obote during the civil war in Uganda from 1981-1986. 
In the aftermath of the war, NRM and its leader, Yoweri Museveni, embarked on the project to 
consolidate and strengthen the ascendancy of the state (De Coninck 2004: 57). Firstly, an extended, 
nationwide system of local councils60 was constructed nationwide. The councils were empowered to 
resolve local conflicts, provide security and distribute food and aid to communities in the conflict-ridden 
nation.  
                                                 
60 These councils were called Resistance Councils and were later used pillars in the construction of Uganda’s decentralized 
governance system (see section 5.3 below). 
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Secondly, a political system was constructed that was formally inclusive of all factions that had made up 
Uganda’s political landscape in previous decades, but under the umbrella of the NRM. No extra-NRM 
political activity was allowed in the name of avoiding former ethnic strides, promote citizenship and seek 
legitimacy (Hickey 2003:34). Thus, the so-called “no-party democracy” was created. This particular 
political structure with no official opposition creates a special environment for CSOs as they need to 
remain “apolitical” in order not be cast “partisan” while still seeking to fulfill their role as service delivery- 
, advocacy or lobby organizations (cf. De Conninck 2004:60 & Interview Deniva, Interview NGO 
Forum). It is difficult to assess the consequences for CSO in the transition to multiparty politics which 
Uganda has recently embarked on61.  
 
The NRM regime managed to establish significant legitimacy through this regime system and the extended 
structures of local governance, which at the same time provided a strong tool for nationwide control and 
supervision. The regime character thus, as Grindle (1980) has emphasized, plays an important role in 
shaping and delineating the process of implementation and, as we may add, the context for CSOs. 
 
Apart from looking at the internal characteristics of the Ugandan political system one cannot escape to 
take into consideration the importance of foreign donors and institutions in shaping and influencing the 
political and economical development of the country when investigating political processes in Uganda. It 
is estimated that around 52% of Uganda’s national budget derives from bilateral and multilateral aid and 
loans, equivalent to 12% of GDP (Lister and Nyamugasira 2003:97).  
 
Donors engage in Ugandan politics with different agendas and strategies although the framework under 
PRSP combined with the budget support and sector wide approach has increased coordination among the 
different donors. Specifically, donors are important actors vis-à-vis the CSO sector in that they provide 
almost all funding to these organizations. This influence for instance is exerted in the change in 
prioritizations from support to service delivery organizations to focus on advocacy and lobby 
organizations. 
 
Ugandan CSOs have been going trough the same process of change as seen in other developing countries, 
i.e. from “gap-fillers” involved in service delivery as contractors with government and donor agencies to a 
more specific political role as advocacy and “watch-dog” organizations. This development has been 
closely linked to the introduction of poverty reduction policies with their specific requirements about 
                                                 
61 In July 2005, a referendum about the transfer from the NRM system to multiparty politics took place, and the result was a 
“yes” with almost 87% of voters in favor of political transition, although less than 45% of the electorate participated (The New 
Vision – Saturday July 30th). The transition is feared among some CSO actors who expect that their non-party status will be 
continuously questioned if resemblance appears between the views of the opposition parties and the CSOs positions and 
statements (Interview NGO Forum). The perspectives of this development in relation to the questions analyzed in this thesis are 
briefly discussed in chapter 8. 
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national ownership and involvement of non-state actors in policy formulation (i.e. World Bank Poverty 
Reduction Resource Book 2003, Lister and Nyamugasira 2003, Barr et al. 2003). Most CSOs, however, are 
not either advocacy or service delivery but maintain “...a holistic approach which give them more flexibility to 
respond to the perceived needs of the population they serve” (Barr et al. 2003:3)62. 
At the community level most CSOs are more exclusively involved in service delivery activities, i.e. 
HIV/AIDS, agriculture, health, and different sorts of income-generating activities63. This dilemma of 
focus and donor support remains an important challenge to Ugandan CSOs. 
 
Another important feature about Ugandan CSOs is that often their status as separated from the state is 
questionable – on the contrary, especially at the district level it seems that local actors in political processes 
have more than one identity – e.g. politicians and CSO chairperson (Brock 2004:98). This poses a real 
challenge for CSOs to maintain a role of holding government accountable. For instance, one important 
parameter for successful CSOs have been their ethnic origin – i.e. persons from Western Uganda where 
the NRM has its main power base are more likely to succeed than persons from the North or East (Brock 
2004:99). All these characteristics pose real challenges to our original, normative understanding of CSOs 
and demonstrate the importance of contextualizing the analysis. 
 
By using a registration mechanism, the government holds another tool to control the activities of CSOs in 
Uganda. While the government claim that the registration statute is merely a formality, there are several 
instances in which the registration statute has been applied to discipline CSOs considered to be political or 
partisan (Brock 2004:98). 
 
Summarizing, the political context of Uganda is dominated by the NRM and the norms of governance 
applied in the no-party democracy. The objective to prevent ethnic conflicts and uprisings has justified the 
introduction of an inclusive political system, a nationwide system of micro governance embedded in local 
councils, and the complete take-over of all economic activities.  
This political system apparently secured political stability in conflict-ridden Uganda, but the inclusion 
principle of the no-party democracy established the ground for a de-facto one-party control of all non-
state political actors. In this context the CSOs were challenged with staying inside the inclusion principle 
or being labelled “opposition”. CSOs are not necessarily structured outside and in opposition to the state 
as politicians can sometimes have several positions, thus blurring the distinction. 
                                                 
62 This holistic approach of CSOs is also the reason why Lister and Nyamugasira argue that donors apply wrong strategies when 
only targeting advocacy organizations. Most organizations have multiple roles and cannot be defined within the dichotomous 
categories (Lister and Nyamugasira 2003:104). On the contrary their argue that service delivery is highly important in terms of 
influencing government: “...it is probably in this joint planning at district level that CSOs are having the most immediate influence on state 
responsiveness to poor people” (Lister and Nyamugasira 2003:100) 
63 In Tororo the major CSOs are either directly implementing PEAP activities in health and agriculture, and he small CBOs are 
mainly involved in service delivery (Interview, Church Network Tororo + CSO Advisor, Tororo Local Government). The same 
CSO structure is found in Bushenyi where the BUDIFA is a major CSO dealing with agriculture initiatives. 
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Having thus clarified the regime and political context of CSO operating in Uganda, we may move on to 
investigate the provisions of the PEAP. 
 
5.2 The Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
The PEAP is the national planning framework for development in Uganda and corresponds to the PRSPs 
used in other countries. The PEAP was first drafted in 1997 as part of the HIPC initiative and has been 
revised in 2002 and 2004 (Government of Uganda 2004 - PEAP).  
 
The PEAP is a comprehensive strategy that outlines overall priorities within key sectors. PEAP consists of 
five main pillars from which the priorities of the government’s allocation priorities are evolved: 1) Macro 
Economic management, 2) Production, competitiveness and incomes (e.g. support for agricultural 
production, small scale enterprises, etc.), 3) Security, conflict resolution and disaster management, 4) 
Good governance, and 5) Human development (e.g. social services). Within each pillar numerous sub 
policies and initiatives may be included. 
 
As the focus of this thesis is on UDN and their involvement in monitoring the spending of funds within 
the PEAP, the good governance pillar is the most important in what could be coined the “accountability 
sector” (IGG 2003). However, in the analysis of PEAP implementation the analysis will look into 
different sectors and policies according to their relevance for accountability and legitimacy in each district. 
 
The Good Governance Pillar of the PEAP elaborately deals with the issue of public sector management, 
including accountability and transparency (GoU PEAP 2004:127). Although all PEAP sectors have 
specific requirements as regard to monitoring performance and evaluation and reporting from local to 
centre level, it is conceded that corruption and mismanagement is rampant in the public sector in Uganda 
in general, including at the local government level, and the PEAP outlines a number of initiatives to be 
implemented to reduce the problem (GoU PEAP 2004:115ff). 
 
One of the existing mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the PEAP is the earmarking of 5% of the PAF 
to finance monitoring and evaluation (GoU PEAP 2004:129). These funds are distributed to districts and 
to central government institutions as conditional grants. The responsibility for monitoring implementation 
of policies rests with the sector ministries and with the local governments (Hickey 2003:23-24). The 
monitoring mechanisms provide one accountability institution at the district level (aimed at securing ex 
post accountability). We shall analyze the use and implications of the 5% PAF monitoring at the district 
level. 
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Another fundamental aspect that is emphasized is the need for dissemination of information about the 
release of funds, the awarding of tenders etc. To enhance this capacity in the public sector the government 
has encouraged all LGs to disseminate information on transfers, expenses, and tender awards, and it has 
also introduced a new information system. The GoU is also drafting a new Public Information Bill that is 
aimed at enabling access to information for the public about government programmes (GoU PEAP 
2004:133ff). This perspective parallels the obligation to provide information as the first phase in 
accountability relations, thereby enhancing opportunities to secure accountable governance64. Again, in the 
analysis we shall focus on the dissemination of information to local governance levels.   
 
A third tool that is applied to govern implementation and monitoring of PEAP is the bonus/reward 
system applied in the Local Government Development Program (LGDP)65 in which performing districts 
are rewarded whereas poorly performing districts are penalized according to criteria on financial and 
administrative accountability (GoU PEAP 2004:130). This is a disciplinary tool which is applied in the 
third phase of accountability, the judgment phase66. 
 
Adding to these tools, the PEAP ascribes an important role to national, public institutions of 
accountability such as the Auditor General (AG) and the Inspector General of Government (IGG) in 
their capacity to investigate cases of abuse of office on all levels of government. The IGG have 
departments at the regional level where they are mandated to intervene is cases of abuse of office 
(Interview, IGG Information Officer). 
 
The good governance and monitoring & evaluation section of the PEAP also briefly touches upon the 
role of CSOs in securing accountability, and specifically mentions UDNs CBMES initiative (PEAP 
2004:219). However, it remains focused on the role of government institutions: “Promoting accountability is 
clearly a public sector role, while civil society can play a part, it cannot remove the need for accountability to be monitored by 
public sector institutions” (GoU PEAP 2004:145).  
 
Apparently, the PEAP seem to be governed by different tools and mechanisms to avoid 
misappropriations and to secure accountability in all sectors. Simultaneously, the monitoring and 
evaluation systems receive earmarked funding and the IGG and AG are appointed important roles as 
guardians of accountability. When embarking on the analysis of the two case districts we shall take into 
account the provisions outlined in the PEAP. 
                                                 
64 In some occasions the provision of information serve as ex ante accountability, but often the information is provided at a later 
stage in implementation. 
65 The LGDP program aims at establishing improved mechanisms and capacity for planning, budgetting and implementation in 
the district (see for instance Ssewakiriyanga 2004:88). 
66 The last PEAP (2004) points at the problem that an entire district is punished for the malpractice of a few individuals, and 
mentions that the government will consider applying action more directly in order to avoid this side effect.  
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5.3 Decentralization 
The context of PEAP implementation is the decentralized governance framework in Uganda. This section 
looks at the resources, organizations, and arenas of interaction at the district level in Uganda and the 
formal rules and guidelines defining the governance at this level67.  
 
The project of unity and the ambition of stability by consolidating the state have characterized the policies 
and actions taken by the NRM in its two decades in power. While avoiding opening political space for 
other parties and initiating democracy, the government of Uganda gradually introduced a formally 
elaborate decentralized system of governance based on the original resistance councils (Villadsen 1996:60). 
Through the constitution of 1995 and the local government act of 1997 the governance principles of the 
Ugandan state were formally placed within a democratic, participatory paradigm: “the state shall be based on 
democratic principles which empower and encourage the active participation of all citizens at all levels in their own governance” 
(Constitution of Uganda 1995: national objectives, II.i)68. 
 
The extended decentralization in Uganda has resulted in a comparatively substantial transfer of powers 
and resources from the central government to the local governments. This development has been 
enhanced by the support of international donors to Uganda’s decentralization as for instance with the 
LGDP and the Strengthening Decentralization in Uganda (SDU) supported by US Aid.  (Ssewakiriyanga 
2004:87f). According to the Local Government Act local governments take over the responsibility for 
service-delivery, they are entitled to collect taxes, and their are responsible for constructing and 
implementing their own development plans, approve and execute their own budgets, raise and use 
resources according to their own priorities, appoint  civil servants, standing committees, boards, and 
commissions, to make ordinances and bye-laws in accordance with the constitution, and to supervise and 
monitor the work of civil servants and the implementation of policies (GoU: The Local Government Act 
1997). 
 
There is no mentioning of the role of CSOs in the Local Government Act, but the LGDP programme has 
introduced a number of modules for involving CSOs in planning and monitoring. The modules are part of 
a larger training programme and are therefore voluntary – and therefore one could doubt the actual 
impact of them (cf. Interview, DANIDA, Governance Advisor Officer). The primary avenues for 
participation are the local council structure from the district to the village level. These councils form the 
                                                 
67 The discussions do not dwell on the overall dimensions and problems of decentralization in Africa as the focus remain on the 
perspectives for UDN intervention. The inherent problems in decentralization have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere, both 
on a general level (e.g. Smoke 2003, Wunsch 2003, Crook 2003) and at the national level in Uganda (e.g. Mitchinson 2003, Ellis & 
Bahigwa 2003).    
68 In comparison with other African states Uganda’s decentralization in terms of power and resources devolved to the local level 
is often described as one of the most ambitious decentralization programmes (e.g. Mitchinson 2003).  
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locus of decision-making at the district level, and we shall return to them later in this section (refer section 
5.5.). 
Having outlined the overall framework of decentralization we may enquire what forms of resources are 
available? 
 
5.4. Resources at the district 
As each district is not able to raise enough revenue through taxes a number of other mechanisms have 
been established to enable LGs to carry out activities. Apart from the tax revenues raised in each district 
there are three overall types of grants transferred from the central government to local governments 
(Francis & James 2003:330): 
- 84 % are conditional grants provided by government for implementation of specified, 
decentralized services within primary health, education, agricultural extension, feeder roads and 
safe water 
- 15% unconditional grants from the centre to address local development priorities (of which the 
majority is spend at salaries and running costs of local governments) 
- 1% equalization grants to assist poorer districts to provide social services at a level not below 
national average 
 
There are different requirements and modalities tied to different grants and funds at the district level 
corresponding to the different government programs that are implemented. Without going into details on 
different sub policies within the PEAP one may distinguish between funds that are administered by civil 
servants, funds that are part of educational programs, and funds that are released in a tender process 
(Francis and James 2003). 
 
The fact that conditional grants make 84% of the grants transferred to local government has led many to 
question the devolution of power and resources as it is described in the Local Government Act (Francis 
and James 2003, Ssewarakiriyanga 2004:91). If the majority of grants are already tied to different activities 
how does the LG exert discretion?69 In any case, as we shall see later on, the modalities and types of 
resources that enter each district may have great importance for the accountability and legitimacy relations 
and the opportunities for UDN to succeed with their interventions. 
 
Local revenue raised by local governments (in rural areas collected by sub county LG) at the district level 
is received are distributed according to the following principles (Local Government Act §86,1-6):  
- Sub counties retain 65% of their collection and remit 35% to districts,  
                                                 
69 Recently, however, the problem of fiscal decentralization has been further addressed and efforts have been made to limit the 
number of conditional grants, for instance as seen from the new Fiscal Decentralization Strategy (LGFC 2004?) and the 
construction of the Local Government Finance Commission. (Refer interview with Adam Babala, LGFC).  
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- Sub counties remit a) 25% of what they retained [i.e. the 65%, my addition] to village councils 
(LC1), b) 5% to Parish Councils, and c) 5% to County Councils. 
The main source to local revenue is the Graduated Tax which is raised from individuals70. The resources 
collected as local revenue, limited as they may be, are one of the contested issues in the politics of poverty 
at the local level. 
Apart from these government resources CSOs that implement service delivery programs also bring in 
resources to the district, but most often as contractors hired by government. There are only few donors 
that directly support smaller projects. 
 
The different modalities of resources at the district pose different challenges of accountability and 
opportunities for UDN to succeed with their intervention. We shall address these forms in the analysis of 
the case districts. 
 
5.5. Arenas of interaction in the local government 
The structure of local government includes a number of central decision-making platforms. These 
platforms potentially form on arenas of interaction between UDN and local government and we shall 
therefore briefly introduce them. 
There are 5 levels of local governments: LC5 on the district level, LC4 on the county level, LC3 on the 
Sub County Level, LC2 on the parish level, and LC1 on the village level. The county, parish and village 
level are administrative units whereas the sub county and the district level are actual local government 
councils with a political wing composed of elected leaders representing different areas and an 
administrative wing composed of an administrative chief, and accountant, and the civil servants. 
 
The local government act ascribes the highest authority at the district level to the District Council that is 
composed of directly elected politicians. This is the political wing of LG headed by the chairman of 
Council, the LC5.  The Council holds the legislative and executive powers of the District (LG Act: #10), 
i.e. the council among others approves the budgets and makes the overall decisions in the district (Local 
Government Act 1997:§31). 
 
The Chief Administration Officer (CAO) is the head of administration and public service in the district 
(LG Act: #64) and the CAO is responsible for the implementation of the decisions of the council and is 
mandated to “ensure accountability and transparency in the management and delivery of Council’s 
services” (LG Act 1997 # 65,b).  The administrative department comprises of a number of civil servants 
attached to different departments according to sectors and a financial department. 
                                                 
70 The Graduated Tax is a universal tax and has recently been politicized. Several politicians has suggested to scrap the tax, but 
this has raised concern about the financing of LGs in general (GoU PEAP 2004:137). As the analysis later will show, the GT is 
also a contested matter on the district level. 
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The District Service Commission (DSC) is appointed by the Council and is responsible for appointing and 
exercising disciplinary control over civil servants (LG Act #56, 1). This function also implies removing 
civil servants from office in case of abuse of office, and therefore the DSC is also an institution of 
accountability at the district level. 
Another accountability actor is the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) who is the representative of 
the President and Government in each District, and whose primary mandate is to monitor and inspect the 
activities of the District Local Government and coordinate the administration of Government services in 
the District. The RDC also has the mandate to involve the Auditor General of the Inspectorate General 
of Government (IGG) in case of need to investigate cases of mismanagement or abuse of office. 
 
The District Tender Board (DTB) is mandated to provide services to District and Sub County councils 
and administrative units by handling the procurement process and awarding tenders (LG Act § 92,1). The 
members of the DTB are appointed by the District Council following recommendation from the District 
Executive Committee. Given the fact that almost 80% (Cf. Interview, DANIDA, GAO) of the local 
government funds are used in tendering, the district tender board is a very important institution in the 
process of allocating funds to contractors implementing service delivery or providing other services. 
 
Finally, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has the mandate to examine the reports from the auditors, 
the internal auditor or any other commission of enquiry, investigate enquiries and matters raised in the 
report, and submit a report to the District Council to which the Council must adhere (LG Act 1997: §87, 
7-9). The PAC thus oversees the financial management of the district and forms an institution of 
accountability, and thus carries out a form of second order accountability. 
 
At the Sub county level the governance structure is almost similar to the District although much less 
developed: there is a Sub county Council, chaired by the LC3 Chairperson, that is mandated to monitor 
the general administration, the provision of government services and the implementation of projects (LG 
Act §25,1). The Executive Committee of the sub county, composed by members of the council and the 
chairperson, must, on behalf of the Council, initiate and formulate policies (including development plans), 
oversee implementation, assist in maintenance of law and security, solve problems and disputes in its 
jurisdiction, collect taxes, and serve as communication channel between government, District Council, and 
people in the area (LG Act 1997: §27, a-k and §81, 1-4). 
The administrative wing is headed by the Sub County Chief and includes an accountant and a number of 
civil servants, e.g. community development worker, agricultural extension officer, education officer, health 
officer, etc.  
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It is widely argued that the sub county level government is becoming a new important locus of 
governance in the districts as the size of many districts inhibits a proper management and effective 
allocation of resources (Interview, Martin Olaa, MOLG). 
 
The planning process in local government form one arena of interaction in which we could presume that 
UDN will seek to intervene (according to the BAI programme). Therefore a short description of the 
process is provided: First, villages at LC1 decide on how they prefer to spend their 25% generated from 
local revenue and make a so-called Community Action Plan, i.e. a list of priorities based on votes at village 
meeting, and eventually on the discretion of the LC1 chairman.  
Secondly, all village plans are gathered and submitted to the parish level LC2 (typically composed of 3-6 
villages) and priorities of the different plans are made in consultation with local government officers.  
 
Thirdly, the parish level plans are brought to the SC Council and synthesized into the SC development 
plan, which is often a 3-year plan. Eventually, the sub county plans and priorities are discussed at the 
District Budget Conference, and a new budget is developed on the basis of the conference and integrated 
with the existing district development plan. This plan is a three-year plan that is adjusted on an annual 
basis. 
 
Monitoring and evaluation forms the second government arena where we should presume that UDN 
would intervene. The responsibilities of monitoring and implementation of policies and projects in general 
rests with the district councillors, the civil servants in each sector, the CAO, and the sub county chiefs. 
We should therefore expect that UDN would seek to interact and gain information from these key figures. 
 
We have thus outline the formal role and functions of key actors in local governments with a particular 
focus on accountability institutions and the mandates of monitoring of particular actors. Furthermore, the 
planning process and monitoring institutions have been identified as arenas of interaction relevant to 
UDN.  
 
5.6. Perspectives on the role of CSOs and of UDN in local governance 
The discussion above has described some of the main characteristics and dynamics of local governments. 
We shall now briefly look into the role of CSOs on the district level in general in Uganda, and then 
present the programmes of UDN (BAI and CBMES) analyzed in this case study. 
 
At the district level most CSOs in Uganda are involved in service delivery (Barr et al. 2003). As resources 
and decision-making have been decentralized CSOs may access resources directly as sub contractors of 
the local government in the implementation of PEAP. Sector specific CSOs in some cases are actually 
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invited to join local government sector meetings and give their input and suggestions (Interview, CSO 
advisor, Tororo District Local Government), thus providing an arena of interaction.  
 
At lower level small scale CBOs are often constituted as self help groups and rarely interact with 
government institutions. With the advent of PEAP, however, a number of CSOs engaged in advocacy, 
lobbying and monitor activities have appeared, among these UDN and Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda, 
who have both instigated activities at district level. Another tendency has been the rise of CSO district 
networks that by co-opting all organizations in one district seek to influence district politics (examples 
include Tororo Civil Society Network, Teso Civil Society Network, and Kasese Civil Society Network) 
(Interview, DANIDA Advisor). 
However, experiences up to now have demonstrated the difficulties for district CSOs to affect policies at 
the district level (e.g. Brock 2004:134ff). The initiative of UDN to monitor the implementation of PEAP, 
however, provides a new kind of initiative not seen before in Uganda. 
 
The following section provides an overview of the background, objectives, and structures of UDN and in 
particular of the BAI and CBMES programmes. The account provides a background for analyzing the two 
cases of UDN engagements in the districts of Bushenyi and Tororo.  
 
Uganda Debt Network (UDN) is a registered NGO which was established in 1996 as a coalition of 
Ugandan NGOs to advocate and lobby on the issue of debt and the implication for poor people and to 
monitor the utilizations of saving from debt relief (UDN webpage – www.udn.co.ug). Since 1999, UDN 
has diversified its activities to include Policy Analysis and Research, Advocacy for Good Governance, and 
Empowerment of Grass root communities, especially the poor, to actively participate in the policy 
processes in addition to monitoring and evaluation of government programmes that are meant to benefit 
them. UDNs mission therefore is to promote and advocate for a participatory pro-poor policy process, prudent 
management of externally borrowed resources, productive and equitable use of national resources, and accountability and 
transparency. 
 
In the first period UDN focused on the national level in monitoring and analyzing the national budget 
allocations according to the PEAP criteria, and analyzing the national policies to eradicate poverty 
(Interview, Daniel Lukwago, UDN). Recently, UDN has focused on increasing the involvement of poor 
people in the budget process and other policy-making processes to ensure that their concerns, interests, 
and needs are provided for. Among the initiatives and projects undertaken, the Budget Advocacy Initiative 
and the Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation System are the focus of interests in this thesis. 
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The BAI was initiated in 1999 and completed in 2004. The main objective of this programme was to enable 
civil society to jointly and actively influence the formulation of pro-poor budget policies at all levels through developing their 
capacity to implement the project activities (DFID Programme Evaluation of the BAI Programme 2003). 
Through BAI, participating organizations receive capacity-building skills and information on budgetary 
processes to develop advocacy areas and lobbying strategies.   
For example, BAI has organized radio talk shows and introductory budget workshops; written and 
disseminated budget briefs; and monitored the government’s use of Poverty Action Fund resources for 
elementary education, primary health care, water and sanitation, road maintenance, and agricultural 
extension. These activities are aiming at empowering civil society to participate in the budget process and 
are widening the debate on national policies.  
 
The CBMES was introduced in 2001 and has been implemented in 17 districts. The CBMES is a 
“participatory learning and action mechanism by communities for tracking inputs and outcomes to measure performance of 
government programmes” (www.udn.or.ug). The overall goal of CBMES is “to empower grassroots communities to 
monitor and evaluate poverty and other development programmes for socio-economic change”. The direct objective of the 
CBMES is “to establish a Community based monitoring and Evaluation System to enhance participation of communities in 
decision making and policy influence”. 
 
UDN mainly elected the districts to be involved in CBMES on the basis of existing contacts and networks 
in the districts. (Interview, Daniel Lukwago, UDN). Following this, UDN contacts the local government 
in the district to inform of their intention to undertake activities in the district. Apparently, this does not 
involve a formal approval from LG, but is a necessary step for any NGOP wishing to operate in a district 
(Lukwago, interview, UDN).  
 
The next step is the process of electing the members of the monitoring groups. UDN invites a number of 
people to participate in a common meeting at the district HQ and the scope and content of work is 
presented. A group is formed, and in the following period the group receives further training facilitated by 
UDN staff on the PEAP, the PAF, the Constitution, budget process, LG Act. Secondly, they receive 
training on how to monitor, how to apply indicators in monitoring, etc.  The work as a monitor is unpaid 
and may thus be termed “voluntary”, but there are provisions to cover transport expenses and pay small 
per diems. 
 
The monitoring groups are organized with a district level core, the Poverty Monitoring Committee (PMC). 
This committee is composed of a chairperson, a vice chairperson, a secretary, a publicity & 
communications officer, usually around 8-10 people in total. Following the administrative structures, 
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monitoring committees are then constructed on the sub county level, and subsequently on the parish and 
village level.  
However, the monitoring groups do not usually cover all sub counties in the districts71. The structure of 
the groups at this level is the same as on the district level: chairperson, secretary, etc. The criteria for 
electing the persons were originally rather broad, and mainly emphasized the need to include women, 
youth, and the elderlies, but in recent years a demand for basic reading, writing and accounting abilities 
has been introduced (Interview, Daniel Lukwago, UDN). 
 
Working procedures of CBMES groups 
The CBMES group at the district level, the PMC, is the overall responsible for the monitoring process in 
the district. Each year the PMC produces a plan for how and when to conduct the monitoring activities at 
each level in the district. Each sub county PMC also submits a plan of its activities and plans for the year. 
The PMCs at the district coordinate the activities and usually join the sub county PMCs when the 
monitoring process takes place. It seems that the implementation of monitoring takes place in a limited 
period of time in which all monitors (sub county, parish or village) are involved (Interview, PMC Chair, 
Bushenyi). However, at the same time many of the PMCs also seem to consider the monitoring to be a 
constant duty, i.e. when they go from one place to another, or when they interact with civil servants 
(Group interview, PMCs in Mitooma, Kakanju, Paya, and Mukuju). 
 
Eventually, approximately every 6 months the PMC District on behalf of the PMC Sub county arranges a 
sub county dialogue  to which all stakeholders are invited: the PMCs, civil servants (e.g.. teachers and 
health workers, the sub county accountant), the sub county chief, and citizens in general. At this dialogue 
the PMC group presents its findings during the period, and the findings are then discussed among the 
stakeholders. At the district level this event is duplicated approximately every 6 months when the findings 
from the different sub counties are synthesized in a report. This report is published and send to the 
involved LG staff (LC5, CAO, civil servants), and then a District Dialogue Meeting is arranged during 
which the findings of the report are discussed. 
 
These are the fundamental characteristics of the working procedures of the CBMES.  We may now 
identify a number of arenas of interaction in which the PMCs may seek to interact in local governance: 
- Budget planning processes at LC1, LC2, LC3 and LC 5 levels in order to advocate for pro-poor 
policies and to acquire information about decisions on allocations and specific projects to enable 
efficient monitoring 
                                                 
71 In Bushenyi 7 out of 28 sub counties are covered (interview, PMC, Chair,) and in Tororo only 8 out of 24 sub counties. 
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- Monitoring government programs at all governance levels: allocations, efficiency, quality of work, 
etc. PMCs may interact with LG staff and councillors to obtain information on monitoring 
progress and challenges in implementation 
- PMCs may interact with LG institutions of accountability such as PAC and RDC to seek to 
improve accountability 
- PMCs may seek to acquire information on contracts and tenders from DTB in order to be able to 
carry out effective monitoring 
- Dialogue meetings with local government 
 
5.7 Summary 
The Uganda’s no-party democracy poses challenges for CSOs seeking to interact with and influence 
government institutions as they are balancing between opposing the government while not being labeled 
as partisan organizations. At the same time, the encompassing character of the state in many cases causes 
the distinction between civil society and the state to be rather blurred.  
 
With the introduction of the PEAP framework, the large number of CSOs involved in service delivery has 
gained a formal opportunity to engage more directly in policy formulation and implementation. This 
provides an arena of interaction at different levels – nationally and locally. The PEAP, apart from setting 
up the framework for policies to fight poverty and allocating substantial resources to the policies 
earmarked in the PAF funds, also deal with the challenge of handling accountability challenges faced in 
the implementation and monitoring of PEAP. Although mentioning the role of CSOs in monitoring and 
implementing PEAP the main actors are government institutions. However, monitoring PEAP 
implementation to secure accountability provides one arena of interaction for CSOs. 
 
With the extended decentralization and the provisions of the Constitution, a formal bottom-up planning 
process at all levels is prescribed as the mode of governance. This provides another arena of interaction 
for CSOs. However, as resources at local government are to a large extent already earmarked to specific 
activities the actual relevance of the bottom-up planning process could be questioned. Therefore, CSO 
efforts to influence the budget process may be hampered. The structure of local governments and the 
roles of different actors and institutions, however, also offer formal opportunities for CSOs to seek 
accountability as institutions such as IGG, RDC, and PAC have formal mandates to monitor and 
intervene in case of malpractices.  
 
UDN enters the district scene with two objectives: to empower the citizens to understand and influence 
the budget process and to empower grassroots communities to monitor and evaluate government 
programs. There are obvious arenas of interaction for UDN to engage local government in seeking 
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accountability, but how are these arenas configured in our case districts, and how are the outcomes 
decided? What opportunities and barriers does UDN meet in the process of implementing these 
programmes? To provide us with a concrete understanding of these questions we now turn to our two 
case districts Bushenyi and Tororo. 
 
 
Chapter 6 - The PEAP implementation process: Bushenyi and Tororo 
 67
 
Chapter 6 - The PEAP implementation process: Bushenyi and Tororo 
This chapter gives an account of the implementation of the PEAP in Bushenyi and Tororo, and thus 
provides and answer to the first part of the research question which asked “how was PEAP implemented and 
what were the obstacles and opportunities for accountability and legitimacy in the case districts?”  
Building on this account we may move closer to analyze and understand the role of UDN and the local 
government. Following a discussion of PEAP implementation experiences in Uganda, the two case 
districts are briefly presented in regard to their population, politics and economy. The analysis of the 
implementation process is focusing on planning & budgettting and monitoring as these two processes are 
the objectives for UDN interventions. However, in order to understand the functionality and 
characteristics of local government we also investigate the intra- and inter-organizational relations of local 
government, the capacity, and the resource situation and allocation decisions in the two case districts 
(refer figure 6.1 below). 
 
Figure 6.1: The focus of analysis in chapter 6 
 
 
6.1 Implementation of PEAP at district level – general experiences 
This section discusses the main challenges in implementing Uganda’s PEAP at the district level from an 
overall perspective focusing on accountability and legitimacy. 
Since 1997 the government of Uganda has coordinated and prioritized all policies within the PEAP 
framework with the overall objective of eradicating poverty. The implementation experiences so far have 
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revealed a number of achievements and challenges as regard to results and institutional setups and 
coherence. 
The PEAP has contributed to development of Uganda and to poverty reduction. Thus, from 1992 to 2000 
income poverty headcount decreased from 56% to 35% (Hickey 2003:6). Uganda has also been renown 
for reductions achieved in HIV/AIDS prevalence, and adding to this the country has experienced 
constant growth rates averaging 4-5% (although it should be noted that annual growth has diminished in 
recent years) (Reinikka & Collier 2001:17). 
 
The introduction of PEAP, however, has also revealed a number of governance challenges in Uganda. 
Several commentators have questioned the impact of the decentralization in Uganda to reach its stated 
goals such as improve service delivery, promote transparency and accountability, and provide enhance 
efficiency to government programmes (Ellis & Bahigwa 2003, Francis and James 2003, Rugambwa 2004).  
 
They argue that decentralization of power and resources has also led to decentralization of corruption and 
a patronage mode of politics: Some local governments have suddenly found themselves with too much power” 
(Turyasinga & Mudoi 2004:101). Some of the main concerns are the lack of involvement of local people 
on the planning processes, the risk of interference in decisions and staffing of the Tender Board by 
politicians or bureaucrats, the problem of shoddy work (i.e. contractors carry out poor work to increase 
their profit and are not prosecuted), the lack of information sharing, and the lack of access to institute 
proceedings in case of misappropriation (e.g. Turyasinga & Mudoi 2004:102, Rugambwa 2004). 
 
With the empowerment of politicians vis-à-vis the bureaucrats through the extended decentralization 
(politicians have attained the highest decision making authority trough the District Council), the 
organizational relations in many local governments have been strained. In some cases conflicts of interest 
between newly elected, often relatively poorly educated, but highly paid politicians and better educated, 
but low paid local bureaucrats have escalated72  (Francis & James 2003:333, Brock et at. 2001:18ff, DEI 
2003).  
 
The changes in power relations and status may be necessary for the implementation of decentralization, 
but they may also represent challenges for horizontal accountability within local government as cooperation 
between the two wings (political and administrative) is put under strain. Eventually, this may affect 
implementation of PEAP. For CSOs these potential internal disagreements poses a difficult challenge 
when interacting with a local government that could be internally split. 
  
                                                 
72 Francis and James mentions that an Assistant CAO earns around 210,000 Ugandan shillings a month whereas a non-graduate 
councilor/politician earns around 1,300,000 Ugandans shillings. (2003:333). The salary differences may pose an indirect incentive 
for patronage behaviour. 
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There seems to be a conflict between central line ministries imposing almost solely conditional grants on 
local government and the same local governments seeking to exercise discretion and maintaining 
autonomy in the name of decentralization (i.e. Francis and James 2003, Hickey 2003). This appears to be a 
problem in many different sectors: roads (Turyasinga & Mudoi 2004), primary education (Kasozi-
Mulindwa 2004), and also water and health (Hickey 2003, Jeppsson 2003).  
Often, the conditional grants are tied together with a number of different reporting requirements. This 
apparent conflict indicates a challenge of accountability: local governments must focus most of their 
resources in providing upwards accountability, whereas downwards accountability could risk becoming a second 
priority73.  
 
The inflexibility of conditional grants may cause problems for local governments to address specific local 
needs as all funds are earmarked to central target sectors outlined in the PEAP. Some observers even 
describe this internal government conflict as a “...territorial war between decentralization and PEAP”, i.e. line 
ministries have difficulties in tackling decentralization and therefore seek to use PEAP as a tool to uphold 
their powers (MOLG, Officer)74. 
  
Some line ministries apparently consider service delivery to have been under performing because of the 
transfer of responsibility to local governments and have raised their concern over “leakages at the local level” 
(Hickey 2003:43). One strategy used by line ministries is to adhere to strict, conditional grants and in some 
cases even to delay the transfer of grants (MOLG, Officer). 
 
Adding to this, it has been observed that the conditional grants and the strict requirements attached to 
them to a large extent limits the incentives for local governments to focus time, resources and energy in 
securing the bottom up planning process as described above. With most of resources already allocated to 
specific sectors there is no incentive to indulge in long planning processes (Hickey 2003:44).  
This poses a threat to downward accountability. CSO and citizen involvement in budget and planning 
processes in the district as local government may have limited interest in time consuming planning 
processes with many stakeholders in light of the above challenges. 
 
In the planning process a representative of MOLG also refers to the tendency that needs and priorities 
developed at LC1 and LC2 often are neglected at the LC3 level as a coherent development plan is 
completed. This problem is a consequence of the conflicting demands between extended decentralization 
                                                 
73 The new Fiscal Decentralization Strategy that was introduced in 2004 aims at diminishing this problem by increasing the 
number of unconditional grants and providing more flexibility in the conditional grants (Interview, LGFC). In this thesis, 
however, we do not analyze the new strategy as focus remains on the role of CSOs. 
74 For instance the Ministry of Health has been greatly unsatisfied with increasing LG discretionary powers as they consider it to 
have a negative impact on health service delivery (e.g. Jeppson 2002, Hickey 2003). 
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and participation with budget planning at four administrative levels and the universal demands for 
efficiency and effectiveness which also apply to planning processes (MOLG, Officer). The costs of 
participation compared to the actual outcome could sometimes be doubted. This dilemma poses a serious 
challenge to vertical accountability to the extent that citizens and CSOs can only bring forward their demands 
and their judgement through voting and not through direct participation in budget priorities.   
 
A related challenge is the battle for resources such as the 25% and 5% at village and parish level which 
according to most actors are both scarce and at the same time are highly subjective to embezzlement from 
LC1 and LC2 chairpersons. There is often no financial accountability for these resources (i.e. MOLG 
Joint Assessment Review Document (JARD) 2004; Rugambwa 2004, DEI 2003).  
 
The declining local revenue at the local level represents another challenge in PEAP implementation as the low 
local revenue make local governments much more dependent on central government grants, thus limiting 
their autonomy (Kjær 2004, Ellis & Bahigwa 2003). Not having to respond and refer to local taxpayers, 
local governments again have more incentives to secure the upward accountability. This may pose a direct 
threat to the mechanisms of political, vertical accountability while simultaneously it hampers the relevance of 
planning at lower levels as resources in the 25% and 5% schemes (the resources allocated for LC1 and 
LC2 planning) are scarce75. Vice-versa, without paying their taxes people in the districts (and with them 
CSOs) risk that their right to participate and seek to influence or monitor policies is questioned.  
 
Political accountability is also very much affected by the fact there is a turnover of almost 75% of councillors 
at LC3 and LC1 levels (MOLG Officer, DANIDA GAO). The short period as incumbents may affect the 
incentives and decisions of the politicians and thus affect implementation of policies in the districts76. It 
has been asserted by several actors that councillors in order to get elected need to invest a substantial 
amount of resources during campaigns, and that there is a general norm that politicians need to finance 
these expenses by seeking to embezzle money (IGG, Information Officer & DEI, Secretary). The 
earmarked 5% allocation for monitoring funds is thus in some cases subjective to risk of embezzlement.  
This is another clear example of the patrimonial traits in politics of poverty in that public office is also a 
direct window of opportunity for access to gains.  
 
                                                 
75 The discussion on the relationship between local revenue and the implications for governance has been investigated with 
different perspectives, see for instance Kjær (2004) and Ellis and Bahigwat (2003). This thesis does cover this issue in depth, but 
mentions local revenue as an important factor of accountability in the districts. 
76 Tax and local revenue collection was deeply politicized at the 2001 presidential elections when president Museveni was forced 
to promise significant reductions of the Graduated Tax in order to overcome promises by his opponent Besigye. However, the 
outcome of this politization has been a significant reduction on local revenue in a majority of districts in Uganda (see for instance 
Hickey 2003:40).  
 
 
Chapter 6 - The PEAP implementation process: Bushenyi and Tororo 
 71
The short time period of politicians and the incentives that could influence them cause the need for CSOs 
to thoroughly consider their approach to politicians in interaction. 
 
In the implementation phase the capacity among extension officers, public employees (health workers, 
teachers, etc.) and the salary level has been raised as another crucial factor for implementation. In many 
cases the low capacity level and the low wages have been mentioned as one of the most important factors 
in distorting implementation of public services. Public employees (including street level bureaucrats) may seek 
to add to their income by demanding extra fees for services and the lack of capacity among extension 
officers can endanger an effective implementation, e.g. because of insufficient monitoring, or weak 
supervision (MOLG, Officer). 
 
As decentralization is embedded in at the highest local government level, the district, staff capacity is 
slowly increasing (although there are huge regional differences). As the sub county becomes an 
increasingly important actor, however, the lack of capacity and staff strength at this level becomes an 
important challenge for accountability structures. In the analysis of accountability problems outlined in 
PEAP and in government plans, a causal relationship is made between increasing capacity among staff 
(e.g. raising their basic wages, providing them with new knowledge and tools) and reducing corruption77. 
Through this initiative the program seeks to improve the potential conflict between central and local 
actors in Uganda’s PEAP and decentralization (DANIDA Governance Advisor, Kampala).  
 
In line with this argument some actors even claim that lack of capacity among the general population to 
understand basic mechanisms such as voting and the role of politicians represent a very important 
problem for improving vertical accountability (e.g. MOLG, Officer & DEI, Officer). As long as people do 
not put up demands towards their leaders there is no reason to think that intransparent or unaccountable 
behaviour will change. One tool to promote this is to promote programmes of civic education according 
to the director of DEI (DEI, Officer) – in line with the governance mode described earlier. Another 
approach in this line of thinking is the intervention of CSOs in citizen initiatives, e.g. UDN CBMES 
programme. 
This problem demonstrates the underlying patrimonial logics in that public office is a mean to personal 
gain. The lack of capacity in the target group and the prevalence of patronage modes of governance 
among LG staff constitute a major risk for elite capture of policy implementation at the local level as 
emphasized by Grindle (Grindle 1980). 
 
Also, the modalities of specific programmes and the delegation of powers in these programmes can affect 
implementation and accountability. One example is Uganda’s Universal Primary Education (UPE) 
                                                 
77 This thinking is also reflected in the LGDP programs I and II described in chapter 5. 
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programme that has delegated more influence to head teachers on the expense of the existing parent and 
teacher groups. Hickey (2003:44) observes that this change has led to decreasing local ownership of 
programmes and increased risk of embezzlement of funds in the education sector. Implementation of 
PEAP, depending on the modality of policy and the incentives among street level bureaucracy, can thus 
lead to politization of government programmes in which implementers exploit their position and access 
public funds as personal gains (e.g. DEI 2003:13, Rugambwa 2004). 
 
The monitoring of PEAP programmes forms an important part of implementation process. This is a most 
important arena in our case study as UDN activities focus on monitoring of PAF funds. Monitoring is a 
crucial part of implementation in terms of providing feedback to politicians on the efficiency of 
programmes and the effectiveness of reaching stated policy goals.  
The monitoring at local government level in general is by some donors seen as rather ineffective (e.g. 
SDU Officer, EU-MMP Officer), and this is also supported by the fact that the LGDP has a substantial, 
independent, nationwide monitoring and evaluation system instead of applying existing structures 
(DANIDA, GAO)78. However, monitoring systems are an integrated part of all local government 
programmes according to law, and, as describe above, 5% of the PAF are earmarked to monitoring of 
PEAP programmes. This should give us reason to expect that adequate resources have been allocated to 
this component of the implementation process. 
 
The existence of extensive monitoring systems could provide an important pool of information and 
knowledge for CSOs such as UDN undertaking their own monitoring activities of government 
programmes. In this way the systems could complement each other. However, the monitoring arena could 
also risk becoming a highly politicized and intransparent arena to the extent that local government actors 
struggle to get access to funds. In such a context the monitoring activities undertaken by CSOs such as 
UDN may be confined by local government actors seeking to secure their positions and interests. 
 
In summarizing, the above discussion has outlined the arenas of accountability challenges in implementing 
PEAP at local government level and the opportunities for CSO intervention. We have observed how 
central-local relations, internal relations in local government, the financial status (including local revenue) of the 
districts, the capacity of local government staff  affect the accountability of local government and the 
opportunities and incentives for CSO intervention in planning processes and monitoring. 
 
Furthermore, we have demonstrated the importance of accountability challenges in the institutions of 
tender board, district service commission. The implementation process has also revealed a number of 
                                                 
78 Recently, in March 2005, The GoU introduced the so-called National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES) 
which is expected to be an encompassing, integrated monitoring system that should streamline monitoring and reduce the risk of 
parallel systems (Lucas et al. 2004:12).  
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challenges in legitimacy and accountability of street level bureaucrats. Finally, we have seen how monitoring 
of PEAP poses dual avenues for CSO engagement: they form important access to information, but may 
also be closed arenas where powerful, local actors protect their patronage interests.  
 
Table 6.1: Overall accountability aspects of PEAP implementation in Uganda 
Accountability 
type 
Opportunities for 
accountability 
Threats to accountability UDN Intervention 
Horizontal, 
upward 
accountability 
Strong rule-based regime, 
control mechanisms 
Conflict between central 
and local authorities, 
capacity limitations 
- 
Vertical, 
downward 
accountability 
Formal bottom-up planning 
mechanisms and institutions 
in place 
Bias because of upward 
accountability focus, 
capacity limitations, 
resource limitations 
Engage in planning 
process 
Monitoring 
Accountability 
Resources allocated and 
rules in place 
Patronage behaviour of 
LG monitors, lack of 
dissemination  
Engage in 
monitoring – 
provide feedback to 
LG 
Political 
accountability 
Officially open, regular 
elections at LC5 and LC3 
Short cycles with 
incumbents, risk of 
patronage behaviour, vote 
buying 
Elections (not 
exclusively UDN) 
 
The relationship between the local governments and CSOs thus seem too difficult to predict. Local 
governments possess a double role: On the one hand their formal autonomy provides them with powers 
to plan and implement policies; on the other hand there are still several tiers to central government which 
necessitates a priority to horizontal accountability.  
CSOs at the district level typically react with disengagement towards the option of cooperating with local 
government. They do not have a formal legally ascribed role in local governance, and many CSOs decide 
to stay outside local government and implement their own activities, e.g. in specific sectors (Brock et al 
2004:97). But investigating the case of UDN we shall look at the crucial accountability arenas and arenas 
of interaction in which they may seek to influence local government actors. 
 
Taking these different arenas of PEAP implementation into consideration we shall now move to our case 
districts. We shall focus our analysis on the arenas and institutions outlined above: implementation 
challenges and achievements, the planning process and avenues for participation for CSOs, the tender 
board and district service commission and avenues for CSO monitoring, the monitoring activities and 
dissemination of information regarding plans, budgets, and monitoring results, and avenues for CSO 
monitoring, and the autonomous spaces of interaction created by UDN (dialogue meetings, radio). 
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6.2 The case districts Bushenyi and Tororo 
The district of Bushenyi is located in Western Uganda, approximately 400 kilometres from Kampala79. 
The large majority of the population of approximately 750,000 citizens are all Banyankore, and they all 
speak Runyankole (Bushenyi District Development Plan 2004-07). The district was established in 1965 
when the former Ankole Kingdom80 was divided into two districts, Bushenyi and Ntungamo districts. In 
comparison with other Ugandan districts, Bushenyi is well-off in terms of livelihood and production, the 
main crops being plantain, coffee and general subsistence farming and livestock rearing. The household 
expenditure per capita is 1.304 Ugandan Shillings (UNDP 2000 cited in Brock et al. 2003:2). 
The LC5 of Bushenyi is now in his second term of office as he was elected in 2000. In Bushenyi the sub 
counties of Kakanju and Mitooma have been selected as cases. Kakanju is located approximately 12 
kilometres from the district capital whereas Mitooma is located almost 35 kilometres from Bushenyi 
Town. Mitooma is also the centre of a county and therefore has a LC4 health clinic (Mitooma SC Chief). 
 
The district of Tororo is located in Eastern Uganda approximately 200 kilometres from Kampala and 
borders with Kenya. The population of approximately 560,000 people comprises three major ethnic 
groups: the Luo, the Iteso, and the Japadhola81. The district of Tororo established in 1970 when the 
former, larger Tororo district was carved out into the Bugiri and the smaller, present day Tororo district. 
Some argue that this division was a measure to avoid ethnic strides (LC5 Tororo), but also part of the 
general construction of smaller, more sustainable districts. The main source of income is subsistence 
farming and border trade with Kenya. The household expenditure per capita averages 1.043 Ugandan 
shillings (UNDP 2000 cited in Brock et al 2003:2).  The LC5 in Tororo was appointed at the last elections 
in 2001, and the CAO has been suspended for a period of time during 2002-2004 (CAO Tororo, 
Councillor of Works Tororo). 
In Tororo, the sub counties of Paya and Mukuju have been selected as cases. Paya is a rural sub county 
located almost 35 kilometres from Tororo town, whereas Mukuju is located approximately 10 kilometres 
from Tororo. Paya is one of the older sub counties in the region, whereas Mukuju was established in the 
early 1990s (Mukuju SC chief). 
 
6.3 The planning process 
In this section we look at the existing planning process and monitoring mechanisms in the two case 
districts. We investigate this process as part of the PEAP implementation process at the local level with 
                                                 
79 Reference os made to annex E, a map of Uganda including districts.. 
80 The Banyankole also today maintain a ceremonial kingdom and their king is the official head. In conversations reference is 
often made to the Ankole Kingdom as the “real” boundaries of the district (i.e. Interview with Tender Board Chairman, 
Bushenyi) 
81 These are the major groups. Small groups of Kenyans and Somalian refugees also inhabit the district.  
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the aim of understanding the dynamics of governance in the local context with particular focus on the role 
of CSOs in the planning process and in monitoring.   
The planning process is formally a fundamental part of the PEAP implementation. From the lowest level, 
LC1 in villages, and the gradually upwards to the district government on LC5 the prioritisations must be 
based on needs assessments and public hearings as outlined in Uganda’s constitution, LG Act, and in the 
provisions of the LGDP programme82. 
 
Bushenyi 
In Bushenyi local government staff from the district level and at both sub counties regards the planning 
process as fundamentally building on and shaped around the bottom up planning. However, depending 
on position there are obvious differences of opinion among the actors. Also, there seem to be agreement 
that participation at the lower levels of government is somewhat limited. 
 
Thus, both the administrative leaders at Mitooma and Kakanju sub counties state that the input from 
villagers at LC1 level is fairly limited (Interview SC Chief, Mitooma and Interview, SC Chief, Kakanju). 
The attendance in the meetings is very low, and some groups, e.g. women and youth, do not show up. 
However, the administrative leaders still maintain that the planning process is basically bottom-up, thus 
allowing participation from villagers. 
They also mention that CBOs are involved at the sub county annual budget meeting, but they mainly 
observe and participate. CSOs are understood mainly as supporters in service provision more than as 
partners in governance (e.g. interview, SC chief, Kakanju). However, in Kakanju there is also a persistent 
problem about financial control due to weak staff, and this may cause problems in the planning process as 
adequate financial information is not available.  
 
At the top level of local government it is a general feature that all government staff, whether politicians or 
administrators describe the planning process as a full, participatory bottom-up process. Thus, it is insisted 
that all procedures in the planning process, including the needs assessment, are duly followed, and it is 
argued that since Bushenyi district receives LGDP funding there are requirements to be followed in detail 
regarding planning (e.g. Interview, Deputy CAO).  
 
Some observers argue that the main problem in developing plans and budgets is the lack of capacity 
among the people at the grassroots level, in that they are not capable of participating in meetings or giving 
any substantial input (e.g. Interview with CAO). One informant explains this as a consequence that it is a 
general problem, that many local citizens only want to spent time on meetings etc. in case they receive 
                                                 
82 Refer chapter 5 for the legal and political framework for the planning process at district level. 
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some sort of support – i.e. payment of lunch, remuneration, financial support or other types of support 
(Finance Officer, Bushenyi)83.  
 
The CSOs are only to a very limited extent in planning process at the district level (CAO, Deputy CAO, 
and LC5 Bushenyi). On the contrary, LC5 describes the NGO sector as very weak. The informants 
explain the relative strong planning capacity by the relative high general capacity among local government 
staff. Thus, there are 18 MA degree holders among the staff (CAO, Bushenyi) and this is one of the main 
reasons for successful and participatory planning process.)84. The CAO of Bushenyi also emphasizes such 
factors as the general awareness among people and their patriotism as important factors in successful 
planning processes.  
 
In Bushenyi there seem to be formal, open spaces for citizen and CSO participation in the planning 
process which is described as bottom-up, but they are limited by capacity constraints and lack of interests 
with the target group and with CSOs. However, the strong staff at district level results in effective and 
good quality planning. 
 
Tororo 
In Tororo there is much larger divergence as regard the planning processes in the district. Basically, 
though, the admin and political leaders draw a picture of a participatory, bottom-up planning process, but 
they add limitations to this picture. 
At lower levels of government (LC1-Lc3) one common characteristic is low participation by citizens, both 
in numbers and in activity. Admin leaders, politicians and technical staff describe a process of needs 
assessment, consultations in villages and assistance in writing up of plans at all three levels (e.g. SC chief 
Paya, SC chief Mukuju, Agriculture Assistant Paya, Health Worker Paya, LC2 Chairpersons Mukuju). 
However, both leaders at SC level and district level point to the problem of low quality of plans produced 
at all three levels because of low capacity (e.g. CAO Tororo, District Planner Tororo) and the 
inconsistence of plans compared with implementation (e.g. the use of the 25% fund at LC1 which is used 
for other purposes that outset in the plan). 
  
Bukedi Diocese Development Organization, a district NGO, raises severe doubt about any actual 
participation at lower levels of government and argues that participation is merely symbolic in that there is 
no discussion and interaction at the meeting (Bukedi Programme Officer). Formal spaces exist, but there 
is no real access.  
                                                 
83 This could be labelled the “monetarization” of politics and governance – i.e. access to resources become the prime incentive for 
becoming involved in governance (refer patrimonial mode of governance above in chapter 4). During the analysis we shall 
investigate how this dynamic is reflected in UDN engagement in the districts.  
84 At the sob counties investigated both the SC Chiefs were also graduates in administration. 
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The CSO officer in local government also mentions this issue: “very little is changed at the district budget meeting. 
The budget is presented, but even the councillors do not seem to be interested at this level” (CSO Officer, Tororo)85. 
However, he also emphasizes that CSOs involved in service delivery are involved in different sector 
working groups in which they are assigned tasks and budgets whenever the local government cannot cover 
the sector completely, i.e. a kind of “gap-filling” role (this observation is also noted in Brock et al. 2001). 
 
At the district level the planning process according the LC5 and the CAO follows the bottom-up mode 
with dialogues at all lower levels, and involvement of different stakeholders at sub county and district 
budget conferences. Among the difficulties in the planning process at the district is the tendency for 
councillors to compete for resources, i.e. they seek to favour their “own” sub counties in allocation 
decisions (District Planner, Tororo and CAO, Tororo). This again demonstrates the patronage mode of 
governance in the tendency of personalization of power. 
One actor even describes the planning as useless and instrumental: “...the capacity of LC1 to plan is so limited, 
so it becomes almost useless process. SC plans are also weak, the district often replies with other projects than priorities” 
(District Planner, Tororo). This problem is enhanced by the fact that sometimes priorities as laid out in 
sub county plans are overruled in the district budget decisions. 
 
It is also seems obvious that major challenges to the planning process arise as a result of internal 
constraints. At LC1-3 level it frequently occurs that investment plans, which should be defining the 
allocations to different budgets, are not linked with budgets, but are merely produced as a separate entity. 
According the district planner in Tororo LG, almost half of the SCs have weak administrative leaders 
which hamper effective and also participatory planning (District Planner, LG) and this is confirmed by the 
observation that several of the crucial committees for planning and budgeting are not operative in some 
SCs86. The CAO laments that “SC chiefs should be replicas of CAOs, but are often just tax collectors” (CAO, 
Tororo). The weak structures at LC3 level diminishes opportunities for CSOs to make any influence on 
planning and carry out budget advocacy at lower levels. 
 
There seem to be limited opportunities for UDN to intervene and influence planning processes due to the 
high risk of elite capture because of low capacity and participation at the lower level. The room of maneuver 
for CSOs is limited to smaller invited spaces which are constrained by risk of elite captures, resource 
deficiencies, and inconsistencies in different levels of planning (LC1-LC5). Furthermore, the role of CSOs 
is traditionally limited to serve as a gap-filler in specific sectors, and UDN budget advocacy initiative could 
                                                 
85 The CSO Officer also explains the lack of interest among councillors as regard the budget by the fact that almost 90% of 
activities are funded by conditional grants from the centre. 
86 Observations from Mukuju SC confirmed the problem of low capacity at SC level in terms of management, dissemination of 
information, and budgetting. In Paya, however, the staff and Chief were better educated and observations from SC office 
indicated that a culture of information dissemination was more common, although the information displayed was dated. 
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therefore foresee substantial aversion since it could be regarded as inherently political.  However, it seems 
that there are better opportunities in Bushenyi than in Tororo since capacity and participation is 
somewhat higher in Bushenyi and formal structures are adhered to.  
 
6.4 Implementation Process 
This section investigates the different parameters of the implementation process in the two districts that 
were outlined in the theoretical framework: the organizational and intra-organizational issues, the 
resources, and the behaviour of the target group. First, however, we shall briefly present the overall 
implementation experiences. 
  
Implementation experiences 
In Bushenyi many actors in local government agree that implementation have been successful and service 
delivery has been improved in different sectors (CAO, LC5, Councillor of works, Engineer). This is 
confirmed by the high assessment of Bushenyi LG in the LGDP assessment report (LGDP Assessment 
2004 Bushenyi District). Bushenyi district was thus as one of only 9 (TJEK) districts in Uganda awarded a 
bonus in the LGDP system as a result of their achievements87 and has also been awarded a number of 
other prices in reward of their achievements. 22 of the 27 sub counties in the district also received 
performance bonus, and only one received a penalty for underperformance. 
 
Governance factors are used as explanations for this success: the high capacity among staff, the good 
relationship between councillors and admin staff, and the solid financial situation (CAO, Bushenyi & LC5, 
Bushenyi, also refer Bushenyi Local Government Annual Report 2003-04). CSOs in Bushenyi are not 
mentioned as contributing in any significant degree to effective implementation of PEAP. 
 
In Tororo the implementation of PEAP programmes have met a number of significant challenges while 
also a number of achievements. The programmes have resulted in an increase in the number of people 
who have access to water (from 47% to 52% since 2002), and an increase of the number of pupils at 
schools (CAO, LC5), and improvement in roads (Engineer, Councillor of Works).  
At sub county level improvements have been noted in Mukuju health sector and in improvements of 
school building (Mukuju Councillors & Mukuju LC3), and improvements in health sector has also been 
noted at the district level with the opening of new health centres (Councillor of social services). In Paya 
the LC3 emphasized the impact of PEAP specifically in health and school (LC3 Paya; Tororo District 
Development Plan 2004-2007).  
 
                                                 
87 The LGDP assessments is an annual assessment that investigates a number of different procedures (including planning, 
accounting, monitoring, etc.) etc. among the local governments. Refer chapter 5 for a further description. 
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CSOs in general play a role as contributors in different sectors as service providers. In Tororo the major 
CSOs are either directly implementing PEAP activities in health and agriculture, and the small CBOs are 
involved in health, credit schemes, HIV/Aids initiatives, etc. (Interview, Church Network Tororo + CSO 
Advisor, Tororo Local Government). (LG CSO Officer). 
The above achievements could be expected to increase the legitimacy of local government in the district. 
 
Organizational and intra-organizational issues 
As described above, Bushenyi staff are comparatively highly educated, both at district level with 18 staff 
holding MA degrees, and at sub county level (e.g. in the two case sub counties the SC chiefs both had BA 
degrees from the university). This capacity advantage is one important factor for a strong organization and 
effective implementation88.  
Secondly, the relative good relations between administrative staff and politicians are also emphasized as an 
important factor contributing to implementation because it improves the working environment (LC5, 
CAO, and Councillor of social services). The same factors are also mentioned in the local government 
reports on reasons for implementation achievements (e.g. Bushenyi LG Annual Report 2003-04). Thus, 
the risk that conflicting interests between politicians and admin staff would hamper implementation did 
not escalate here according to staff and also external reports (LGDP Assessment 2004, Brock et al. 2004). 
 
The tender board is assessed by both external observers (e.g. LGDP Assessment 2004), the former 
secretary of the tender board, and local government staff to be fairly well-functioning and transparent in 
its procedures. The ex-secretary emphasizes that the problem of shoddy work is not the responsibility of 
the board as they only award tenders, and do not carry out supervision and monitoring. Bushenyi also 
received a reward from the central government for the work of the tender board (Ex-secretary, tender 
board Bushenyi). 
 
LC5 and CAO in Bushenyi both agree that the private sector through the increasing use of tendering in 
local service delivery has become more important, but it is a challenge to accountability, and thus also to 
implementation, that the private sector is still rather weak while also very keen on acquiring tenders (CAO, 
Bushenyi, LC5 Bushenyi, Engineer Bushenyi). The weakness of the private sector in some cases 
deteriorates service delivery as companies produce shoddy work. According to the engineer this happens 
in almost 20% of the projects undertaken and therefore shoddy work is regarded as a main problem 
(Engineer, Bushenyi). The issue of shoddy work is highly important in relation to the monitoring work 
carried out by UDN89. 
 
                                                 
88 Refer the governance framework and implementation theory (see chapter 4). 
89 One of the themes of the radio programmes was also the problem of shoddy work (Radio programme, UDN Bushenyi). 
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Another threat to accountability is within finance. The financial accountability have improved at SC level 
were staff have become more responsible in book keeping, but at LC1 and LC2 financial accountability 
still very weak (Senior Finance Officer). 
 
The role of CSOs is assessed to be rather meagre. In fact the LC5 claims that “secretive operations of CSOs” 
are a threat to implementation of PEAP (LC5, interview). The most important CSO in the district is active 
within agriculture (BUDIFA), and most other CSOs are rather small in size of programmes (mostly in 
health) (Lc5, Bushenyi, Councillor of Health). 
 
According to some actors in the district one of the reasons for the weakness of civil society is the 
tendency of NRM hegemony in the district. Located in Western Uganda near the native town of president 
Museveni, the NRM structure is very strong here, and some actors claim that this dominance suffocates 
alternative positions (PMC Officer, Bushenyi District PMC). However, it is difficult to find evidence to 
prove this tendency, although observations at a local government meeting gave indications of this 
dominance90. 
 
The district government in Tororo has since 2003 been affected by deep internal disagreements and 
conflicts. This was manifested in almost all interviews, but in particular with the political wing of 
government (CAO, Councillor of Works, Councillor of Social Services, LC5, RDC, and District Planner). 
The background and the reasons for the conflicts are difficult to extrapolate, but it is evident that they 
involve mutual accusations of mismanagement of office and improper acquirement of resources between 
the LC5 and a few adherents and another large part of the council. The severity of the conflict was 
revealed in the observed council meeting which had to be cut short because of loud, angry and semi-
violent discussions between different council members (Council Meeting, observed).  
 
Although it was mentioned that the conflict had now been resolved (e.g. LC5, TOCINET Chairman) it is 
obvious that disagreements of this sort hamper the work of the council in decision-making and budgeting 
and diminishes the opportunities for successful implementation. The RDC described that “council work is 
regularly blocked, and because of wrangles there is no cohesion in council decisions” (RDC, Tororo). 
 
Another major challenge in policy implementation in Tororo is the political interference in implementation 
and monitoring which is described by a number of actors (District planner, RDC, Chief Finance Officer, 
Chairman of Commerce). This interference is for instance manifested in the tendering processes in which 
some politicians apparently award tenders to companies owned by themselves but in the name of relatives 
                                                 
90 The rhetoric of the LC5 and the constant references to Museveni in a speech were some of the examples observed. The PMC 
officer, who is also a youth council member, went as far as saying that you cannot influence anything if you do not embrace the 
Movement (PMC Officer, PMC Bushenyi District). 
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or friends (Chairman of Commerce, RDC)91. The RDC even go as far as claiming that “implementation 
suffers because of the widespread corruption” (RDC, Tororo). Tendering interference is also observed at the sub 
county level (CAO, Tororo). Even the finance department of the district has experienced political 
interference in its operations raising doubt on the impartiality of the department (CFO, Tororo). At sub 
county level (in Paya) the recent changes of administrative staff also reveal the degree of accountability 
problems92. 
 
Political interference at different levels in implementation is an example of personalization of power, clientelism 
and the transcending of formal mandates, and demonstrates how patrimonial governance modes are 
important factors in Tororo district politics. The internal conflicts in the local government may form an 
important hindrance to effective UDN intervention in promoting accountability since UDN will 
potentially be challenging the interests of the local elites. 
 
The capacity of local government staff in Tororo is an influential factor for the challenges in 
implementation process according to many of the actors involved. Mukuju councillors refer to the 
problem that because of insufficient accounting in several years they have no knowledge of financial 
accounts (Mukuju Councillors). A parallel problem is found in Paya where the accounts until recently have 
been lacking for several years back in time. This raises severe doubt of financial accountability in sub 
county local governments. According the LG District Planner the capacity of SC chiefs in almost half of 
the sub counties is insufficient in terms of planning, budgetting, and monitoring of policies. “We are let 
down by SC chiefs. You go to monitor and you find out there is nothing there” (CAO, Tororo). 
 
Resources 
The comparatively solid financial status of the district enhances the opportunities for successful 
implementation (e.g. Bushenyi LG Annual Development Report). There are no budget deficits, and local 
tax revenue is higher than the national average of Uganda (CAO, LGDP Assessment 2004). This revenue 
make up the largest part of financing of budgets at the sub county, parish, and village level, and therefore 
one must, according with the governance paradigm, expect that there is a greater incentive to actively 
participate in planning since resources are there. 
 
There is a recurrent problem of delay of unconditional grants which causes the release of wages to be 
delayed, but this seems to be limited to short periods of the year (Chief Finance Officer). This should 
                                                 
91 The chairman of commerce claims that the entire private sector is infiltrated by politicians: “Tenders are being taken by the 
councillors themselves. Business community is avoided in the tendering process, and councillors take all tenders. You need to give 
bribe to get access to tenders” (Chairman of Commerce). 
92 LC3 Paya explains that during his incumbent period of three years he has worked together with four different SC chiefs, of 
which the two were removed because of irregularities in office (e.g. lack of finance management or embezzlement). (LC3 Paya). 
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decrease the risk of implementation distortions and accountability problems - e.g. that street level 
bureaucrats have incentives to seek to increase they income by demanding extra payment for services. 
However, there is also a widespread experience that co funding initiatives involving resources raised at the 
local level are difficult to implement (LC5, SC Chief Mukuju, District Engineer). 
 
The financial situation in Tororo is unsustainable as the there has been over-budgeting for the last 4 years 
(CFO, CAO). This problem is aggravated by the rather low level of local revenue collected (refer LGDP 
Assessment Tororo 2004), which is also complained by actors at both sub county and district level 
(Mukuju Councillors, Mukuju SC, Paya SC, CAO)93. The district thus has a shortfall of 60 million 
Ugandan shillings every month because of low revenue which makes it difficult to cover payments and 
expenses (LC5 Tororo). 
 
The insufficiency in funds and over-budgeting has direct consequences for implementation. On the 
overall level transfers from the centre (such as LGDP funds) are decreased (as the district does not meet 
the performance standards), and on the field level the general constraints in resources have impact on the 
local projects – i.e. projects are under-budgeted so that shoddy work is likely to be the outcome (Mukuju 
SC Chief gives several examples of this)94. The councillor of finance even explains the problem of shoddy 
work as a result of insufficient funds instead of malfunctioning institutions (“the funds that are allocated to 
schools are not sufficient and therefore there is a high risk of shoddy work”) (Councillor of Finance, Tororo). 
 
The low performance which Tororo district has demonstrated in previous years (e.g. LGDP Assessment 
Tororo 2004) also affects the transfers from the centre which may be further delayed, both from line 
ministries and from donors (e.g. Paya Sc Chief & LC3 Paya, Councillor of Social Services, Councillor of 
Finance). This negative spiral affects the opportunities for successful implementation, e.g. at the 
implementation site where street level bureaucrats may turn to charging fees for services in case they don’t 
receive their salaries or where the risk for shoddy work in public works increases. 
 
Adding to this, the audit functions of the district have in several cases been subject to severe criticism in 
LGDP assessments and the PAC also confirms that audit reports are not of sufficient quality, and that 
there is no follow up of the PAC enquiries. This raises concerns that financial accountability in the district 
is not there (PAC, Tororo). 
The scarcity of resources is reflected on the behaviour of CSOs as well in the struggle between different 
CSOs about access to projects and thereby resources (CSO Officer & Bukedi Diocese). The question now 
is how are local PMCs of UDN able to engage this arena and raise demands for financial accountability? 
                                                 
93 In Paya SC local revenue has plunged from 51% in 2003 of estimated revenue to be collected to 35% in 2004 (Paya SC Chief).  
94 The councillors of Paya Sc explained they had two month remittances in salaries. Again, this may pose a threat to accountability 
(Paya SC Councillors). 
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Target group 
The behaviour of the target group could also be an important factor for successful implementation. In 
Bushenyi local government staff observe a number of challenges regarding the target group. One major 
problem is the general difficulty of mobilizing local villagers in taking ownership of government 
programmes: “communities do not know their role – they want money if they are requested to go to some meeting” 
(Secretary of finance, Bushenyi). This point is also backed by staff at the sub county level (e.g. Kakanju 
SC), and indicates that patrimonialism (as primarily a struggle for resources) is extremely important as a 
source for understanding the behaviour of citizens in implementation. This behaviour may also impact the 
opportunities for CSO engagement. 
 
Another problem is the lack of resource mobilization, both in terms of tax collection and in terms of 
government projects that are based on a co-funding principle95. Although Bushenyi on an overall level has 
a higher tax collection rate than other districts, the tax collection rate is still less than 30% in some sub 
counties, e.g. Kakanju. This may cause difficulties for implementation of SC and parish initiatives and for 
covering running costs of the sub county. 
The relative weakness of civil society, private sector and the target group in general indicates that 
Grindle’s assumption on weak interest generation is relevant in this context and that it may impede 
opportunities for UDN to carry out budget advocacy (Grindle 1980). 
 
In Tororo the management of local government describes the target group as in general not interested and 
with lack of knowledge about government services (CAO, RDC). However, most local actors note the 
problem of inability to implement co funding projects and related to that, the lack of will among citizens 
to pay taxes (e.g. Mukuju Councillors & Councillor of Works).  
Tendencies in both districts could indicate societal disengagement in that citizens evade state interventions e.g. 
by avoiding paying taxes and contributing in co-funding projects. We shall later see what implications this 
have for UDN intervention. 
 
Monitoring government programmes 
Monitoring the implementation of PEAP takes place on several levels in Bushenyi. Government staff 
emphasize the important distinctions between different kinds of monitoring. There are three different 
types of monitoring: supervision, multi sectoral monitoring, and sector monitoring.  
The supervision is carried out by administrative staff and focuses on the more technical aspects of 
implementation, i.e. construction, materials, etc. The multi sectoral and sectoral monitoring is carried out 
by politicians and administrative staff in teams that visit a selected number of projects on a quarterly basis.  
                                                 
95 The LGDP has a 10% co funding mechanism and is one example of this type of program. 
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The method of these visits is that the team bring check lists of different projects which they need to 
investigate. Adding to this the local government also carry out commissioning, i.e. handing over of 
projects to villages at the end of implementation to secure sustainability (Dep CAO, Bushenyi). At SC 
level monitoring structures are much weaker, as staff is limited to one or two persons + politicians. 
However, in Kakanju SC, monitoring is carried out on a regular basis and is used in the monthly Council 
meetings (Kakanju SC Chief). In health management performance checks through health centre visits and 
reporting requirements have been established to secure implementation (Councillor of Social Service). 
 
The Dep CAO notes that “monitoring is not pronounced in our system” (Dep CAO). The councillors also 
observe that monitoring is not carried out sufficiently (e.g. councillor of works) which indicate that 
monitoring structures are not a priority. However, on the LGDP assessment Bushenyi receives a high 
score in monitoring which demonstrates the relative strength of the existing system in comparison to 
other districts. 
 
We may therefore assume that monitoring sector in Bushenyi overall contributes to improve 
implementation and policies, and following this, that UDN intervention into this sector must be rather 
likely to succeed in obtaining acceptance form politicians since they will not be perceived as a threat, but 
rather as supplementing existing monitor projects. Mechanisms for dissemination of information seem to 
be in place. We shall pursue these perspectives in the analysis of UDN in Bushenyi. 
 
In Tororo, one finds the same monitoring types as described above: supervision, multi sectoral 
monitoring, and sector monitoring. However, when investigating different levels within government it 
appears that there are differences in understanding of and prioritization given to monitoring. 
In Paya sub county monitoring is carried out by technical teams around ten times every year, according to 
sector and project (Paya SC Chief). Adding to this, Paya Councillors are monitoring multi sectorally every 
quarter, but only “if funds are there” (Paya Councillors). They mainly monitor physical indicators of 
construction work. Strangely enough LC3 Paya states that monitoring is carried out on a weekly basis 
(LC3 Paya).  
 In Mukuju, monitoring is much more irregular, as councillors monitor twice a year whereas the technical 
teams carry out monitoring on a quarterly basis (Mukuju Councillors, Mukuju SC Chief) and are obliged to 
report on this at the council. There is no dissemination of monitoring results apart from the internal 
discussions in council and committees. 
 
At district level monitoring is carried out by politicians and administrative staff on the same premises as 
described above, i.e. supervision, multi sectoral. The councillors are supposed to monitor 4 times a year 
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but it varies in the sectors – e.g. because of resource constraints they only monitor once in a while in 
finance department (Councillor of finance) whereas for instance department of works carry out much 
more regular monitoring – twice every month (Councillor of Works). 
 
However, other actors in the local government point at a number of problems in relation to monitoring. 
One issue is the widespread problem of embezzlement of monitoring funds, both among politicians and 
among administrative staff (CAO, LC5). The RDC takes the argument even further: monitoring of 
programmes does not take place: “It (the monitoring, my addition) is amputated by young technical staff, who 
manipulate the figures and share funds with politicians” (RDC, Tororo).  
Thus, according to the opportunities, it seems that admin staff and politicians may be conniving when 
necessary to get access to funds. The CAO explains that monitoring is carried out, but reports are not 
delivered. Another tendency is that politicians only want to monitor the sub counties in which they were 
elected (CAO) and seek to avoid going to other sub counties.  
 
On the other side, the LC5 also argues that administrative staff is holding back monitoring funds and thus 
denying politicians access to carry out monitoring (LC5) – a prime example of the internal conflicts in 
government as well as the conflicting statements given by the various actors.  
According to the Councillor of Finance the 5% PAF monitoring funds are insufficient for carrying out the 
necessary monitoring operations, and this may exacerbate struggle to acquire resources (Councillor of 
Finance). 
Dissemination of monitoring information apparently is not a priority as such since it is mainly understood 
as an internal governance instrument (LC5, CAO). 
 
It has thus been demonstrated that although monitoring in some areas are performing and providing the 
information necessary, the patrimonial practices are threatening the value and use of monitoring efforts. 
This occurs in the forms of personal office employed as a means to access resources as well as in networks 
between admin staff and councillors.   
Therefore, we may doubt the extend that monitoring can effectively improve PEAP implementation in 
Tororo. We may also expect that opportunities for CSOs such as UDN to enter into this extremely 
politicized monitoring sector are fairly limited since they will be perceived as a threat. Most likely, this will 
also diminish the opportunities for PMCs to interact with government regarding monitoring information. 
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Prospects for accountable governance 
From the discussion of the implementation process above we can seek to draw up the main implications 
for accountability and for CSO interventions96. 
The planning process is characterised by de jure accountability and involvement of all stakeholders at the 
different levels. CSOs are invited to take part in budget conferences and provide their input. However, the 
lack of capacity among citizens to participate poses a challenge to effective influencing policies, but this 
problem is also caused by the monetarization of politics.  
 
Financial capacity is weak at the sub county level and there is a risk of accountability failures since financial 
information is not available – this may affect implementation and increase risks of patronage behaviour. 
Downward accountability is seemingly functioning, as service delivery has improved towards citizens in the 
district. The problem of shoddy work in tendering is only to a minor degree affecting implementation 
results. 
 
As regard internal accountability there has only been one case of fraud in the last three years. Information on 
budgets and resource allocations is disseminated at sub county offices and at district headquarters as well 
as in local media, and therefore there seems to be a formally rather genuine persistence of information 
provision to citizens97. In general, although with some exceptions, governance procedures seem to 
conform to existing rules and regulations. Therefore, one may conclude that based on the above the 
accountability of Bushenyi district must be expected to be rather strong (compared to other Ugandan 
districts). It also appears that planning and budgetting procedures allow some space for CSOs to 
participate in planning process. The question now is, how are these opportunities exploited by UDN in 
their intervention? 
 
In Tororo, the accountability of the planning process is not evident as there is a lack of information 
dissemination of plans and budgets. Adding to this, downward accountability could be questioned as there is 
very low participation and involvement of citizens in the development process. On the other hand, the 
formal appointment of a CSO officer in local government and the involvement of CSOs in different 
sector groups may prove an avenue for intervention for UDN. 
 
Financial accountability is threatened by weak capacity at both SC and district levels and by the patronage 
behaviour fuelled by the conflict that affects some of the central institutions and actors in the 
implementation process. Internally, the financial accountability is also threatened by the relative weakness 
                                                 
96 It is emphasized here that the issue of political accountability is discussed in chapter 7. 
97 The CAO explains that this year all tenders and budget allocations have been published in a local, vernacular newspaper. (CAO, 
Bushenyi) 
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of finance department vis-à-vis other departments. However, in recent years some progress has been 
noted as regard auditing and budget control. 
The relative high number of cases involving shoddy work indicates that service delivery in some cases is 
jeopardized by personalized objectives of politicians in a struggle for resources, and thus constitutes 
another potential accountability and implementation failure. 
 
There are thus numerous challenges from actions guided by the patrimonial accountability mode to 
accountability in Tororo. The formalization of CSO involvement in the planning process can provide a 
window of opportunity for UDN involvement, but at the same time UDN intervention towards 
accountability may cause fundamental disagreements as the interests of local elites are challenged. These 
particular dynamics must be taken into consideration when we look at UDN intervention. 
 
6.5 Summary 
We have now completed the analysis of the PEAP implementation process in Tororo and Bushenyi. We 
have demonstrated that Bushenyi seem to have relatively successful in implementation in terms of 
securing accountability98. The capacity of local government staff and the relative good relationship 
between administrators and politicians provide the basic foundations for effective implementation of the 
PEAP in Bushenyi. There are no clear organizational conflicts in the local government and with others, 
and these characteristics diminish the risk of accountability failures in the district. The financial basis of 
the district is relatively strong and salaries are most often released in due time. The statement from local 
government staff together with the reports from different inspecting agencies and articles leads us to 
conclude that implementation has been relatively successful in Bushenyi. As such the strong institutions, 
the relative high capacity, and the financial stability are crucial factors that provide Bushenyi with 
significant autonomy and capacity to successfully implement PEAP with fewer accountability challenges. 
 
In Bushenyi it appears that modern modes of governance dominate smaller retractions to patrimonial 
mode of governance. There is a general conformity to and justification of rules according to the 
governance mode paradigm, and presumably no expressions of discontent, thereby providing the 
foundation for legitimacy. The engagement of government institutions pervades political mobilization as 
there are only rather weak non-state, organized, local actors in the district. Political space is open in so far 
as it is based on invitations and formal structures and thus controlled. 
 
On the other hand, implementation in Tororo has been subject to a number of failures and has revealed 
significant accountability problems as limited autonomy and capacity. The main reasons for this are the 
                                                 
98 Please refer table 6.2 below. 
 
 
Chapter 6 - The PEAP implementation process: Bushenyi and Tororo 
 88
rather weak institutions hampered by internal conflicts and lack of capacity, financial constraints, and 
undue political interference. 
  
In Tororo a blurred image of governance appears in which patrimonial modes of governance co-exist with 
and even dominate governance modes. Government institutions and leaders are not able to dominate all 
mobilization in the district as seen e.g. in the number of conflicts at different levels. Political space is 
tending to be closed as political and bureaucratic elites pursue their interests, but at the same time the state 
disengagement impedes control of all spaces, e.g. non-state political actors have a formal place in sector 
planning institutions, and on the lower level several small organizations are operating. 
 
Table 6.2: The Implementation Process in the case districts99 
 Bushenyi Local Government Tororo Local Government 
Capacity Relatively strong Relatively weak 
Resources Due releases from center, relative 
high local revenue 
Penalized by centre because of low 
performance, late releases, low local 
revenue  
Organizational relations Coherence and cooperation 
(tendency to NRM hegemony) 
Internal conflicts in organization – 
struggle for resources 
Planning Accountability Participatory, accountable planning 
in most levels, challenge is capacity 
among constituencies 
Planning at districts level, only to 
less degree at lower levels 
Implementation 
Accountability 
Efficiency, but challenges from 
shoddy work 
Interference in Tender Board, street 
level bureaucrats, shoddy work 
Monitoring 
Accountability 
Monitoring implemented, 
dissemination of information 
Monitoring hampered, limited 
dissemination of information 
 
From this conclusion, combined with our framework of understanding civil society and state interaction, 
we may develop the following hypothesis regarding UDN intervention in the districts: 
UDN is more likely to succeed with intervention in high performing district with fewer accountability problems (Bushenyi) 
than in low performing districts with widespread accountability failures (Tororo). 
 
This hypothesis builds on our assumptions developed in chapter 3, in which it was stated that “the 
capacity, political stability and low number of conflicts produce a conducive environment for UDN 
interventions whereas the opposite structures in lower performing districts may pose a barrier for UDN 
interventions”. The hypothesis rests on the assumption of the governance mode that accountability, 
transparency and political space provide opportunities for CSOs to affect governance.  
 
The hypothesis is furthermore supported by the assumption that local government actors in good 
performing districts will have less inclination to seek to block CSO interventions in accountability and 
                                                 
99 The table gives a simplified and “pure” picture of the differences in the two districts for the sake of the argument. 
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planning than local governments in poorly performing districts since they will not have anything to fear in 
terms of accountability and legitimacy. On the contrary, local governments and other elites in poorly 
performing districts could be assumed to seek to restrain CSOs in raising questions that may threaten their 
hegemony. 
In the following chapter we shall bring forth this hypothesis and investigate the intervention of UDN in 
Bushenyi and Tororo. 
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Chapter 7 - The Role of UDN in implementation: Watch-dog or client? 
This chapter investigates the interventions of UDN in local governance in the two case districts. First, the 
organizational structure of the UDN PMC groups in Bushenyi and Tororo and their organizational setting 
is briefly introduced. Following this, the analysis outlines the experiences of the UDN PMCs in the two 
districts in terms of their activities with BAI and CBMES and their relations with the local government. 
The analysis in particular look at three arenas of interaction in the implementation process: planning & 
budgetting, monitoring and district dialogues. Throughout the analysis our two modes of governance are 
employed to account for the developments and outcomes of UDN interventions in the districts (please 
refer figure 7.1. below) 
 
Figure 7.1 The focus of analysis in chapter 7  
 
 
7.1 UDN organizational structure and working procedures in Bushenyi and Tororo 
This section introduces the organizational structure of UDN in the Bushenyi and Tororo100. 
In Bushenyi the PMC was established in 2000 when UDN took the initiative to set up a PMC by inviting a 
number of stakeholders from the local level. Some of the attendants at the meeting decided to join and 
formed the PMC at the district level. Since then, the PMC was trained (according to description 
                                                 
100 In each of the districts 2 PMCs at the sub county level and the district PMC were visited and interviewed. At the sub county 
level the PMC is composed of members from the parish PMCs and thus this level was also partly covered. 
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mentioned above) and the group started to scale up monitoring activities at the sub county level such that 
in 2005, 8 out of 27 sub counties have operating PMCs101. 
The PMC operate according the guidelines set up by UDN Kampala (refer chapter 5.7 for details). The 
basic working circle is monitoring, report writing, and dialogue meetings with local government. This 
applies for both district and sub county level. 
 
In Tororo, UDN took contact to a local CSO network organization Tororo Civil Society Network 
(TOCINET) when they first decided to implement the CBMES in Tororo. It was decided that UDN 
would make use of the existing structures set up by TOCINET102 and therefore the responsibility at the 
district level was handed over to TOCINET instead of setting up a completely new PMC district 
structure. TOCINET is thus responsible at the sub county and parish level, the structure resembles the 
one that applies for Bushenyi although the coverage is somewhat higher (8 out 24 sub counties). 
 
It is important to note the difference in the staffing of the leadership in the two districts. The small, 
voluntary-based network in Bushenyi (with no official office, but borrowing from another CSO) appear to 
be weaker in capacity compared to the professionalized CSO Tocinet in Tororo in which a two full-time 
staff are employed and have an office base(however, they are not exclusively working on the monitoring 
project). The wider range of activities of Tocinet and the larger number of donors also gives Tocinet an 
edge in terms of autonomy compared with the PMC in Bushenyi. 
 
The PMC group at the district level (in both is organized with a chairman, a secretary, a treasurer, and a 
public information officer. On the sub county level the same structure applies. Among the leading 
members of the PMCs one find the common feature that they possess several roles at the same time. In 
Bushenyi two of the PMC District members are also councillors in the District Council. This double role 
is an example of the blurred boundaries between civil society and state which makes it much more 
complicated to delimit the spheres of civil society in the local context, and thus confirm our assumption 
from the patrimonial framework that civil society may penetrate state institutions and vice versa103.  
 
Other PMC District members were working in several different CSOs as advisors or volunteers. These 
different profiles demonstrate how a number of strategies are applied on the individual basis – i.e. the 
                                                 
101 It must be noted that PMCs do not cover all parishes in each sub county, but there are on average 3 out of 4 parishes in the 8 
sub counties (the same applies for Tororo). 
102 TOCINET is a network organization with around 180 members, of which most are small CBOs. It was established in 1999, 
and has 5 different programmes of which budget monitoring is one component, but the main priority is human rights education 
and monitoring (Tocinet Chairman). 
103 Another example of the close relationships between civil society and government in local settings was the family relation 
between an officer of Tocinet who was the niece of the social service councillor. 
 
 
Chapter 7 - The Role of UDN in implementation: Watch-dog or client? 
 92
interest in accessing resources, the use of an existing power base, and in some cases even the platform of 
PMC as a catalyst for a political career104. 
On the other hand the multiple roles of CSO members are perceived as a threat among local government 
staff in Bushenyi: “the selection of UDN staff becomes too political” (LC5 Bushenyi). Here multiple roles of 
monitors are seen as an eventual threat to successful implementation – but most likely also as a direct 
threat to the hegemony of the ruling NRM hegemony.  
 
A third interesting element in the selection of members and staff is the measure to include civil servants 
from health centres and schools; members who were found in 3 of the 4 visited PMCs in sub counties.  
As street level bureaucrats these members are in an excellent position to monitor and investigate the 
accountability of eservice delivery, but at the same time one could doubt whether members with a double 
role would be able to monitor themselves critically105. Street level bureaucrats could be expected to have 
mixed interests of maximizing resources to their units while at the same time seeking information and 
improvement of accountability, 
 
7.2. Work of PMCs 
The working procedures in monitoring and reporting vary widely among the PMCs visited. In Mitooma, 
the monitoring period is limited to around 3 weeks per year (Mitooma PMC), but many among the 
monitors emphasize that they see monitoring as an ongoing activity, which takes place on an every day 
basis: “we monitor everywhere we go” (Mitooma PMC). In Paya, the group carries out monthly monitoring 
according to a work plan developed every year (Paya PMC). In principle each person is put in a group and 
the group is given a sector which they have to monitor. The actual monitoring takes 4-6 hours depending 
on the location of the site to be monitored (e.g. Paya PMC)  
 
There is not total agreement among the different monitors about the indicators and the sites of 
monitoring. In Paya, members of the PMC refer to investigation of utilization of funds released compared 
with planned and implemented activities in the sub county, the accountability of purchases of material in 
public institutions, and the accountability in schools (Paya PMC). The different ideas among PMC 
members about which areas and sectors should be the focus and objective of the monitoring process 
could be an indication that the specific points in monitoring and the roles of monitors have not been 
clarified. 
 
The absence of a clear understanding of indicators and eventually the objective of monitoring is reflected 
in the frequent referrals to defilement cases monitored and reported, mostly at schools. This 
                                                 
104 The Bushenyi PMC mentions this and emphasizes the empowerment of the core group members which has enabled them to 
enter politics and other organizations. (Bushenyi PMC Chair). 
105 In this relation there would be no 2nd order accountability, except of course from government staff. 
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understanding reflects a wider complexity in the role of monitors: do they constitute a sort of new police – 
or do they just monitor and report issues on service delivery? What are the boundaries of their mandate 
and what are the indicators they should apply? The understanding of the mandates of the monitors is a 
contested arena among all local actors and an example of society sponsored engagement confronting 
government institutions. 
 
It was revealed that PMCs in several of the sub counties did not compare monitoring results with contract 
information and standards outlined. Instead, monitors see themselves as “checking if something is wrong” (e.g. 
Mukuju PMC). This suggests that the legitimacy of monitoring efforts from UDN could be questioned 
since they do not investigate the implementation sites on the basis of the rules and agreements and 
specifications outlined in policies and contracts, but rather on the basis of overall criteria. The PMC 
Bushenyi describes the working process and objectives in this way: “What we normally do is that communities 
see something is wrong, and they point it out, together with us, and then it is normally rectified” (PMC Bushenyi). 
 
In Mitooma the PMC explains that they “…just look at physical appearance, they do not have access to contracts to 
compare”. (Mitooma PMC). However, the group also emphasizes that their acquire project documents 
which they use when investigating implementation sites (Mitooma PMC). 
In Kakanju the group explain that reporting is only done orally at LC1 and LC2 level, i.e. only at SC and 
district level a written report is made. This could be an important threat to the legitimacy of the 
monitoring results, as they become much more difficult to check. 
 
Overall Accountability problems 
The work and experiences of the monitoring groups provide a somewhat different picture of the 
accountability of the implementation of PEAP in Bushenyi and Tororo. According to observations and 
assessments of PMCs implementation of PEAP is constrained by a number of patronage practices in local 
government. 
 
There are regular reports of demands for extra payments and bribe fees at local health centres in which 
street level bureaucrats seek to maximize their resource access and improve their salary situation (e.g. 
Kakanju PMC & Mukuju PMC). In schools there are reports that teachers exploit opportunities in the 
guidelines of UPE funds to enrich themselves directly and refuse to give account of the funds (Mitooma 
SC, Mitooma PMC).  
A related problem is the tendency to exaggerate figures of pupils and patients in schools and hospitals 
with the aim of increasing transfer if funds from the district (Tororo PMC). These problems vary in 
prevalence, but fundamentally distort service delivery and constitute a bias vis-à-vis the poorest in the 
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communities. They also bear evidence of the importance of street level bureaucrats in implementation of 
policies.  
 
One of the most important threats to successful implementation is the tendering and contracting 
processes. This problem contains two related elements: the lack of transparency in tendering process and 
the lack of quality in the actual construction work of contractors. The lack of transparency in tendering 
process has caused that there is heavy suspicion and some argue even evidence that tenders are awarded to 
politicians who use other names or relatives as companies.  
This applies particularly in Tororo. The problem has repercussions at the implementation level where 
companies construct shoddy work – for instance by using poor materials to lower their expenses, or by 
speeding up construction work. Another strategy employed to generate income is to overprice tenders in 
comparison to their real costs (Mitooma PMC, Kakanju PMC, and Tororo PMC). 
 
These accountability failures occur more frequently in Tororo than in Bushenyi as reflected in the field 
work as well as in a number of reports on the two districts (LGDP Assessment Report 2004: Tororo, 
Brock 2004). 
A general peculiar feature observed is that the PMC members assess the degree of accountability failures 
according to the amounts involved, and not according to the fundamental principles. This is an example 
that accountability is operationalized according to different norms than the principles outlined in the 
governance framework106.  
A number of accountability failures at different levels were mentioned in regard to shoddy work and bias 
in service delivery, but overall the assessment that implementation has been more successful in Bushenyi 
than in Tororo was confirmed. Therefore, we our hypothesis has been justified in this case. 
 
7.3 Planning and budgeting 
Considering that monitoring demands knowledge on planning and budgets in the districts and that the 
BAI initiative is closely linked to the CBMES in the work of UDN, one would expect that correspondence 
has been made between budget participation and monitoring. The analysis in chapter 6 also demonstrated 
that there are some opportunities for involvement for CSOs. The meetings potentially is one important 
arena of interaction between UDN (here PMC members) and local government. 
 
The statements from PMC members in both districts, however, demonstrate that the problems on 
bottom-up planning and citizen involvement are more dominating. Statements indicate that incentives for 
participating in planning processes are severely limited as resources at the village and parish level are 
                                                 
106 Another example of this: Corruption is assessed to be a larger problem at the sub county level than in the district 
(Mitooma SC), and at LC1 the problem is less severe simply because there are not many funds available. 
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constrained because of low local revenue (e.g. Kakanju PMC: “...the money 25% at village level is simply too 
small”). 
In Mitooma, Mukuju and Paya there is no involvement in budget planning processes at LC1 and LC2 
levels. In Mitooma all informants indicate that LC1 chairman interferes in budget planning, and even if 
they do join planning “…the money is too little and is mostly eaten by LC1 chairmen and their relatives” (Mitooma 
PMC).  
 
In two sub counties PMC groups also emphasize that most people at the grassroots level are simply not 
aware of the resources available at LC1 and LC2 level. In Paya the PMCs claim that local leaders avoid 
informing the communities when they have received the 25% funds. These barriers in planning process in 
this way causes societal disengagement in that citizens simply denounce the planning process and deliberately 
stay out – mainly due to the prevalence of patronage governance modes; here clientelism and public office 
as a mean to access public funds. 
 
Even when planning and assessment meetings are called for there is a tendency that only few people 
attend, and therefore there is a high risk that programmes and initiatives that are implemented are not 
directly the priority at the community level107. In Mukuju the PMCs explained that they are never invited 
for budget or planning meetings, and that there are no indications on when these meeting take place 
(Mukuju PMC). 
 
Another recurrent feature is the perception among the PMC members that they only join planning 
meetings if they receive an official invitation letter (PMC Kakanju, PMC Paya, PMC Mitooma). This 
applies in particular for meetings at the sub county level. The political space for participating in meetings 
is not a window of opportunity unless official accept is given and invitation is received, and the political 
space is subject to control by a political elite. 
At the planning and budgeting stage the 25% funds are subject to a high risk of capture from LC1 
chairmen because of the weak mechanisms for accountability at that level (e.g. Kakanju PMC, Tororo 
PMC). Secondly, there is only limited vertical accountability because of the weak opportunities for 
participation. 
 
The limited opportunities, incentives and capacity for UDN i.e. PMC involvement in budget and planning 
processes from the PMCs at the sub county level is confirmed by PMC leaders in the two districts. “Bottom 
                                                 
107 An example of this from Kakanju PMC members who found a problem about a local spring, but when they 
requested further information on this from villagers no one knew about the spring (Kakanju PMC Members). 
Mukuju PMC members claim, that government programs are imposed (Mukuju PMC): “extension workers do not want to 
involve communities in work, we do not decide on projects in PMA for instance ourselves, they are imposed on us”. 
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up planning is not real. There are supposed to be meetings at all three levels [from LC1-LC3, my addition], but meetings 
are irregular” (PMC Bushenyi). She further adds that “...budget advocacy is a little bit advanced for us as we need 
knowledge on technical issues” (Bushenyi PMC), thus indicating that connecting budget and monitoring in 
UDN activities is a huge challenge because of limited capacity among PMC members. 
 
In Tororo, a partly parallel problem appears when the budget process is also assessed as being too difficult 
and technical for members to join. However, the chairman of Tocinet adds that “…government officers keep 
the process closed, and CSOs are only invited to budget conference when it is too late” [i.e. when decisions have already 
been made] (Tocinet, Chairman). This again indicate the tendency that budget conferences and meetings 
at local government are mainly invited, controlled political spaces in which there is only rather limited 
room for manoeuvre for outside actors to suggest changes or alternatives. On the other hand, the formal 
mechanisms for CSO involvement (in sectors) in budgetting provide a window of opportunity, which 
however is not exploited by the PMCs. 
 
However, interviews also show that the priority and focus on most of the UDN training activities was on 
monitoring and less on planning and budget processes. One PMC even argued that they had never been 
informed about the importance of knowing government budgets in order to carry out monitoring 
(Kakanju PMC). 
 
It appears that at sub county level in Bushenyi there are some opportunities for the PMCs to participate 
due to the regular budget conferences held, whereas the weak structures of especially Mukuju SC in 
Tororo blocks the opportunities for PMCs to participate. The PMCs themselves, however, also noted that 
they did always prioritise the meetings because of other urgent matters. 
  
Following the above we may conclude that the PMCs have only to a limited degree managed to participate 
in budget and planning meetings at district and local government level. Furthermore, we have observed 
that there is a disconnection of perceptions of planning processes in which government stakeholders 
overall outline a bottom-up, participatory process, whereas PMCs with reference to their experience draw 
a rather different picture of a top-down, intransparent, an in some cases unaccountable planning process, 
in particular at LC2 and LC3 levels.  
 
We have thus demonstrated how the two frameworks, patrimonial and governance, are referred to as 
incentives and explanations for actions and opportunities in the planning process. Adding to this, we have 
revealed that PMC members are only to a very limited degree involved in planning and budgeting, both as 
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a result of existing barriers and because of their reluctance to join these meetings108. This may directly 
influence their ability to provide any meaningful monitoring since they will not be aware of the details of 
the programmes they are monitoring. 
Finally, we may return to our assumption from chapter 6 regarding the opportunities for successful 
interventions in the districts, and we may conclude that evidence regarding planning & budgetting does 
not confirm the assumption. In Tororo, the formal structures for CSO to participate in sector planning 
and the CSO officer actually provide formally better mechanisms for involvement than in Bushenyi. 
However, at the sub county level opportunities for UDN to interfere are better in Bushenyi than in 
Tororo. 
 
7.4 Monitoring as interaction 
The ongoing monitoring activities forms another important arena of interaction between UDN (here 
PMC members) and local government staff and politicians. In the process of conducting monitoring 
activities PMC members directly confront and meet with local government staff and public employees. 
The interaction between PMC members and local government staff in the monitoring process reflects a 
number of challenges in the state-CS interaction in terms of accountability and legitimacy. The 
intervention in monitoring reflects an autonomous political space where monitors directly engage with 
local government staff and street level bureaucrats operating in existing spaces. 
 
The entrance of a new player in local governance, a new agent of accountability-seeking, basically affects 
local government staff in three ways which can be overlapping:  
a) They apprehend the new player as a threat to their positions and in their practices 
b) They apprehend the new player as an illegitimate and insignificant player that does not have the right or 
the capacity to contribute to improved governance 
c) They apprehend the new player as a legitimate partner which can contribute to improved accountability 
 
There are indications in both districts that the monitoring work of UDN is seen as a contribution to 
existing efforts to promote government accountability (c).  
 
The executive leaders in local governments in both districts, despite the statements above, are in general 
positive in their statements on the intervention of UDN, and they hope that it may contribute to 
improving accountability in the districts (e.g. LC5, Bushenyi, Lc5 Tororo, and CAO Tororo). It is also 
evident that in some of the sub counties the monitoring efforts had an effect on diminishing patronage 
mode of governance – i.e. UPE funds at schools have been properly used and implemented (Mitooma 
                                                 
108 One informant explained that UDN when introducing the programme never emphasized this part of the programme, but 
focused on monitoring (PMC, Paya). 
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PMC), LC1s in Mukuju and Mitooma are now giving account of the consumption of the 25% funds, and 
even at the district level Tocinet has assisted in resolving internal conflicts among LG staff (Tocinet 
Chairman, LC5).  
 
At sub county level administrative leaders while doubting the sustainability of UDN efforts (because of 
limited funds) also hail the interventions of UDN (e.g. Mitooma SC Chief, Paya SC Chief). Apparently, 
some PMCs also assess that government staff are benevolent towards the overall objective of monitoring 
efforts. In Mukuju, the idea that UDN intervention will challenge patronage mode of governance is 
displayed in the explanation that network bias in resource allocation has been broken in the sub county 
(Mukuju PMC). 
 
However, according to the statements from PMCs the reactions from local government staff resemble a) 
and b) as described above – in particular in the first period of PMC work in districts and sub counties. 
Thus, monitors in the encounter with government staff have met a number of challenges potentially 
diminishing the effect and legitimacy of their work. 
 
In accountability relations access to information is a resource of crucial importance since the obligation to 
provide information is the first important requirement for accountability (refer chapter 4 above). This in 
particular applies in the arena of monitoring in which the monitors’ access to information about projects, 
budgets and government programs could be assumed to be crucial to their success in producing precise 
and useful monitoring reports.  
 
However, it appears that there are some constraints to the access to information in both districts. On the 
one hand, there are few cases, especially at the district level, in which monitors visit district HQ to acquire 
information. In Bushenyi the PMC chair explains that it is not her responsibility to request for budget 
information, it is the responsibility of with all monitors, but she also explains that PMCs only rarely visit 
the district to get information (Bushenyi PMC Chair). A parallel behaviour is observed in Tororo: “the 
interaction between monitors and government is low – we only come if we receive information”. 
 
An important obstacle in reaction to accountability demands is restricting access to information on 
programmes and budgets in the areas by refusing to share information, avoiding meeting with monitors, 
or even harassing them so that they will stay away. This is evident both in monitoring street level 
bureaucrats such as teachers and health centre staff (e.g. Mukuju PMC, Paya PMC) and with technical and 
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administrative staff in sub counties and districts109. One of the most important issues is the questioning of 
their legitimacy and mandate to demand information at the implementation site. This becomes a struggle 
of legitimacy and authority which many monitors consider can only be solved if they carry ID cards which 
demonstrate their organizational belonging.  
 
In some cases local government staff even reacts on the monitors aggressively, by threatening of 
repercussions if they try to enquire about more information. At the same time it seems as if some among 
the local government staff are simply not seeing the group as a threat: “people don’t take us seriously, but give us 
information because not many consequences they think” (Mitooma PMC).110 
 
In Tororo, one way of going beyond the problem of accessing information has been to create an informal 
alliance with the LC5 and thereby taking advantage of the existing conflict between actors in local 
government. The relationship with LC5 in contrast to the councillors is seen as an alliance because the 
LC5 is willing to fight corruption harshly. This causes other councillors to judge Tocinet very negatively 
since their interests are directly challenged (Tocinet Chairman). Tocinet in this way again transcends the 
traditional boundary between state and CSOs in their ambition to affect governance. But their alliance also 
has costs: since initiating the direct contact with LC5 the organization has experienced telephone 
intimidation (Tocinet Chairman). 
 
Tender boards and tendering process are reported to be one of the major threats to accountability in the 
districts. The tender board is a rather closed arena which PMCs do not have access to. This also applies to 
the contract information and the agreements according to the PMCs. When tenders are awarded PMCs 
almost never gain access to crucial information on prices, materials, etc. and therefore when monitors 
interact with contractors at the implementation site the outcome is often futile (e.g. Mukuju PMC, 
Mitooma PMC). 
 
Another block to the monitoring of the PMCs is the use of technical language by administrative staff 
which exhibit the limits of capacity of the groups, but also demonstrates that language, rules, and norms 
within the public realm poses a barrier to PMC monitoring and a viable strategy for local government staff 
                                                 
109 In Mukuju some teachers directly refuse to share information (Mukuju PMC), and in Paya hospital staff sometimes stay away 
from appointments. In Tororo the SC Chief in Osukuru retain information from monitors on budgets and projects according to 
the monitors (Tororo District PMC). 
110 The opportunities for access to information for CSO may improve with the passing of the Public Information Act which is in 
preparation. However, it seems that there are still substantial opposition in Parliament to increase the powers of accountability 
institutions and related laws – a recent example of this is the decision to curb investigation authority of the IGG, the key 
institution in Uganda for securing horizontal accountability.  
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to avoid the questioning from monitors111. In line with this some staff uses argument from acts and 
guidelines to question the legitimacy of monitors.  
In other situations government staff do not show up to a meeting has been arranged or even refuse to 
meet them. At implementation level civil servants (“street level bureaucrats”) occasionally refuse to 
provide information and monitors accuse them for covering illegitimate patronage interests (Mukuju, 
Mitooma PMC). 
 
Related to this divide in rules and norms is the reaction among some local government staff to question 
the legitimacy of PMC monitors as such. One civil servant in Bushenyi describes an aspect of this: “UDN 
can do monitoring, but they cannot do supervision. They do not have the technical know how to decide if building structures 
are shoddy work. How can they use indicators?” (Dep CAO, Bushenyi).  
 
This argument focuses on the technical and capacity constraints of PMCs, which is seen to limit their 
legitimacy and the outcome of their monitoring efforts. Arguably, all members of PMC are not capable of 
reading and understanding projects documents and budgets, and the ability to analyze these documents 
could also be questioned. By pointing at this weakness among some of the members and generalizing it to 
the entire organization, the government officials are able question the demands for accountability from 
PMCs in their reports and in meetings, since these demands do not draw on the correct, legitimate pools 
of knowledge and information. 
 
Another aspect of this struggle for legitimacy appears in the statements in which the monitors are 
apprehended as a self-established accountability regime which operate as “witch-hunters”112 (e.g. Paya 
PMC, Mukuju PMC, but also Dep CAO Bushenyi, Councillor of Finance, Tororo). 
The advent of a new player in monitoring imposes new demands on existing institutions, and introduces 
new, direct relationships of accountability by posing questions to local government staff. However, due to 
the limited experience and unequal pool of knowledge between the actors, the PMCs are operating on the 
edge of a knife risking to be blamed of a promoter of mob justice rather than genuine accountability. 
 
One officer in Bushenyi even goes as far as questioning the foundation of the reports produced by the 
PMCs: “You find them working on speculation – they should come in my office and bring me questions and enquiries 
directly, not wait for the dialogue. And they should ask for information here so that they don’t build reports on speculation”. 
In this way two set of strategies are applied in de-legitimizing the monitoring work of UDN: by making 
reference to the lack of proper data applied in the monitoring the outcome produced in monitoring 
                                                 
111 E.g. Mukuju: “Technical staff uses technical language to avoid answering our enquiries” (Mukuju PMC). 
112 This word was used by several of the local government staff and the PMCs also explained that some among LG staff thought 
of monitors using this phrase. 
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becomes devaluated113. Secondly, the officer shows his preference for a closed, and controllable debate in 
the office (in which the monitors apparently have unlimited access to information) instead of the open 
forum at the district dialogue.  
These strategies reflect the continuous state engagement in Bushenyi; here specifically, the co-optation of civil 
society in the state. Local government “appeases” the conflicting potential in monitoring by co-optating 
the CSO – here UDN, and connecting it directly to the CAOs office.  
 
Another aspect of the legitimacy of monitoring work that is being questioned is the presentation of 
monitoring results. As the majority of reports focus on problems and gaps in service delivery and direct 
accountability failures some government staff claim that they draw a wrong picture of the situation in the 
districts, and this becomes a direct threat to politicians in the districts since they would need a more 
balanced presentation, which will be more realistic (e.g. LC5, Bushenyi). 
 
Legitimacy of the PMCs and of UDN activities in general may also be questioned in terms of procedures. 
Staff in both districts consider the direct presentation of accountability failures to resemble accusations 
and in this the PMCs and UDN must have 100% evidence in order to maintain their legitimacy. As this 
has not been the case in a number of situations, the organizations risk that hey authority to monitor is 
easily questioned. (E.g. Dep CAO, Bushenyi). 
 
As outlined above (in chapter 6) local government is carrying out its own supervision and monitoring of 
programmes. From the interviews with PMCs, however, it was evident that the monitoring procedures 
and mechanisms of the local government are not well known among the PMC members. Most of the 
members are not aware that government is carrying out monitoring, and therefore also not aware of the 
5% earmarking of PAF funds for monitoring (e.g. Mitooma PMC).  
This also means that there is no exchange of information between local government monitoring and PMC 
monitoring, which could otherwise streamline the monitoring, but also risk compromising the legitimacy 
and autonomy of UDN and the PMCs as independent organizations. However, not even considering 
closer collaboration between the two information systems seem to be a result of lack of knowledge rather 
than a conscious strategy. 
 
Secondly, it must be emphasized that the PMC members only rarely encounter the monitors of the 
government, in particular at the sub county level. In Paya, the councillors are not seen very often, and 
neither is the district staff that is otherwise responsible for monitoring. Another common experience 
among the PMCs is that councillors often travel to monitor their “own” sub counties and thus meet their 
constituencies. This is an indication of a disconnection between government monitoring as described 
                                                 
113 This argument is flawed by the problem that monitors in many cases gain access to information as described above! 
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earlier and government monitoring as seen on the ground, and, adding to this, an example of patronage 
governance forms in the tendency to guard and preserve their personal interests, irrespective of their 
formal mandate. 
 
In summarizing, we may conclude that the PMCs in their effort to create an autonomous political space, 
the monitoring arena, face a number of challenges. The sine qua non of monitoring is acquiring 
information to be able to conduct useful monitoring, but there is a tendency that access to information is 
rather limited. Furthermore, the interaction between PMC members and local government staff provokes 
a battle for legitimacy since monitors step on new ground where government staff and councillors 
normally exercise hegemony.  
 
However, the PMCs instead of the confrontational approach also opt for creating an alliance with key 
government figures (in Tororo) and in this way exploit existing fractures within local government. In 
Bushenyi, the NRM hegemony does not provide for an opening of the monitoring arena as such, and the 
tendency to state engagement in Bushenyi could in the long run provide an “appeasement” of the activities of 
UDN (co-optation). However, the formal access to information and existence of a transparency culture in 
Tororo leads us to conclude that our assumption is valid in regard to the monitoring arena. 
 
7.5 The Dialogue Meetings & the radio broadcast  
The district and sub county dialogues form another important arena of interaction between monitoring 
groups and local government staff. During the dialogue meetings the findings of the monitoring groups 
are presented and the involved officers as well as administrative leaders and officers have an opportunity 
to respond. Therefore, the dialogue sessions could provide us with important indicators for the 
relationship between PMCs and local government as they essentially represent a condensed form of CSO-
state interaction. 
 
The dialogues take place in the district or sub county buildings. It seems to vary a lot which persons 
among the staff actually attend the meeting, but most often the leadership of the district and the sub 
county attends. The district dialogues are prioritized as the most important meetings and they are also 
sometimes joined by UDN Kampala staff. Dialogue meetings thus form an autonomous political space 
initiated and arranged by UDN and the PMCs. Most often the meetings take place in local government 
buildings. 
At the dialogue meetings the secretary of the PMC reads aloud a report of all the findings and complaints 
collected during the monitoring period by the PMC. Following this, the involved civil servants have an 
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opportunity to respond to enquiries and reports, and eventually the local government leadership make a 
decision in case there is a need to follow up any issues114. 
 
According to some monitors the direct opportunity to approach civil servants (if they do appear – some 
monitors mention that many involved servants stay away deliberately115) provides a window of 
opportunity to affect the behaviour of the same civil servants and thus eventually and opportunity to 
improve accountability (e.g. Mitooma PMC). Some monitors actually assess that dialogue meetings result 
in increased respect for the monitoring work afterwards since the meeting demonstrate the disciplining 
effect of monitor reporting in open forums (Mitooma PMC), and there are several examples that due 
action has been taken following the reporting of monitor groups at dialogue meetings (e.g. Tocinet 
chairman, Tororo PMC, Bushenyi PMC chairman)  
 
The dialogue meetings, however, also contain potential conflict dynamics. The direct confrontation and 
personal, but public enquiries made towards specific civil servants carry the risk of escalating into severe 
conflicts. This is for instance what happened in Tororo. The last district dialogue held “went off track” 
according to the Tocinet Chairman: “expectations from monitors were not met, and they were compromised by civil 
servants. This resulted in a stand-off situation and eventually brought the dialogue to halt”.  
 
The dialogue in Paya was a very rough session because the exposure of government staff led to aggression 
and contempt for what is understood as unjustified accusations (Paya PMC). These outcomes of 
interactions demonstrate some of the problems that may occur when citizens transgress the existing, 
official boundaries of the state by questioning the accountability of local government institutions. The 
dialogues thus represent an example of society-sponsored engagement in direct interaction with 
government authorities, but still basing their authority on existing laws and regularities (e.g. Local 
Government Act, the Constitution of Uganda). 
 
Conflicts or disagreements also arise in cases when the PMCs seek to use their information strategically as 
part of the dialogues. This happens in cases when PMCs do not share the report with local government 
staff before the dialogue meetings which causes several among civil servants to complain that they do not 
have a chance to prepare responses to the reports (e.g. Paya SC).  By using this strategy (which apparently 
is not deliberate, but caused by communication problems) the confrontational approach of the monitoring 
is emphasized and the effect of monitoring reports enhanced. In the longer term, however, it does not 
                                                 
114 This basic framework is cited by all stakeholders and observed at both dialogue meetings assessed on video. 
115 This problem has been reported in several places, e.g. Mitooma SC. 
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seem to be a viable strategy since conflicts jeopardize legitimacy of UDN and PMCs, and the monitoring 
activity demands constant cooperation with government stakeholders116. 
 
Another threat to UDN legitimacy in the districts is the lack of coherence and quality in some of the 
reports (CAO Bushenyi). Some of the enquiries and complaints are simply imprecise and irrelevant and 
based on rather vague indicators. This makes it difficult to assess the validity of the finding sin the reports 
(Engineer), and thus determine the validity of the different reports. 
The PMC in Mitooma complain that dialogues at SC level only to a limited extend has any substantial 
outcome, whereas the PMC in Paya consider the SC to be a much more efficient level for dialogues since 
the involved staff is much closer to the problems. These differences demonstrate that the PMCs in general 
depend on the benevolence and capacity of LG staff to cooperate and undertake real cooperation with 
monitors. 
 
The PMCs in both districts also present and debate issues regarding monitoring another community issues 
in a weekly radio programme on a local channel. This forum provides a second autonomous space for 
PMCs and UDN, and gives an important opportunity for the PMCs to spread the awareness of 
monitoring efforts, but it is also used as a forum for debates and discussion. 
During the two programmes attended two important things were observed. On the one hand, the PMCs 
were eager to bring up the accountability problems of the district and sub counties. On the other hand, 
the fear of going too far was evidently demonstrated in the non-confrontational approach applied in the 
programme: do not mention politics!  
 
The delicate balance between criticizing government and yet being dependent on it in monitoring work is 
an example of the fundamental challenges for CSOs in manoeuvring in the one-party state of Uganda. 
They may question decisions and behaviour of government actors, but eventually they also depend on the 
same actors to make their efforts sustainable, and to gain access to political spaces and resources – in the 
case of the PMCs in particular access to information. And, as outlined above, a related strategy may in 
some cases actually be to create alliances with important persons in government to improve the 
opportunities for impact. 
 
In regard to our working assumption of the former chapter, we may once again conclude that there does 
not seem to be any significant difference between UDN opportunities in district dialogues in Bushenyi 
compared to Tororo. The differences are not systematic, and in fact it can be argued that the success of 
Tocinet in bringing to light other governance problems in the Tororo (e.g. human rights issues) has 
                                                 
116 It should be noted, that conflicts were initially rampant in both district during dialogue meetings, but during the last year the 
number of conflicts have decreased. 
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increased the opportunities for the intervention to obtain results (an argument applied by the DANIDA 
Advisor). 
 
In summarizing, district dialogues as autonomous spaces are the most direct form of interaction between 
UDN/PMCs and local government. As such, they reveal some of the challenges that face UDN in this 
society engagement intervention: the struggle for legitimacy, the risk of conflicts between the two sides, 
the dependency of UDN on local government actors to attend meetings. Government agencies thus 
maintain control, but the very fact that citizens may now directly confront and enquire civil servants form 
a new avenue for intervention. 
 
The impunity problem 
Following the collection of monitoring data the monitoring data is presented. The outcome of monitoring 
eventually stands a test as the debating phase has come to and end after dialogue meetings and discussions 
with government staff. This is the judgement phase during which the persons responsible for accountability 
failures are brought to account for their actions and eventually a decision on the consequences of eventual 
mistakes is made. 
 
According to the statements from PMCs in all sub counties there is a high incidence of impunity in the 
case of accountability failures reported by monitors, i.e. there is a tendency that no action is taken against a 
number of the violations of accountability as observed by the PMCs. there are several examples of this 
problem, ranging from school head masters (e.g. Kakanju) to civil servants, mostly at the sub county level. 
 
Most often PMCs experience that perpetrators are not prosecuted but only transferred from their 
positions to other districts or sub counties. In some cases this even apply to criminal cases (e.g. 
defilement) in which the problem of establishing evidence represents a big hurdle. However, it seems that 
the PMCs are not always aware of the different requirements and principles applying to public employees 
which may make prosecution more complicated. 
 
From an overall perspective, though, the impunity tendency represents a major obstacle to the work of the 
PMCs in the two districts. As described by the PMC in Tororo: “We monitor for 5 months, then there is a 
dialogue, but then after that there is nothing – we are dying after dialogue” (PMC Tororo).  In Paya, the PMC explain 
that it is very difficult for them to get to know about the outcome of the discussions at dialogue meetings 
and to what extent any measures have been taken in case it is necessary.  
 
The lack of follow up and dissemination of what actions have been taken and not seem to constitute a 
substantial threat to the actual outcome of the process and to the sustainability of the PMCs since in the 
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long term they will lose motivation to continue the work. This destabilizing factor is inherent among many 
outsiders who are sceptical about the impact of the PMCs: “people are getting apathetic about the whole process 
because there are no results, and so monitors feel they do not have any influence on decisions. There are no substantial results 
in progress” (Tororo PMC). The apparent hegemony of patronage governance causes some people to give 
up because they experience that corruption is a day-to-day activity that takes place at so many levels (PMC 
Bushenyi). 
 
This has wider implications: experiencing recurrent impunity and lack of follow up after dialogue 
meetings, PMC members may drop expression of content of governance because there is no conformity 
to rules. In that case they see that they might as well indulge in patronage modes of governance to 
optimize their opportunities to reap benefits. Impunity thus poses a threat to the sustainability and success 
of monitoring efforts. 
 
Comparatively, impunity appears to be more widespread in Tororo than in Bushenyi in terms of the 
number of cases where prosecutions were not followed up. A likely explanation is the different alliances 
that shape the governance realm in which protection and mutual accusations form part of the strategies. 
Thereby, our assumption from the former chapter is confirmed in regard to impunity. 
 
 
7.6. Political accountability 
The majority statements from PMCs and even from government staff seem to indicate that political 
elections are influenced of patrimonial interests and behaviour which affect both the decisions of the 
voters and the campaigns of candidates. The PMCs in Kakanju explain that using the vote in the struggle 
to secure accountability is not a relevant strategy: “using the vote is not a very good opportunity because votes are 
being bought” (Kakanju PMC). A similar logic applies among Mitooma PMCs who openly admits how they 
sometimes are offered CASH for supporting one candidate – and opportunistically they may even vote for 
another candidate after receiving funds. 
 
Tororo PMC describes how elections have become commercialized – candidates are elected on ability to 
distribute resources. This behaviour shows that also PMCs fluctuate between the two modes of 
governance in their behaviour – in this case expressing consent to patronage modes of governance and 
thus assigning patronage with legitimacy.  
 
Thus, there does not seem to be a necessary link between accountability seeking through monitoring and 
through elections. The two arenas are in some cases distinct and operate according to different logics: 
patrimonial and governance logic. We may also consider that this distinction is an example of an overall 
 
 
Chapter 7 - The Role of UDN in implementation: Watch-dog or client? 
 107
fatigue with traditional politics in the districts among the PMCs. In depoliticising monitoring activities into 
more technical or clear interaction PMCs consider the opportunities for improving accountability as much 
higher than using the arena of political accountability. 
 
However, as mentioned earlier, in some instances the PMC regard the politicians as their direct allies vis-à-
vis government staff (e.g. Paya PMC). Here, politicians become an ally with whom monitors can access 
information and important contacts (Paya PMC).  
 
Political accountability is formally operating in accordance with provision for elections, but appears to be 
primarily governed by patronage modes of politics in that there is a widespread norm that public resources 
can be extracted after election campaign to cover personal costs. This principle applies among 
constituencies who cast their vote according to direct resource benefits as opposed to their merit and 
qualifications. In Bushenyi politicians are not perceived as an asset in carrying out monitoring work (on 
the contrary, a few government officers are mentioned as the most benevolent). 
Politicians, however, may also become allies of PMCs and provide access to important information and 
decisions as seen in Tororo. 
 
7.6 The internal structures – capacity problems and resource struggle in PMCs 
The structure and background of the PMCs and their relation to UDN raises another important question 
regarding the opportunities and limitations for PMCs to succeed in the organisational objective. 
The PMC members are all voluntary citizens who carry out the monitoring tasks on a regular basis and 
they receive compensation from UDN to cover their costs.  This means on the one hand that a capacity 
gap can easily arise. PMC members mentions this in terms of limited means of communication (OMC 
Bushenyi), there are not funds to implement a sub county dialogue (Mukuju), there is a general lament of 
lack of funds for remuneration, and there is a limited capacity to analyze the data collected during 
monitoring (PMC Tororo).  
 
The field work also demonstrated that the logic of patronage to a large extent also penetrates the 
organizations and in this way a “patrimonialization” of CSO work is also a viable scenario. This was most 
evidently displayed in Tororo where an internal power battle between PMCs and Tocinet had escalated 
causing one PMC to announce that they prefer direct contact with UDN instead of having Tocinet as 
middle man. Fuelled by direct accusations on corrupt behaviour among Tocinet members of the PMC 
aimed at de-legitimizing the Tocinet structure117. The conflict is an example of the underlying principle of 
                                                 
117 The legitimacy of some of the PMC members, however, was also undermined as one member directly cheated the author of 
the thesis on some funds prepaid for copy services. This was an interesting example of the dilemma between operating in an 
organization that promotes accountability while at the same time seeking to fulfill private interests in terms of resource 
generation. 
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battling for resources among CSO members while simultaneously working for the objectives of the 
organization – and in this way they simultaneously draw on governance and patrimonial norms of 
behaviour. 
 
Another aspect of capacity constraints is the risk of dependency from the resource centre – UDN in 
Kampala. The PMCs do not meet with UDN Kampala representatives on a regular basis, and the support 
in terms of staff and courses from the centre is rather limited. 
The scarcity for resources causes members to seek a strategy of optimizing their opportunities within the 
CSO framework. This was also reflected in the statements of several members that they wanted to pursue 
careers and become actual employees in UDN. 
 
As argued earlier, the stronger structure and professionalism of Tocinet may provide better opportunities 
for interventions to succeed than in Bushenyi where the organization is entirely based on volunteers. 
Therefore, our hypothesis from chapter 6 is not confirmed in this regard.  However, the 
professionalization of CSO work entail a flip side: volunteers start to envy the professional wing, and seek 
to obtain more resources by requesting independency, thereby risking that the legitimacy of the 
monitoring work is undermined. 
 
7.7 Summary 
The analysis above has investigated the interventions of UDN in three arenas in the two districts: 
planning, monitoring, and district dialogues. The chapter thereby provided an answer of the second part 
of the research question: “How have UDN interventions in PEAP implementation affected accountability and 
legitimacy of local government and UDN in the case districts, and what were the crucial factors for the outcomes”?  
 
The figure 7.2 below summarizes the findings of the analysis. 
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Figure 7.2: UDN Interventions in local governance arenas 
 
 
Firstly, it was argued that the perspectives of the PMCs on the implementation process in the two districts 
drew a somewhat different and more problematic picture of implementation118.  
A number of accountability failures at different levels were mentioned in regard to shoddy work and bias 
in service delivery, but overall the assessment that implementation has been more successful in Bushenyi 
than in Tororo was confirmed.  
 
The analysis showed that the PMCs in the two districts have not been able to influence the budget and 
planning process at either district or sub county level. At most, their involvement could be seen as symbolic 
participation in invited spaces in which actual influence is constrained by the lack of transparency in the 
allocation of funds, the lack of capacity among PMC members to read and understand a budget and 
development plan, the governance norms that do not promote participation by “outsiders” to 
                                                 
118 The discontinuity between PMCs and government actors suggests that accountability failures constantly challenge the 
implementation of PEAP at different levels as is evident form the examples mentioned above, that accountability failures are 
understood differently at different levels, and that dual patrimonial and governance modes guide the behaviour of actors in the 
process. 
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government. Thus, although the legal framework prescribes avenues for participation in planning and 
budgeting there are several limitations to real participation which impedes UDN and the PMC members 
to influence policies at the local level. The analysis, however, also suggests that the stronger capacity and 
resource stability in Bushenyi enhances opportunities for interventions. 
 
The CBMES initiative, on the other hand, has proved effective in mobilizing small groups of people in 
monitoring teams that monitor government programmes in the two districts, and thus the organizational 
foundation has been consolidated. On an overall level, PMCs through monitoring of government 
programmes have created new arenas for interaction between government and citizens. By directly 
questioning government staff and critically looking after government projects a new seeker of 
accountability has entered the political stage. The monitoring efforts have also led to accountability 
improvements on the local level in both districts. 
The access to information constitutes a crucial part of the monitoring arena. There are serious challenges 
to monitors in this process since their legitimacy as “ordinary” citizens suddenly demanding information is 
questioned. On the other hand, this is also the arena in which monitors could see an actual impact of their 
work. However, the lack of clarity of the indicators and direct objective of monitoring increases the risk of 
losing legitimacy in the eyes of local government staff. 
 
The district dialogue forms another important arena for interaction between monitors and local government 
staff. The dialogue meetings exhibit the accused civil servants and may thus provide an instrument of 
accountability, but if PMCs have not prepared adequately the meetings may backfire and undermine PMC 
legitimacy. Monitors are not directly involved in the last phase when reported accountability failures are 
acted upon and the tendency of impunity as observed by the monitors lead to frustration and sometimes 
lack of commitment to the organization since outcomes are felt to be somewhat meagre. The judgement 
phase of accountability is thus incomplete. 
 
Political accountability is not aligned with the perception of accountability among the monitors since the 
political system in their perception is to a large extent dominated by patronage modes of governance. This 
demonstrates the co-existence of the two modes of governance in the strategies and behaviour of the 
actors and in the political context of the two districts. 
 
The internal structures of PMCs also affect the success of monitoring efforts. In both districts internal 
constraints in the form of limited capacity and monetarization of activities threaten sustainability of the 
initiatives. This tendency may be further exacerbated by internal struggles such as the one registered in 
Tororo which demonstrates the duality of strategies and objectives among all actors, drawing upon the 
logics of governance as well as patronage. 
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Table 7.1 below summarizes the analysis of UDN interventions in the two districts. 
 
Table 7.1.: UDN interventions in arenas in the two districts 
 
Considering our original assumptions that it was more likely that the UDN intervention would succeed in 
Bushenyi than in Tororo the reply becomes more blurred. We may confirm the hypothesis to the extent 
that the capacity of Bushenyi local government staff, political stability, and low number of intra-
organizational conflicts provide better opportunities for UDN and the PMCs to access information and 
implement monitoring activities with less resistance from government staff.  
However, when looking at the actual involvement of the PMCs in Bushenyi, it appears that the low 
capacity and autonomy of the organization along with the limited political support and the contest of 
struggling against the NRM hegemony eventually diminishes opportunities for UDN long-term success in 
Bushenyi. 
 
On the other hand, we may actually reconsider the hypothesis by looking at the case of Tororo. The 
stronger mobilization of CSOs in general and also of PMCs in particular, based on a professional CSO 
structure (Tocinet), and the strategic use of the internal conflicts in local government which enabled 
PMCs to establish an informal alliance with some politicians actually contradicts our assumption. 
Contributing to this conclusion is also the ability of Tocinet to gather continuous support from a range of 
donors as compared to Bushenyi where the PMC fully depends on UDN. 
 
 PMC Bushenyi  PMC Tororo (Tocinet + sub county PMC) 
Planning and 
budgetting 
Limited participation. Limited tradition 
for participation among CSOs. Better 
opportunities at sub county than at 
district level. 
Limited participation. Formal opportunities 
available. Reluctance because of 
patrimonial behaviour. Better opportunities 
at district than at sub county level. 
Monitoring Struggle for legitimacy. Results at the 
lower level, but shoddy work and 
tender board remains a problem. NRM 
hegemony and success may undermine 
sustainability of group.  
Struggle for legitimacy. Results at the lower 
level, but shoddy work and tender board 
remains a grand problem. Alliance with 
leadership to gain access. 
Dialogue 
meetings, 
impunity 
The creation of the autonomous space. 
Civil servant reaction to enquiries main 
result, but impunity is a threat. 
Legitimacy at risk. Better results at 
district level and sub county. 
The creation of the autonomous space.  
Civil servant reaction to enquiries main 
result, but impunity is a threat. Legitimacy 
at risk. 
Political 
accountability 
No link to PMC activities, vote-buying 
well known practice 
No link to UDN activities, vote-buying 
well known practice 
Internal 
structures 
Voluntary based, endangers 
sustainability, resource struggles, 
capacity limitations 
Professionalization increases opportunities, 
potential resource struggle 
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Finally, on the basis of the analysis we may seek to outline the main factors for the outcome of UDN 
interventions. It is difficult to provide a definitive prioritization of the factors affecting the interventions, 
but there is no doubt that the following are extremely important: the capacity, resources, and 
organizational relations in local government while not a determining factor does indeed play a role in 
providing the fundamental structures, the access to information, and the benevolence and will to 
cooperate. Moreover, the analysis has demonstrated the importance of the regime or political context, the 
organizational capacity, the tendency to impunity, and the importance of personal networks in providing 
access to information as other important factors. We have seen how PMCs navigate in struggles for 
legitimacy to become an accepted accountability seeker, but also how there behaviour is affected by 
pressures for governance and by patrimonial interests. Therefore, our analysis has demonstrated relevance 
of applying a dual approach to the case study in order to understand the crucial factors determining UDN 
interventions in the two districts. 
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion and perspectives 
In this section I shall return to the research question and sum up the conclusion of the analyses, discuss 
the wider perspectives of the conclusions of this study, and briefly outline a number of avenues for further 
research. 
 
8.1. Conclusion 
This thesis explores the role of and opportunities for CSOs to participate in governance in the context of 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) by investigating the case of Uganda and the CSO Uganda Debt 
Network (UDN).  
The thesis claims that the consequences of the introduction of PRSPs in developing countries for CSOs 
and their abilities to intervene in governance has generally remained focused on the central level of 
government and in particular the process of formulating policies in PRSPs. It is therefore argued that 
there is a need to investigate the role of CSOs in the implementation of PRSPs. 
 
Taking departure in the assumption that PRSPs may promote an opening of political space and CSO 
influence in politics, the thesis investigates to how UDN can fulfill their stated role as a legitimate actor 
promoting accountability at the district level, and which factors are important in determining the 
opportunities for their interventions. How does UDN intervene in the politics of poverty? 
  
The thesis is constructed around a research question in two parts: The first part of the research problem 
ask how was PEAP implemented and what were the obstacles and opportunities for accountability and 
legitimacy in the case districts, and the second part of the research problem addresses how UDN 
interventions in PEAP implementation in the case districts have affected accountability and legitimacy of 
local government and UDN, and seeks to determine what factors where crucial for the outcomes. 
 
The investigation of these two questions is developed around a comparative case study of the role of 
Uganda Debt Network in the PEAP implementation process in two districts in Uganda. The case study 
involved extensive field work including interviews with UDN members, local government representatives 
in districts, donor representatives, and central government actors, and observation of meetings and 
interactions. 
 
The answer of the first part of the question is divided into several parts. Firstly, it is demonstrated how the 
regime context, the legal provisions and the policy framework of PEAP (in providing formal mechanisms 
for participatory governance) affects the implementation of PEAP and the role of CSOs. In this 
perspective Uganda’s CSOs find themselves operating in difficult circumstances: on the one hand have 
formal access to the policy process at national and local level and avenues for participation as ascribed in 
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legal texts; on the other hand the no-party regime character, the political control exercised through local 
councils and Registration Act, and the dependence of donors limit the opportunities for CSOs to 
participate in the policy process. 
 
Secondly, through the analysis of the implementation process of the PEAP in the two case districts, the 
thesis demonstrated that Bushenyi with relative high capacity and good intra-organizational relations was 
more successful than Tororo where political and ethnic strides along with low capacity resulted in a less 
successful implementation. In both districts we saw how the different local government actors in pursuing 
their interests take recurrence in dual patrimonial and governance norms and behaviour and that their 
behavior potentially lead to accountability failures.  
 
In Bushenyi - although downward accountability is constantly under threat because of the low 
involvement of citizens, and there are indications of parallel prevalence of patrimonial and governance 
structures - the capacity of the staff, intra-organizational efficiency and stable financial capacity make up 
three cardinal factors for accountability in implementation. On the other hand, the low capacity, weak 
financial capacity, and the internal wrangles in Tororo along with the large number of accountability 
failures (such as political interference) make us assume that accountability is severely threatened in 
implementation and that prospects for UDN intervention to succeed are meager. 
 
Building on the result of the analysis in the first part of the research question an assumption regarding the 
likelihood of success was then advanced, arguing that UDN would have better opportunities for 
succeeding in Bushenyi than in Tororo. 
 
The analysis of the second part of the research question investigated how the intervention of UDN takes place in 
three arenas: planning, monitoring, and district dialogue meetings. Each of these arenas forms a distinctive 
political space with particular opportunities for UDN. 
The analysis demonstrated that the risk of elite capture and bias vis-à-vis citizens in the planning 
processes, the low amount of resources at lower governance levels, and the limited capacity to read and 
understand budgets constitute crucial factors that UDN has not been very successful in their effort to 
influence budget decision making at the district level. Therefore, UDN has not managed to make use of 
the link between budgeting and monitoring. 
 
The investigation also demonstrated that the monitoring initiative of UDN has created new arenas for 
interaction between government and citizens. By directly questioning government staff and critically 
looking after government projects a new seeker of accountability has entered the political stage. It is 
difficult to assess whether the monitoring programme has had a significant impact, but at least it has, in 
 
 
Chapter 8 - Conclusion and perspectives 
 115
both districts, resulted in new pressure for accountability. The monitoring efforts have led to 
accountability improvements on the local level. However, the monitoring arena is also characterized by 
continuous struggles of legitimacy. The access to information through monitoring constitutes an 
important arena of accountability in which the struggle for information as a vital resource in monitoring is 
the main dynamic.  
 
The arena of monitoring raises serious challenges to monitors since their legitimacy as “ordinary” citizens, 
suddenly demanding information is questioned by local government staff. Most often, the obligation to 
provide information is not fulfilled. The lack of clarity of the indicators and direct objective of monitoring 
increases the risk of losing legitimacy in the eyes of local government staff. UDN capacity to analyze and 
use information forms a crucial factor for success in this area.  
Overall, the monitoring arena remains a government dominated stage since UDN generated information 
is mostly considered to be inferior. 
 
The district dialogue forms another important arena for interaction between monitors and local government 
staff. They are autonomous spaces initiated and arranged by UDN. The dialogue meetings form the 
debating phase in accountability matters, and as institutionalized forums they provide a direct opportunity 
for UDN to follow up the enquiries. Experience show that dependence on benevolent politicians is still a 
crucial factor for success as local government staff may avoid responding or show up at dialogues. This 
dependence poses a dilemma for UDN between criticizing accountability flaws while staying on good 
terms with the leadership. Strategic alliances such as the one in Tororo provide one solution to this, but it 
may be questioned whether this is durable. 
  
The tendency to impunity may, although it is undermining the legitimacy of the local government, in the 
long pose a serious threat to the work of the PMCs as they are likely to give up. 
  
Political accountability is not aligned with the perception of accountability among the monitors since the 
political system in their perception is to a large extent dominated by patronage modes of governance. This 
demonstrates the co-existence of the two modes of governance in the strategies and behaviour of the 
actors and in the political context of the two districts. 
 
Returning to the assumption regarding the likelihood of UDN intervention to succeed, the analysis 
demonstrates that the governance factors of capacity, resources, and organizational relations make up 
important, but not necessarily determining factors. The intervention outcomes thus do not completely 
follow the assumptions, although PMCs in Bushenyi overall have met less resistance in their work. 
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The low capacity and autonomy of the organization in Bushenyi along with the limited political support 
and the contest of struggling against the NRM hegemony eventually diminishes opportunities for UDN 
long-term success in Bushenyi. In Tororo, stronger mobilization of CSOs in general and also of PMCs in 
particular, based on a professional CSO structure (Tocinet), and the strategic use of the internal conflicts 
in local government which enabled PMCs to establish an informal alliance with some politicians actually 
contradicts our assumption. 
  
Therfore, we need to add to “traditional” governance indicators to be able to explaing the outcomes of 
UDN interventions in the districts. The analysis has demonstrated the importance of the regime or 
political context, the organizational capacity, the tendency to impunity, and the importance of personal 
networks in providing access to information as other important factors. UDn as well as local government 
actors fluctuate in behaviour and statements between the two frameworks of understanding. The 
proposition made at the initial stage that a profound understanding demands a dual theoretical approach 
has thereby been confirmed.  
 
Overall, there seem to be a fundamental disconnection between the descriptions and understandings of 
accountability in the district among the different actors. This disconnection reflects an apparent dual 
existence of governance and patrimonial norms and behaviour at one at the same time. The behaviour and 
the strategies of both some of the local government actors and UDN actors cannot be explained using 
simply one paradigm, for which reason both frameworks serve to explain and understand the cases. 
The thesis thus argue on the basis of the case study that PRSP processes may provide new opportunities 
for CSOs to influence politics at the district level, but that the impact of CSOs interventions to a large 
extent depend on the capacity and benevolence of local governments, as well as the ability to build a 
strong organization that is not overwhelmed by patrimonial relations. 
 
 
Analytical and theoretical perspectives 
The assumption based on the governance framework on the likelihood of UDN intervention to succeed 
was not fully confirmed as demonstrated above. This acknowledgement indicates that one single 
framework cannot explain the interaction between state and society. 
The thesis has demonstrated the inability of one single theory to explain the conditions and opportunities 
for CSOs to succeed in interventions vis-à-vis government institutions. The governance framework in 
itself proves insufficient explaining the behaviour and the outcomes of the interactions between CSOs and 
local government. It has proven necessary to include a number of factors to explain the different aspects 
of CSO interventions.   
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The investigation has furthermore demonstrated the importance of contextualizing any analysis of civil 
society organizations and basing them on empirically observation, since the fuzziness and the ideological 
use of the concept risk pervading any discussion of these organizations. 
 
There is no doubt that the selection of specific cases and methods affect the perspective of analysis in a 
case study. As such, one could argue that the “extreme” cases while providing a rich data material may not 
be directly representative as such for Ugandan districts. Also, the investigation provides a “snapshot” of 
the state of affairs in the districts and does not follow the cycles of for instance monitoring reporting, 
dialogue meetings, and elections. A longer time frame would provide an even more precise picture of the 
behaviour of the actors in interaction and the outcomes of interactions. 
Finally, one may argue that the selection of theories is crucial in the production of case studies, and that 
alternative theoretical approaches, for instance rational choice theories, could provide interesting 
alternative insights – e.g. again on the decisions and behaviour of each actor (please refer section 8.3 
below). 
 
 
8.2. Perspectives 
The conclusions of this thesis raise important new questions regarding the role of CSOs in the context of 
PRSPs. 
The introduction of PRSP potentially enable CSOs to become participants in policy making and sharpen 
their advocacy profile, but the investigation of the implementation process in two districts has 
demonstrated how this political space is challenged and threatened at the implementation level. This leads 
us to criticize the existing preoccupation with PRSP formulation, and to emphasize the importance of the 
implementation phase as a crucial determinant process for the outcome of PRSPs. This applies for the policy 
objectives for the PRSPs as well as for CSO interventions as demonstrated in the thesis. The PRSP 
framework, while mentioning monitoring and feedback mechanisms, could further increase the attention 
to mechanisms for controlling and monitoring the implementation process. 
 
Related to this it seems evident from this study that what be coined the “accountability sector” (internal 
horizontal accountability institutions, control mechanism in policies as well as CSOs carrying out 
monitoring and research) need to be seen as an integrated, coherent part of PRSP processes (and 
implementation) and not as a necessary supplement to fight specific problems: corruption, nepotism, and 
so on. In this respect the recent decision by the Ugandan government to curb some of the investigating 
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powers of the IGG appears to be a step in the wrong direction. Here, specific requirements from donor 
agencies as part of the PRSP framework could provide important regulating mechanisms119. 
 
Thirdly, the thesis also point at the problem of the limitations of CSOs in developing countries. A recurring 
argument against the involvement of CSOs in policy making has been the lack of capacity which impedes 
them to actually influence policies. The PRSP processes have proven a window of opportunity in this 
respect. Specifically in the field of monitoring, however, the demands for knowledge on technical issues, 
laws, and administrative documents form a concrete challenge (e.g. Lucas et al. 2004:17). Therefore, it is 
necessary that CSO monitoring is seen as supplementary monitoring that potentially may increase 
government legitimacy will also raise problematic issues. 
 
The experiment of UDN in monitoring is a new and interesting example of CSO in the role of watch-dog 
of government institutions, an initiative that has been acclaimed in many different forums on the 
development stage (e.g. Lucas et al. 2004). It is also an interesting example of the new accountability 
agenda in which public organizations no longer hold monopoly on accountability seeking. The new role, 
however, entails a number of important challenges, a number of which have been discussed in this thesis. 
In any case, there is no doubt that the development of the poorest countries in the world to a large extend 
also depend on the improvement of public institutions and of accountability – in terms of politics, 
economics, service delivery, and the judiciary.  
 
Without accountability these countries remain illegitimate in the eyes of the outside world and, more 
important, in the eyes of their citizens. Even though the control mechanisms introduced by donors entail 
one type of measurement to increase accountability top-down, there is no doubt that new initiatives, such 
the one introduced by UDN, may prove efficient in increasing accountability bottom-up. If successful, 
citizens may start demanding the services and the resources that they deserve as a right instead of 
depending on personal relationships. However, it is likely that personal relationships maintain crucial 
importance in shaping politics in these countries, and therefore we shall not conceive of the classical 
liberal paradigm of accountability but rather of numerous simultaneously existing accountability regimes. 
 
8.3. Avenues for future research 
This dissertation has aimed at filling a gap in development research on the role of CSOs in the Third 
World. It has provided a number of answers to questions on the role of CSOs, but the analysis also raises 
new questions that could provide avenues for future research on the subject. 
                                                 
119 All stakeholders rely on the functionability of government institutions in developing countries unless the control and audit 
approach applied by some donors is to become the normal procedure. That will not help build capacity of governments in 
developing countries. 
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Firstly, a micro study that includes a baseline, a historical perspective (to observe changes over time) and the 
perspective of citizens could further enhance our knowledge on the impact of the CSO intervention in 
monitoring and planning.  This analysis could provide an account of the sustainability in CSO 
interventions and an understanding of how citizens understand and make use of CSOs. 
 
Secondly, a sector specific approach investigating the roles of CSOs, donors and government agencies within 
specific sectors in the PRSPs could provide us with a more detailed understanding of the differences 
between sectors in PRSPs and how these differences affect the opportunities for CSOs to intervene in 
monitoring and planning. 
 
Finally, a third interesting perspective could be an international comparative analysis looking at the 
experiences of CSO interventions in monitoring and planning in other countries. This could provide 
further understanding of which factors are crucial for CSO interventions to succeed and to enable a 
differentiation of factors that are country specific and what factors that are more general. This knowledge 
could be extremely important for donors and international CSOs in understanding the working conditions 
for national CSOs and in deciding how to engage with the same national CSOs.
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